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WE'RE NO ANGELS: RULEMAKING AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN FLORIDA*
STEPHEN T. MAHER**
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were
to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government
would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no
doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.'
T HESE words were written to emphasize the importance of "main-
taining in practice the necessary partition of power among the sev-
eral departments, as laid down in the Constitution .... -2 Those
partitions have become more difficult to maintain in the modern ad-
ministrative state, where the sight of an administrative agency acting in
executive, legislative, and judicial roles has become commonplace. Our
view of what separation of powers requires may have changed, but the
observation concerning the necessity for "auxiliary precautions" re-
mains true. Today, we look to administrative procedure acts to provide
those precautions and to prescribe the nature of the interaction between
agencies, the courts, and the Legislature.
* Copyright 1990 by Stephen T. Maher. An earlier version of a portion of this Article was
delivered to the Seventh Administrative Law Conference under the title "The Consequences of
Being Different." I express my gratitude to three of my colleagues, Rob Rosen, Alan Swan, and
Terry Anderson, for their many helpful suggestions. Patricia Dore, Robert P. Smith, Jr., Sidney
A. Shapiro, and many others read and commented on earlier drafts. I also thank Scott Boyd and
Jeannette Scully of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee staff for providing me with
much information concerning the legislative history of the Florida Administrative Procedure
Act. The University of Miami School of Law supported my work on this Article with a summer
research grant.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law and Chairman, Sev-
enth Administrative Law Conference sponsored by the Administrative Law Section of The Flor-
ida Bar.
1. Tim FEDERALIST No. 51, at 354-55 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison) (M.W. Dunne ed.
1901).
2. Id. at 353.
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The Florida Administrative Procedure Act (Florida APA or "the
act")3 offers a new approach to the control of administrative govern-
ment, with innovative answers to traditional problems of administrative
procedure. However, its message is likely to be lost. The act is misun-
derstood in its own jurisdiction, its innovations have not been adopted
elsewhere, and its approach is clearly out of step with the prevailing
wisdom in state administrative law, the 1981 Model State Administra-
tive Procedure Act (1981 MSAPA). 4 This occasion, the fifteenth anni-
versary of the Florida APA, is a suitable one for a more careful look at
the promise of the act and the problems that beset it.
Both the language and the legislative history of the act clearly indi-
cate that, in the areas of rulemaking and judicial review, the drafters
and the Legislature intended the Florida APA to depart considerably
from existing law and other models. The principal departures important
to the discussion here' are the Florida act's provisions that 1) guarantee
persons affected by rules "an opportunity to present evidence and argu-
ment" to the agency as part of the rulemaking proceedings, 6 2) estab-
lish a "draw out" procedure under which rulemaking can be suspended
and more formal adjudicative procedures held, 7 and 3) establish limits
on the scope of judicial review in light of the extensive procedural pro-
tection afforded to participants in the rulemaking process.8
Two of the three departures analyzed in this Article are largely ig-
nored by the courts. The courts follow the legislative judgment that the
fairness of the procedure and the quality of the product are enhanced if
agencies hear evidence and argument during rulemaking. However, the
courts reject two other legislative judgments. First, they refuse to fol-
3. FLA. STAT. § 120.50 (1989). The Florida APA was originally enacted by Ch. 74-310,
1974 Fla. Laws 952. It became effective on January 1, 1975. The act has been amended in every
session since it was enacted. I discuss the present form of the act, unless otherwise indicated. For
a good summary of the amendments that have been made to the act, year by year, see Dore,
Overview of the Administrative Procedure Act, in FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 2.1, at
2-5-2-7 (3d ed. 1990). Amendments to the APA are also summarized in the Joint Administrative
Procedure Committee's annual reports.
4. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMnIISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1981, 15 U.L.A. 1 (1990)
[hereinafter 1981 MODEL ACT].
5. Other innovations included in the act have had a significant effect on how rulemaking is
conducted, but they are outside the scope of this Article, which focuses on innovations that
provide opportunities for public input concerning the substance of proposed rules. Other proce-
dural requirements, like the economic impact statement requirement, FLA. STAT. § 120.54(2)
(1989), formal requirements, FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1) (1989), and legislative checks on the process
such as the involvement of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC), FLA. STAT.
§§ 120.54(11), 11.60 (1989), also play an important role in the rulemaking process, but are also
outside the scope of this Article.
6. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (1989).
7. Id. § 120.54(17).
8. Id. § 120.68. Judicial review is discussed here only as it relates to rulemaking.
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low the Florida APA's approach to adjudicatory process during rule-
making. The act guarantees the availability of adjudicatory process
during rulemaking through the draw out mechanism. However, the
courts, however, have marginalized the draw out. Second, the courts
have ignored the limitations in the act on judicial intervention in rule-
making, and they have instead borrowed federal standards, such as the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. The courts have also
continued to use characterizations such as "quasi-legislative" and
"quasi-judicial," in order to retain their discretion and power, even
though the drafters had specifically repudiated the use of such terms.9
In this Article, I argue that the Florida Legislature struck a balance
between contending interests when it adopted the act and that the bal-
ance struck, although unusual, is potentially quite beneficial. 0 After
fifteen years of experience with the act, we are no closer to being able
to actually evaluate the utility of that balance because it has not been
honored in the courts. I suggest that the time has come for the Legisla-
ture to reassert its authority in this area and undertake a reexamination
of the act in light of the concerns I address.
Part I of this Article analyzes and discusses the history, the intended
effects, and the value choices underlying two central rulemaking provi-
sions of the Florida APA: sections 120.54(3) and 120.54(17), Florida
Statutes. These provisions establish the right to present evidence and
argument in rulemaking proceedings and, in some circumstances, the
right to have a more formal adjudicative hearing under the draw out
provision." Part II discusses the statutory provisions intended to govern
and restrict the role of the courts in reviewing the results of administra-
tive rulemaking. Part III analyzes the balance struck between citizen
participation, agency action, and judicial review. Part IV discusses the
principal judicial decisions dealing with rulemaking and judicial review
under the provisions analyzed in Parts I and II. In Part IV, I seek to
demonstrate how the Florida courts have failed to perceive and imple-
ment the new and different approach to rulemaking and judicial review
adopted by the Legislature, and have instead "borrowed" federal law
in a way that has fundamentally altered the Legislature's intended ef-
fect of the Florida APA. Part V discusses the advantages of the Legis-
9. Reporter's Comments on Proposed Administrative Procedure Act for the State of Flor-
ida March 9, 1974, in A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, FLORIDA ADMNISTRATIVE PRACTICE MANUAL
5, at app. C (1990) [hereinafter Reporter's Comments].
10. Because the balance struck is so unusual and may at first appear to be a throwback to
some discredited past, it is important to withhold judgment on the viability of the balance until
the longer explanation that follows is concluded.
11. For a short overview of the rulemaking process in Florida, see Maher, Rulemaking in
Florida: An Opportunity For Reflection, 62 FLA. B.J. 48 (Jan. 1990).
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lature's original approach, with special attention to the seldomly-used
draw out mechanism. Part VI concludes that changes should be made
in the conduct of rulemaking and judicial review. I suggest that if the
courts do not correct the problems that have developed, the Florida
Legislature must step in and do so.
I. THE FLORIDA APA's OPPORTUNITIES FOR CITIZEN INPUT CONCERN-
ING THE SUBSTANCE OF PROPOSED RULES: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE His-
TORY, INTENDED EFFECTS, AND VALUE CHOICES
The Legislature enacted Florida's first comprehensive administrative
procedure act in 1961 (the "1961 act"). 2 A partial revision was at-
tempted in 1973, but Governor Askew vetoed it, believing that the Law
Revision Council 3 should conduct a comprehensive review of the act.14
The Director of the Center for Administrative Justice, created in 1972
by the American Bar Association, 5 agreed to organize an ad hoc task
force to assist in preparing a draft of a new act.' 6 The task force met in
September 1973,' 7 and
prepared extensive drafts incorporating recent judicial and proposed
statutory concepts dealing with administrative fairness, many of which
had never before been given such specific legislative drafting attention.
These drafts also devoted attention to expanding the procedures by
which decisions of adjudication and rulemaking could be made in
order to provide agencies with greater flexibility to conduct their
affairs and the public with a greater ability to be heard effectively in
such proceedings."'
Reporter Arthur England drew upon these early drafts in preparing a
comprehensive initial draft, followed by four more drafts which he pre-
12. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.031-.051 (1961). A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, supra note 9, § 1.02(a),
at 2. This act was similar but not identical to the 1961 Revised Model Act (RMA). REVISED
MODEL STATE ADUmasTRATivE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1961, 15 U.L.A. 137 (1990) [hereinafter 1961
MODEL ACT].
13. The Law Revision Council was created to examine State law, discover defects and
anachronisms, and recommend needed reforms. FLA. STAT. § 13.96 (1989).
14. A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, supra note 9, § 1.02(b), at 3. The Council established a
committee chaired by Professor Harold Levinson and contracted with Arthur England to be the
Reporter. England subsequently served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Florida. Id.
15. For a discussion about the Center, see Carrow, Administrative Justice Comes of Age,
60 A.B.A. J. 1396 (1974).
16. Kennedy, A National Perspective of Administrative Law and the Florida Administrative
Procedure Act, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 65, 66 (1975).
17. The weekend conference in Washington was a "brainstorming" session attended by
Arthur England, Professor Levinson, and "a number of distinguished administrative law scho-
lars and practitioners from various parts of the country." Levinson, The Florida Administrative
Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975 Amendments, 29 U. MIAM L. REv. 617, 621 (1975).
18. Kennedy, supra note 16, at 66.
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pared and annotated with the assistance of Professor Harold Levin-
son.' 9 The Council presented the Reporter's Final Draft to the
Legislature as a new administrative procedure act, accompanied by ex-
tensive annotations commonly known as the Reporter's Comments.2
The Law Revision Council held public hearings on the draft propos-
als at various locations throughout Florida. 2' At the same time, parallel
efforts were undertaken by the Government Operations Committee of
the Florida House of Representatives. 22 A bill reflecting the work of
both the Law Revision Council and the House Government Operations
Committee quickly passed the House.23 Meanwhile, the Senate passed a
completely different bill designed to subject agency rulemaking to more
stringent legislative control.24 The conference committee bill incorpo-
rated most features of both the House and Senate versions.2
To expand the effectiveness of the public's voice in rulemaking, the
new act provided three different proceedings that persons with an ap-
propriate level of interest could request during rulemaking.2 Section
120.54, the section of the Florida APA governing rulemaking, author-
izes each proceeding under separate subsections: section 120.54(3)
grants persons an opportunity to present evidence and argument on all
issues appropriate to inform the agency of that person's contentions;
section 120.54(17) permits that evidentiary opportunity to be drawn out
into a more formal proceeding, which will resolve factual and policy
disputes pursuant to established procedures, and develop a record for
judicial review of those disputes; section 120.54(4) provides persons
whose substantial interests are affected with an administrative remedy
for invalidating a proposed rule that is an invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority,27 before the rule becomes effective. These provi-
19. See Levinson, supra note 17.
20. "The Reporter's Comments, submitted to the Florida Law Revision Council by its re-
porter in March 1974 to accompany the Council's final draft of the APA, have been recognized
in a number of court decisions as a primary source of legislative intent." A. ENOLAND & L.
LEviNSON, supra note 9, § 1.05(a), at 12-13.
21. Id. § 1.02(b), at 4.





26. An opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues appropriate to inform
the agency of the contentions of "affected persons" is authorized by section 120.54(3), Florida
Statutes. A "draw out" of that rulemaking hearing by those who timely assert that their "sub-
stantial interests" will be affected in the proceeding is authorized by section 120.54(17). Finally,
"[any substantially affected person" may seek an administrative determination of a proposed
rule pursuant to section 120.54(4).
27. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (1989). Proposed rule challenges are discussed here only to
the extent such discussion is necessary to fully address sections 120.54(3), (17), and 120.68.
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sions reflect the drafters' conviction that procedural flexibility is essen-
tial to protecting the interests of the public. The Reporter's Comments
state:
[A]gency proceedings frequently affect individual rights and create
general policy at the same time, so that they partake of adjudication
and rule-making at the same time. A failure of agencies to recognize
this fact, and the reluctance of Florida courts to depart from analysis
in terms of "judicial" and "legislative" decision-making, has created
rigidity in the [1961 APA], unwarranted exemptions, and
unreviewable agency discretion which defeats due process. 28
A. The Intended Effect of Rejecting "Quasi-Legislative " Rulemaking
Before the Legislature adopted the present APA, rulemaking was
generally a matter of agency prerogative, and agencies frequently prom-
ulgated rules without the participation of the public or the persons af-
fected. 9 Under the 1961 act, circuit courts reviewed rules by declaratory
proceedings, while district courts of appeal reviewed by certiorari the
final orders from adjudicative proceedings. 30
The 1961 act characterized rulemaking as "quasi-legislative," a char-
acterization used to restrict public input into the process. In Daniel v.
Florida State Turnpike Authority,3' for example, the Supreme Court of
Florida stated:
[I]t cannot be doubted that the power to promulgate rules and
regulations to effectuate the general public purpose of the statute is an
administrative function that is quasi-legislative in nature, rather than
quasi-judicial. This being so, a hearing before the administrative body
is not necessarily a sine qua non to the validity of rules and regulations
adopted by it pursuant to legislative authority. 32
Similarly, in Bay National Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson,33 the
court used the quasi-legislative characterization as a basis for conclud-
ing that the State banking commissioner did not violate due process by
issuing without a public hearing a certificate of authorization to engage
28. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 6.
29. Note, Rulemaking and Adjudication Under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act,
27 U. FLA. L. REv. 755, 759 (1975).
30. A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, supra note 9, § 1.02(a). ...
31. 213 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1968).
32. Id. at 586.
33. 229 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969).
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in the banking business.14 Thus, the court employed the characteriza-
tion of rulemaking proceedings as "quasi-legislative" in order to limit
the opportunity to present evidence and argument afforded those whose
substantial interests were affected by the agency action.
The Reporter's Comments indicate that the Law Revision Council
sought "to rid existing law of the anachronisms" the "quasi-judicial,"
"quasi-legislative," and "quasi-executive" characterizations had pro-
duced. 5 The Reporter's Comments note:
A major feature of the proposed act is to eliminate these
anachronisms (i) by focusing attention on the rights affected rather
than the labels given a particular process, (ii) by allowing total
flexibility for fact-finding in rule-making proceedings and policy-
making in individual cases, and (ii) [sic] by authorizing informality
whenever it is possible to exercise it without affecting rights unfairly.1
The Law Revision Council sought to reduce the power of characteri-
zations such as "quasi-legislative" in determining the type of proce-
dures required. The Reporter's Comments expressly caution against the
continued use of such characterizations, explaining the damage they
caused under the old act and explicitly indicating the Legislature's in-
tent to "overrule cases making the distinction, such as Bay National
Bank and Dickinson v. Judges of the District Court of Appeal .... "7
B. The Significance of the Rejection of Quasi-Legislative Rulemaking
The Florida APA's rejection of the "quasi-legislative" concept is sig-
nificant. As Professor Martin Shapiro has noted, "[i]f rulemaking is
quasi-legislative, it is quasi-arbitrary . . . ." A legislator's "factual as-
sumptions, whether correct or absurd, need be based on no evidence of
record; his policy choices, whether statesmanlike or deplorable, are not
limited to any pleadings or points raised in argument." 3 9 There was a
34. The court found, "[i]n passing upon such an application the Commissioner performs a
purely quasi-legislative or quasi-executive function. His consideration of the application does not
constitute an adjudication of rights vested in any person or corporation, but is an administrative
determination as to whether a requested right shall be granted." Id. at 304.
35. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 5.
36. Id. at 6-7.
37. Id. at 18 (citation omitted). They also explain that "the discretionary determinations of
many governmental agencies and officers which have been characterized as 'quasi-judicial,'
'quasi-legislative' or 'quasi-executive,' or have otherwise been exempted from the operation of
administrative procedure laws, are now brought under the minimum fairness provisions of the
proposed act." Id.
38. Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REv. 447, 463 (1986).
39. Linde, Book Review, 66 YALE L.J. 973, 975 (1957) (reviewing C. NEwmAN & S. SuR-
aEY, LESoLATioN, CASES AND MAERIS (1955)).
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time when agency rules were treated as presumptively correct4O and were
upheld if not "arbitrary and capricious.'"' This traditional standard of
judicial review of rules in the federal courts was "extremely deferential,
perhaps close to the 'minimum rationality' test for the validity of sta-
tutes under substantive due process. "42
The Florida APA rejects this approach, recognizing instead a new
standard for minimum fairness exceeding the degree of fairness guaran-
teed by the Federal Constitution. The Reporter's Comments state that
in Florida, "[tihe notions of basic fairness which should surround all
governmental activity, [includes rulemaking and] the right to present
viewpoints and to challenge the view of others, the right to develop a
record which is capable of court review,... and the right to know the
factual bases and policy reasons for agency action. . . . ",4 The drafters
and Legislature intended the Florida APA to check all arbitrary agency
action through its procedural requirements. By guaranteeing certain
persons the opportunity to participate in agency decisionmaking, even
in rulemaking, the Legislature sought to ensure agency responsiveness
to fact and reason, thereby enhancing the accuracy and legitimacy of
agency decisions, and rendering those decisions more acceptable to the
public. The Reporter's Comments note there are three due process
checks to prevent arbitrary agency action: "the requirements that rea-
sons be stated for all action taken or omitted, that reasons be supported
by 'the record,' and that specific judicial review procedures allow the
courts to remedy defects of substance. "
In short, the approach to rulemaking incorporated in the Florida
APA is very different from the deference characterizing the early fed-
eral cases, such as Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White.45 The act
also breaks with the traditional Florida understanding of procedural
protection by focusing attention "away from labels and toward the ef-
40. "[W]here the regulation is within the scope of authority legally delegated, the presump-
tion of the existence of facts justifying its specific exercise attaches. ... Pacific States Box &
Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 186 (1935).
41. "With the wisdom of such a regulation we have, of course, no concern. We may en-
quire only whether it is arbitrary or capricious." Id. at 182.
42. A. BoiNmL & M. Asimow, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMNISTRATIVE LAW 621 (1989) (em-
phasis in original). It has also been suggested that this arbitrary and capricious standard "bore a
strong family resemblance to the test employed by appellate review of jury verdicts." Shapiro,
Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1492 (1983).
43. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 5 (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 20. This passage was quoted with approval in McDonald v. Department of Bank-
ing & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
45. 296 U.S. 176 (1935). The more recent federal cases have also moved away from this
early federal approach. For a more detailed discussion of those developments, see infra notes
256-63 and accompanying text.
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fects of agency decision-making,'"'4 and makes clear that "rule-making
can involve substantial individual interests, and that procedures suitable
for adjudication may be needed in the course of rule-making in order to
protect these interests." 47
This shift, from the traditional deference shown agency rules to a
requirement that agencies explain the rules and support the explana-
tions in a record, may be thought to threaten the efficiency of the deci-
sionmaking process.4 The Florida APA seeks to address efficiency
concerns through its emphasis on flexibility. The agency's duty to pro-
vide well supported reasons is limited to those cases in which substan-
tially affected persons actually take advantage of opportunities during
rulemaking to discover and challenge the fact or policy choices incorpo-
rated in the rule. Where affected persons do not take prompt action to
protect their substantial interests, the agency need not defend its
choices.
This approach permits opportunities for significant participation by
affected persons while not unduly compromising efficiency. The deci-
sion to make significant procedural protections available, but only as
needed, encourages prompt and vigorous participation by substantially
affected persons, while freeing decisionmakers from the unnecessary
formality of explaining and supporting every decision.
C. Value Choices Included in Citizen Participation Opportunities
Against this general background, it is worth examining more specifi-
cally the innovations the Florida APA brings to the rulemaking
process. Other state administrative procedure acts commonly make
some provision through which interested persons may submit their
views on proposed rules 9 Federal law also requires that agencies "give
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule-making
through the submission of written data, views, or arguments with or
46. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 18.
47. Id.
48. Efficiency is one of three normative requirements usually identified in administrative
procedure. The other two are accuracy and acceptability. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type
Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L. REv. 585, 592-93 (1972); Verkuil, The
Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 258, 279-80 (1978) (using
slightly different terminology).
49. Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FIA. ST. U.L. REV. 967, 998
(1986). Professor Dore notes that a majority of states have adopted requirements based upon the
RMA, which requires agencies to afford interested parties "reasonable opportunity to submit
data, views, or arguments, orally or in writing." Id. at 998-99.
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without opportunity for oral presentation" in most circumstances.50
The federal provision has generally been construed to require "notice
and comment" rulemaking and to permit agencies to limit participation
in rulemaking to written submissions, although the courts have regu-
lated the comment process in an attempt to improve its effectiveness.5'
The language of the rulemaking provisions of the Revised Model Act is
similar to the language in the federal provision. 2 The extent and in-
tended effect of the Florida APA's departures from the federal and
state models is clearly apparent in the procedures mandated by sections
120.54(3) and 120.54(17).
1. Section 120.54(3)- The Public Hearing
Section 120.54(3)(a) provides in relevant part:
If the intended action concerns any rule other than one relating
exclusively to organization, procedure, or practice, the agency shall,
on the request of any affected person received within 21 days after the
date of publication of the notice, give affected persons an opportunity
to present evidence and argument on all issues under consideration
appropriate to inform it of their contentions.53
50. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988) (informal rulemaking). Informal rulemaking is the dominant
rulemaking approach in the federal system. Professor Davis concludes that "rulemaking on the
record is in process of disappearing except for fixing the rates of one or a few companies." K.
DAvis, A DmNismrvTVE LAW TREATISE § 6:8, at 481 (2d ed. 1978). However, in a recent trend,
Congress has been adding procedures to basic section 553 requirements in various substantive
enactments. Id. § 6:9, at 482. For further discussion of federal informal rulemaking, see infra
notes 280-88 and accompanying text.
51. For a more detailed explanation of federal law in this area, see infra notes 280-97 and
accompanying text.
52. Section 3 of the RMA also requires a notice and comment procedure for the adoption
of rules. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 12, § 3(a), at 167. It provides that the agency shall "af-
ford all interested persons reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments, orally or
in writing." Id. § 3(a)(2), at 168. Section 3-104 of the 1981 MSAPA, which Professor Bonfield
suggests "modifies and extends" the RMA provision in a number of respects and goes beyond
the federal act, provides for an opportunity for written submissions concerning the proposed
rule. A. BONFIELD, STATE ADmInSTRATrVE RULEMAsINo 187 (1986). However, even the expanded
citizen participation opportunities of the 1981 MSAPA provide significantly less opportunities
for citizen participation than does the Florida APA. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-104(a),
at 36. The RMA and the 1981 MSAPA both provide that in the case of substantive rules, an oral
hearing must be granted only when requested by 25 persons, a governmental subdivision or
agency, or an association having not less than 25 members. 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 12, §
3(a)(2), at 167-68; 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 3-104(a)(2), at 36-37. Section 3-104 "does
not create a right to a trial-type or evidentiary hearing in rule making 'only an argument-style
oral proceeding"' without confrontation or cross-examination. A. BONFIELD, supra, at 198. For
a comparison of the RMA, the 1981 MSAPA and the federal act on these points, see A. BON-
Fies, supra, at 187-207.
53. FiA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (1989).
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The language of section 120.54(3) differs significantly from the lan-
guage commonly used in such provisions. For example, section
120.54(3)(a) of the Florida APA guarantees each affected person5 an
opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues under con-
sideration appropriate to inform the agency of the participants' conten-
tions, except in the case of rules that relate exclusively to organization,
procedure, or practice.55 Neither the federal act nor the model state acts
guarantees individuals the opportunity to present "evidence and argu-
ment."
The decision to allow evidence and argument rather than to require
only notice and an opportunity to comment was a considered judg-
ment. The language "present evidence and argument on all issues"
appears in the Reporter's First Draft, although not in the rulemaking
section.5 6 Only when the House Government Operations Committee
prepared a bill based on the Reporter's Final Draft were the words
"opportunity to present evidence and argument" added to the rule-
making section of the Florida APA1 7 The Legislature deliberately
chose language traditionally associated with adjudication to describe
the rulemaking hearing guaranteed by the new APA. This decision to
incorporate adjudicatory language in the rulemaking section comports
54. The public hearing authorized by this section can be invoked by "affected" persons.
The remedies authorized by sections 120.54(4) and 120.54(17) can be invoked only by "substan-
tially affected" persons. Although the act defines neither category, the logical conclusion that
the "affected person" standard is less difficult to satisfy than the "substantially affected" stan-
dard, has been confirmed. For a detailed discussion of the level of interest necessary to invoke
this and other administrative proceedings authorized by the act, see generally Dore, supra note
49.
55. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1989). As defined in section 944.02(5), Florida Statutes, prison-
ers "may be limited by the Department of Corrections to an opportunity to submit written state-
ments .... "
56. Reporter's Draft No. 1 (on file with the author). This language appeared in section
0120.6, titled "Adjudication; in general" and it listed the "source" of this language as "F.S.
120.22; RMA 9(a)." Id. at 14. Section 120.22, Florida Statutes, was titled "Administrative Ad-
judication Procedure," in Part II of chapter 120. Section 9 of the RMA provided the procedure
applicable in "contested cases." 1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 12, § 9, at 207-08. The term
"contested case" was defined in section 1 of the RMA to mean "a proceeding. . . in which the
legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency
after an opportunity for hearing .... " Id. § 1(2), at 148. Thus, both of the source sections
pertained to adjudication. Section 9 of the RMA provided that parties may "present evidence
and argument on all issues involved." Id. § 9(c), at 207. The Reporter's Final Draft retained that
language in section 0120.6, but did not include that language in the section 0120.4, the section
that governed rulemaking. Section 0120.4 provided only for "an opportunity for such public
hearing as may be appropriate to inform it of the contentions of interested persons." Reporter's
Final Draft (Mar. 1, 1974), in A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, supra note 9, 4 at app. B [hereinafter
Reporter's Final Draft]. This language was the same as the language in the first draft of that
section. Reporter's Draft No. 1, supra, at 8.
57. Fla. CS for SB 892 at 956 (1974). This language was also retained in section 120.57.
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with the decision to focus "attention on the rights affected rather than
the labels given a particular process," but differs from the language
suggested by the Law Revision Council." Section 120.54(3) does not
require a hearing every time a rule is proposed. Rather, pursuant to
the principle of "total flexibility" and "informality whenever it is
possible to exercise it without affecting rights unfairly," 5 9 it varies the
actual process, case by case, depending upon the degree to which af-
fected persons participate in the rulemaking process. If no one re-
quests a hearing, none is required. If an individual wants merely to
comment in writing, that comment is to be made a part of the record.
However, if even a single affected person requests a public hearing
one must be held. Whether an affected person wants to use that op-
portunity to appear and comment orally or to present evidence and
argument is a matter to be decided by that participant, not the
agency.60
58. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 6. I recognize that the view I express here con-
flicts with the view expressed by one of the principal drafters of the APA shortly after it was
enacted. Professor Levinson stated: "The new Florida Act establishes, by this provision, the
type of rulemaking which is generally known in the literature of administrative law as 'notice-
and-comment,' or 'informal' rulemaking.... This type of proceeding is also found in the fed-
eral APA ...." Levinson, supra note 17, at 639 (footnotes omitted). Levinson's description
failed to take into account the changes that had been made to the rulemaking provisions of the
act in the House Government Operations Committee. His description corresponded with his er-
roneous suggestion that the Florida APA does not require an oral proceeding in rulemaking. Id.
at 634. That suggestion has not been followed. I do not believe that the Florida provision can
fairly be construed as either "informal" rulemaking or "notice and comment" rulemaking, in
light of its language and legislative history. Professor Levinson supported his analysis with ex-
tensive citation to federal materials:
Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent Developments
in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DuKE L.J. 51; Fitzgerald, Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Federal Power Commission and the Flexibility of the Administrative Procedure'Act,
26 An. L. Rv. 287 (1974); Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA.
L. REV. 185 (1974); Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of
Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974); Wright, Court of Appeals Review of
Federal Regulatory Agency Rulemaking, 26 ADmiN. L. REv. 199 (1974).
Id. at 639 n.122. For reasons discussed later, I suggest that such reliance on federal authority in
interpreting the Florida APA is inappropriate.
59. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 6-7.
60. In Florida, an agency is required to hold a public hearing on a proposed rule at the
timely request of only one affected person. Professor Dore notes that "no state other than Flor-
ida permits a single 'affected person' to require the convening of a pubic hearing on a proposed
rule at which 'affected persons' may submit their views to the agency." Dore, supra note 49, at
1000. This requirement should have been clear from the fact that affected persons have the right
to make evidentiary presentations. However, the requirement was clarified by a 1978 amendment
to section 120.54(3) which added: "The agency may schedule a public hearing on the rule and, if
requested by any affected person, shall schedule a public hearing on the rule." Ch. 78-425, Fla.
Laws 1411 (emphasis added). Legislative history suggests that the amendment was designed to
clarify, rather than to create, such a requirement. A JAPC memorandum dated April 28, 1978,
described the purpose of that language when the amendment was attached to House Bill 1751:
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Thus, section 120.54(3) was adopted to guarantee affected persons
an opportunity to make an evidentiary presentation at a public hear-
ing. This opportunity differs from the participation opportunities
guaranteed in other jurisdictions: by requiring an opportunity for an
evidentiary presentation that is appropriate to inform the agency of
the participant's contentions,6' section 120.54(3) allows the agency
some discretion to control-but not to eliminate-the presentation.
Whether an opportunity is "appropriate" depends upon its reasona-
bleness under the circumstances. In determining what is appropriate,
the agency may consider limitations on an evidentiary presentation
only to avoid duplication, irrelevant matters, unnecessary delay, and
disruption of the proceedings. This is precisely the construction given
to the provision by the Model Rules.6 2 Under the popular labels of the
old act, a hearing permitting such a presentation might be character-
ized as adjudicatory or "quasi-judicial" in nature. The new act, how-
ever, does not focus on the labels given a particular process but on the
rights affected.
In sum, section 120.54(3) reflects a legislative decision to favor citi-
zen input during rulemaking and to discount concerns about the loss
of efficiency these additional opportunities threaten to create. The
Legislature recognized the value of input of affected persons. By pro-
viding information that supports their views on the proposed rule and
explaining their understanding of how it will apply to them, affected
persons help the agency understand its proposal. 63 The Legislature
also recognized the value of permitting affected persons to participate
in the process by organizing and delivering an evidentiary presenta-
"An agency's obligation to conduct a public hearing on a proposed rule upon the request of an
affected person is clarified ..... " The fact that this amendment was a clarification is also clear
from contemporary commentary. Johnson, 1978 Revision of the Administrative Procedure Act,
52 FLA. B.J. 549, 550 (1978) ("Section 120.54(3) was amended to clarify that the 'opportunity to
present evidence and argument' in rulemaking proceedings means a public hearing."). Model
Rule 28-3.031(1) now provides that an "agency shall provide, upon request, a public hearing for
presentation of evidence, argument and oral statements, within the reasonable conditions and
limitations imposed by the agency ...... FLA. Arnmi. CODE R. 28-3.031(1) (1990). The Model
Rules were promulgated pursuant to section 120.54(10), to provide uniform procedures on such
questions. See Whisenand, Model Rules of Florida Administrative Practice-Chaos or Unifor-
mity, 49 FLA. B.J. 361 (1975).
61. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1989) (emphasis added).
62. FLA. ADxw. CODE R. 28-3.031(1) (1990). Some commentators have read into this lan-
guage more agency discretion than is appropriate. See Dore, supra note 49, at 1007-08. For
further discussion of this point, see infra notes 149-75 and accompanying text.
63. Who better than the affected person can provide this information? By permitting evi-
dentiary presentations, the APA not only obtains the views of such persons, it also solicits the
raw material from which those persons have drawn their views, thereby providing the agency
with a depth of information sufficient to allow exploration beyond the conclusions a participant
might draw from that raw material.
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tion.64 The Florida APA empowers affected persons to protect their
own interests in rulemaking where it appears to them that an agency is
acting without full knowledge of the facts or a proper understanding
of policy. The Legislature chose the evidentiary presentation as the
proper vehicle for educating agencies and affected persons alike.65
2. Section 120.54(17)-The "Draw Out"
Section 120.54(17) of the Florida APA provides for what is popu-
larly known as a "draw out." It states:
Rulemaking proceedings shall be governed solely by the provisions of
this section unless a person timely asserts that his substantial interests
will be affected in the proceeding and affirmatively demonstrates to
the agency that the proceeding does not provide adequate
opportunity to protect those interests. If the agency determines that
the rulemaking proceeding is not adequate to protect his interests, it
shall suspend the rulemaking proceeding and convene a separate
proceeding under the provisions of s. 120.57. Similarly situated
persons may be requested to join and participate in the separate
proceeding. Upon conclusion of the separate proceeding, the
rulemaking proceeding shall be resumed.
This proceeding is not just unusual, it is unique to the Florida
APA. 66 Under sections 120.54(17) and 120.57, the nature of the draw
64. Individuals who prepare an evidentiary presentation are likely to be more familiar with
the broad spectrum of concerns that the proposed rule is designed to address than individuals
who are only prepared to comment. Preparation of an effective evidentiary presentation requires
that the participants develop a theory of the case being presented, analyze and sift through the
available evidence, and take account of contrary evidence and argument. Participants concerned
about the effectiveness of their presentation will commonly modify their case theory during in-
vestigation and preparation in order to take account of contrary evidence and argument that has
been discovered. In this way, a provision permitting evidentiary presentations during rulemaking
can sensitize affected persons to contrary evidence, value judgments, and compromises that may
be incorporated in the proposed rule, even before such affected persons appear to participate in
the rulemaking proceeding.
65. Like section 120.54(3) proceedings, notice and comment rulemaking procedures were
intended "for the education of the administrator, especially on questions of policy ...." Na-
thanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator: Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial
Review Under the Administrative Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 COLUM. L. Rv.
721, 755 (1975). Section 120.54(3) proceedings, however, provide an even better education.
66. Dore, supra note 49, at 1006. The Legislature originally adopted the draw out provision
as part of the introductory paragraph to section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1975). It was subse-
quently moved to section 120.54 by Ch. 76-131, 1976 Fla. Laws 221. Originally numbered sec-
tion 120.54(15), it was renumbered (16), Ch. 76-276, 1976 Fla. Laws 750, and then renumbered
(17) as a result of Ch. 84-203, 1984 Fla. Laws 612. Apparently, the Legislature intended no
substantive change when the provision was moved from section 120.57 to section 120.54, al-
though there were changes in language. A JAPC staff memorandum entitled "Amendment
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out proceeding, as well as who will preside at the draw out hearing,
varies depending upon the nature of the matters in dispute.67 If a ma-
terial fact is in dispute, section 120.57(1) governs the draw out and the
full formal proceedings of that section, including discovery and an ev-
identiary hearing, are available to resolve the factual dispute." The
statute specifies that, in most instances, an independent hearing offi-
cer from the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) will pre-
side. 69 The hearing officer hears the evidence, rules on proposed
Number 10" explains the rationale for the move to section 120.54:
PROBLEM
The language in the introductory paragraph to §120.57 relating to adversary hearings
to protect a person's interests at a rulemaking proceeding, properly belongs with the
other rulemaking provisions of the Act.
SUGGESTED SOLUTION
Amendment #10 moves these provisions from §120.57 to a new subsection (15) of
120.54 without substantive change except to make it clearer that the regular §120.54
hearing is suspended pending completion of the § 120.57 hearing.
67. A. ENGLAND & L. LEvINSON, supra note 9, § 9.22(i), at 78. "If the affected person
demonstrates to the agency that his substantial interests will not be adequately protected by in-
formal rulemaking proceedings, the agency must convene a separate, trial-type hearing, which
shall be formal if a disputed issue of material fact is involved; otherwise the procedure is infor-
mal." Levinson, supra note 17, at 639 (footnote omitted). For a general discussion of the nature
of the proceedings conducted pursuant to section 120.57, see A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, supra
note 9, chapters 11-13.
Whether formal or informal procedures under section 120.57 are required is a determination
most frequently made in the context of the type of hearing appropriate when rules or policy are
being applied, and when the person to whom they are being applied demands a hearing; how-
ever, one case has confirmed that a similar determination should be made to decide appropriate
hearing procedure outside that traditional context. Garrido v. Department of Health and Rehab.
Servs., 386 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (holding that the determination of proper hearing
procedure in connection with a petition to initiate rulemaking turned on the existence of a mate-
rial factual issue; if a material issue of fact existed, then section 120.57(1) proceedings are re-
quired); but cf. Bayonet Point Hosp., Inc. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 490 So. 2d
1318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding that findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required
in an order denying a petition to initiate rulemaking pursuant to section 120.54(5), because those
proceedings are governed by section 120.54).
68. For example, section 120.57(1)(b)(4) guarantees that "[a]ll parties shall have an oppor-
tunity to respond, to present evidence and argument on all issues involved, to conduct cross-
examination and submit rebuttal evidence, to submit proposed findings of facts and orders, to
file exceptions to any order or hearing officer's recommended order, and to be represented by
counsel." FLA. STAT. § 120.57(l)(b)(4) (1989). Section 120.58(l)(e) also guarantees the right to
cross-examine, whether the proceeding results in a rule or order. Levinson, Elements of the Ad-
ministrative Process: Formal, Semi-Formal, and Free-form Models, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 872, 902
(1977). Also, parties may prepare for the draw out hearing with the assistance of discovery,
Model Rule 28-5.208, and employ subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses. FLA. STAT.
§ 120.58 (1989); FLA. ADnaN. CODE R. 28-5.301 (1990). These guarantees are most familiar in the
context of adjudication. See generally Benton & Pfeiffer, Administraiive Adjudication, in FLOR-
IDA ADMI NS rIVE PRACTCE 4-1 (3d ed. 1990). Through the draw out, the same procedural
protections available in adjudication are available in rulemaking.
69. Section 120.57(1) provides that the Division of Administrative Hearings shall conduct
hearings unless they are conducted by the agency head or a member thereof, or unless the hear-
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findings submitted by the parties, and makes findings of fact and con-
clusions of law on policy issues in a recommended order which is sent
to the agency. The agency then enters a final order that accepts or
rejects the hearing officer's findings and recommendations. When this
procedure is complete, rulemaking may continue. Where no material
facts are in dispute-for example, where only policy matters are
disputed 70-section 120.57(2) specifies applicable procedures. In a
120.57(2) proceeding, an independent hearing officer is not required
and the procedure is less formal. Still, the affected person's right to
choose how to present evidence and argument, either oral or written,
is preserved, 7' as is a ban on ex parte communications. 72 If the objec-
tions of the persons or parties are overruled, the agency is required to
provide a written explanation within seven days.73
The decision to provide similar forms of protection for persons
whose substantial interests are affected by proceedings previously
thought of as either "adjudication" or "rulemaking" is one of the
most significant innovations of the Florida APA. 74 This innovation,
the Reporter's Comments note, "broaden[s] considerably the scope of
administrative fairness. ' 75 The Reporter's Final Draft intentionally
ing is of a type exempted from that requirement in section 120.57(1)(a)(1)-(8). These subsections
exempt certain agencies from the DOAH hearing requirement in cases where the agency's own
hearing officers may preside. The exemptions may be construed not to extend to rulemaking.
For example, section 120.57(l)(a)(2) exempts from the DOAH requirement "[hearings before
the Unemployment Appeals Commission in unemployment compensation appeals, unemploy-
ment compensation appeals referees, and special deputies pursuant to s. 443.141 ...." FLA.
STAT. § 120.57 (l)(a)(2) (1989) (emphasis added). This language suggests that, if the Unemploy-
ment Appeals Commission engages in rulemaking, it will be subject to the DOAH hearing re-
quirement during a draw out. Whether-and to what extent-these exemption provisions apply
to rulemaking are currently open questions.
70. Some policy questions will involve factual disputes and others will not. If the question is
whether the policy choice incorporated in the proposed rule will perform in practice as the pro-
posed rule suggests, then a material factual issue may exist which should be resolved pursuant to
section 120.57(1). If the issue is whether the policy choice follows logically from the agency's
resolution of the underlying policy considerations, then a section 120.57(2) proceeding may be
adequate.
71. Section 120.57(2)(a)(2) guarantees the right "to present to the agency or hearing officer
written or oral evidence in opposition to the action of the agency or of its refusal to act, or a
written statement challenging the grounds upon which the agency has chosen to justify its action
or inaction." FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2)(a)(2) (1989).
72. Section 120.66(1) provides that the ban on ex parte communications is applicable "[i]n
any proceeding under s. 120.57 ..... Id. § 120.66(1).
73. Id. § 120.57(2)(a)(3).
74. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 6-7. The authorization of adjudicatory methods
in rulemaking is consistent with the APA's emphasis on rational decisionmaking: "Adjudication
is ... a device which gives formal and institutional expression to the influence of reasoned
argument in human affairs." Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudications, 92 HARv. L. REV.
353, 366 (1978).
75. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 18. The draw out provision as enacted was de-
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avoids terms such as "adjudication" when providing protection for
substantial interests in order to "focus attention away from labels and
toward the effects of agency decision-making. '76
The legislative history of the act further suggests how the decision
to depart from "unthinking adherence to 'rule-making' and 'adjudi-
cation' procedures, as if the two were wholly distinct and distinguisha-
ble, ' 77 was one important way the drafters sought to rid the act of
anachronisms creating unfair procedures. The drafters intended that
rulemaking under the act be flexible enough to provide for adjudica-
tory process during rulemaking, and that the need for such proce-
dures, rather than the label given the proceedings, should determine
the process to be used. As the drafters stated: "This provision ...
makes clear that rule-making can involve substantial individual inter-
ests, and that the procedures suitable for adjudication may be needed
in the course of rule-making in order to protect these interests. "7 s
While the Florida APA differed from other administrative proce-
dure acts when it was adopted, its approach gained support among
some commentators. Most APAs require agencies to follow rulemak-
ing procedure when they adopt rules, and adjudicatory process when
they issue an order. 79 Yet,
rived from a similar provision included in the section of the Reporter's Final Draft governing
decisions affecting substantial interests, which, with some significant changes, the Legislature
adopted as section 120.57. Section 0120.6 provides in relevant part: "Rule-making proceedings
shall be governed solely by section 0120.4 unless and to the extent that a party timely asserts that
its substantial interests will be affected in the proceeding and affirmatively demonstrates that the
proceeding does not provide adequate opportunity to protect those interests." Reporter's Final
Draft, supra note 56, at 8. The Senate version of the proposed APA that was sent to the confer-
ence committee did not provide for a draw out. Fla. CS for SB 892 (1974). However, the bill
passed by the House included the draw out, but differed from the Reporter's Final Draft in that
it added "to the agency" after "affirmatively demonstrates." It also added the following after
the provision quoted above: "If the agency determines that rule-making proceedings are not
adequate to protect a party's interests, it shall convene an additional proceeding, which shall
conform to the provisions of this section. The agency may request similarly situated parties to
join and participate in such a proceeding." Fla. CS for HB's 2672, 2434, 2583, § 120.57 at 15,
lines 1-7 (1974). As adopted, the law changed "an additional proceeding, which shall conform to
the provisions of this section" to "a separate proceeding and proceed under the provisions of
this section." FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (Supp. 1974). Note also that the protections proposed in
section 0120.6 of the Reporter's Final Draft were limited in applicability before adoption in
section 120.57(1). Reporter's Final Draft, supra note 56, at 8-10. In the Reporter's Final Draft,
the protections later adopted in section 120.57(1) applied not only when a material fact was in
dispute, but also in the case of a dispute over policy or the interpretation of a provision having
the effect of law. Reporter's Final Draft, supra note 56, at 8. As adopted, the act limited the
availability of section 120.57(1) proceedings to situations where a material fact was in dispute.
76. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 17-18.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id. at 18.
79. Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative Law, 72 VA. L. REv. 297, 308
(1986). Bonfield notes that this is the approach followed by the federal APA and the two model
state acts.
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[c]ritics argue that the classification of all formal agency action as
either a rule subject to rulemaking procedures or an order subject to
adjudication procedures is unduly rigid and, therefore,
fundamentally unsound. Such a dichotomous classification may not
always yield the most appropriate procedures. For instance, in the
adoption of certain statements of general applicability-rules-some
types of relevant factual issues may properly be the subject of oral
testimony and cross examination, procedures granted of right only in
formal adjudications.80
The Florida approach recognizes the difficulties this critique
describes" and adopts a unitary decision making process.
3. Broader Theoretical Framework for the Florida Approach
The Florida APA breaks with tradition by taking a functional ap-
proach to the determination of appropriate procedure. In their cover
letter to the first draft of the act, the drafters stated:
For purposes of the draft statute, the traditional terms
"adjudication" and "rule-making" have been retained. The draft
has been developed, however, on the assumption that these terms are
operationally too narrow and confining.... Thus, authority is
provided in rule-making proceedings to determine disputed facts in a
hearing, and in adjudicatory proceedings to establish policy with the
mechanics of rule-making. In other words, the traditionally narrow
paths to administrative determinations have been varied to allow
function-oriented goals, rather than continuing a pattern of
procedures pre-conditioned by the first denomination of the
proceeding. 2
This critique-that the distinction between adjudication and rule-
making is an overly rigid one-may be misinterpreted; this criticism is
not essentialist in nature. 3 The problem is not that some rules are es-
sentially orders or that some rulemaking will include some facts better
found through the use of adjudicatory methods. The problem is that
the determination of facts and policy by the adoption of legislative
rules precludes the right to challenge those determinations when the
80. Id. at 309 (footnotes omitted). Bonfield does not subscribe to this critique. Id. at 311.
81. Bonfield states, "[t]his line of criticism further suggests that the states should have sub-
stituted for the rule-order dichotomy a unitary decision-making process that used different pro-
cedures for different classes of factual and legal issues that might arise in the course of an agency
proceeding." Id. at 309.
82. Cover letter to Reporter's Draft No. 1, at 2 (on file with the author).
83. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLTIcs 46-49 (1975).
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rule is applied. Agencies, therefore, often enact legislative rules in or-
der to benefit from their preclusive effect.8 In Florida, as in other
jurisdictions, a rule properly enacted pursuant to legislative rulemak-
ing authority displaces proof as to the facts upon which it was predi-
cated and forecloses debate concerning the policy judgments it
embodies.85 Thus, substantial interests are affected in rulemaking,
even rulemaking that occurs long before the rules are actually applied
to those interests.
The importance of this recharacterization of the problem can best
be seen by reviewing some suggestions made by Professors Bonfield
and Davis. Professor Bonfield suggests a four-part test for identifying
those situations where an agency statement of general applicability
should be treated as an "order" subject to adjudicatory procedures
rather than a "rule" subject to rulemaking procedures despite its
form. 6 According to his test, a "rule" is an "order" only when it can
be demonstrated that:
(1) in effect, the impact of the statement falls exclusively on one
identifiable individual or entity; and (2) it can be demonstrated that,
on the basis of current information, no other individual or entity
could ever join the described class; and (3) the statement is based
wholly on specific facts pertaining to the circumstances or conduct of
that particular individual; and (4) as a matter of subjective agency
intention, the statement is directed only at the particular individual
or entity in question.87
Thus, Bonfield suggests that where a rulemaking proceeding is essen-
tially an adjudication, a-reliance on the distinction between rules and
orders would be placing form over substance.
Professor Davis proposes a distinction between "legislative" and
"adjudicative" facts.88 Adjudicative facts are rare in rulemaking, ar-
84. See, e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (holding that social security grid
regulations relieved the Secretary of Health and Human Services of the need to rely on voca-
tional experts in individual cases, because the types and numbers of jobs existing in the national
economy was established in the regulations); Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc.,
412 U.S. 609 (1973); Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States
v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). "Storer marked a shift in judicial notions
about administrative procedure. Before the APA, the notion of fair procedure had been equated
primarily with trial-type hearings." Verkuil, supra note 48, at 189 (footnote omitted). After
Storer, the courts were willing to preclude trial-type hearings on issues resolved through rule-
making, even if only notice and comment rulemaking was conducted.
85. McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 583 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
86. A. BoNI'La, supra note 52, at 85.
87. Id. (emphasis in original).
88. See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
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gues Davis; therefore, where adjudicatory methods may increase the
accuracy of the adjudicatory facts found in rulemaking, the efficiency
of rulemaking will not be unduly compromised by using adjudicatory
methods in order to find those facts. Professor Davis concludes that it
is inappropriate to determine the degree of procedural protection
based upon the rule/order dichotomy in those circumstances.8 9
Professors Bonfield and Davis respond to the concern about the
preclusive effect of rules only in a very minimal way. Bonfield's anal-
ysis of the circumstances in which adjudicatory procedures should be
used in rulemaking is limited to cases in which the preclusive effect of
rulemaking is immediate and apparent. Davis' analysis rejects the ri-
gidity of the distinction in circumstances where the preclusive effect
applies specifically to individuals. Yet, all facts forming the predicate
of rules have a preclusive effect on individuals because rules are not
subject to proof when they are later applied. 9° This preclusive effect is
true for both legislative and adjudicative facts, and raises the question
of whether those facts should be subject to challenge. 9'
The courts have generally been unwilling to find that this preclusive
effect raises due process concerns. 92 An early example of this trend,
HARv. L. REv. 364, 402 (1942). While Professor Davis' distinction between legislative and adju-
dicative facts has had great influence, it has also found critics:
Apart from the rather circular nature of this distinction-since it takes us back to the
ultimate question of law or policy to be decided-in actual application it is as elusive
as all the other magic keys which have been offered for the solution of the right to
hearing problem.
Nathanson, Book Review, 70 YALE L.J. 1210, 1211 (1961) (reviewing K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TRrAESz (1958)); Cramton, supra note 48, at 591 ("While the idea that trials are appropri-
ate only for 'adjudicative facts' is suggestive, it begs the hard question because the identification
of 'adjudicative facts' is so subjective and flexible." (footnotes omitted)). It has also been recog-
nized that "[g]eneral or legislative facts consist of a host of particulars .... Fuchs, Agency
Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 781, 800 (1964).
89. K. DAVIS, supra note 50, § 14.4, at 20 ("If the agency's task is to find disputed adjudi-
cative facts, that is, facts about a particular party, the proper basic procedure is almost always
trial procedure . . . ."). Bonfield disagrees because of the costs he believes such an approach
would create. Bonfield, supra note 79, at 311.
90. "[A] factual predicate is, of course, the 'factual' underpinning of the rule. It is the set
of facts under which the rule becomes a means of furthering the statutory goal." Gifford, Rule-
making and Rulemaking Review: Struggling Toward a New Paradigm, 32 ADMm. L. REV. 577,
595 (1980) (footnote omitted).
91. Professor Davis has recognized:
The ingredients of all lawmaking have to be policy ideas and facts, but the policy ideas
are necessarily dependent, immediately or remotely, on facts. Two interrelated ques-
tions . .. are: (1) Should law require lawmakers to develop the facts that are relevant
to their lawmaking? (2) Should law require lawmakers, before using facts in lawmak-
ing, to allow interested persons to challenge the assumed facts?
Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1980).
92. Rulemaking does not raise due process concerns, except where an agency is making a
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cited by more recent cases as a leading authority, is the Bi-Metallic
Investment Company v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado93
case. In Bi-Metallic, Justice Holmes considered the degree of the par-
ticipation opportunity guaranteed by the United States Constitution
and found that "[w]here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few
people it is impracticable that every one should have a direct voice in
its adoption. "94
This assumption-that a hearing is impracticable in such circum-
stances-is subject to challenge and has been called "inadequate on its
face." 9 However, when Judge Williams of the D.C. Circuit made that
observation some years before he went on the bench, he suggested
that a "second dimension" of Justice Holmes' concern is "more plau-
sible: the possibly greater utility of the political process as a check
upon administrative error." 96 Nevertheless, he acknowledged weak-
nesses in this reasoning as wellY 7 He sought to justify Holmes' result
as based upon the different nature of the inquiry in adjudication and
rulemaking:
The Bi-Metallic preference for the political remedy makes sense in
comparative terms. Holmes may have meant not that the political
remedy is ideal, but merely that when the ultimate issues require
value judgments that are not susceptible to "proof," the check
afforded by the procedural protections of a hearing may be even less
worthwhile-especially when one considers the costs in time and
energy involved in such procedural checks."
"quasi-judicial" determination, exceptionally affecting in each case a very small number of per-
sons upon individual grounds, or perhaps where a totally unjustified departure from long stand-
ing procedure is involved. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519, 542 (1978); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224,
242, 245 (1973).
93. 239 U.S. 441 (1915). In Bi-Metallic, "Justice Holmes articulated the basic procedural
distinction between rulemaking and adjudication that prevails to this day." Verkuil, supra note
48, at 264 n.22. Bi-Metallic is often read together with Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908),
another case involving a Denver property dispute. "Upon this unlikely foundation much of the
structure of procedural due process has been erected." A. BoNrML & M. AsIMow, supra note
42, at 94.
94. Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S at 445.
95. Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. Cm. L. Rav. 401, 404 (1975) (suggesting practical solutions to the
problem).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 405. He suggests that these reasons include the lack of clear-cut supporting exam-
ples and the fact that the political process might respond only to large numbers of affected
persons.
98. Id. at 407 (footnote omitted).
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Williams had to qualify this justification further because, as he con-
ceded, "[w]henever the perception of raw data is at stake, or doubts
are raised about the analytical underpinnings of competing inferences,
those requirements may play more or less the role that they do when a
rule is being applied to a historical episode." 99 He ultimately dis-
counted the utility of additional procedures, on the assumption that
agencies can avoid the correction of factual errors made during rule-
making by recasting their fact-finding as value judgments.' ° Thus,
when reduced to its core, the challenge raised by Bi-Metallic is to find
a way to prevent agencies from accomplishing this maneuver.
To the extent that a system can be designed to operate with reasona-
ble efficiency and to increase assurance that faulty factual premises
will be identified and corrected, such a system holds promise as a
method of improving agency accountability during rulemaking. Putt-
ing aside efficiency concerns, an adjudicatory system holds promise
because it seems more likely to discover errors in legislative as well as
adjudicative facts. Professor Glen Robinson notes:
Challenges to the suitability of adjudicative methods (particularly the
reliance on testimonial evidence and cross-examination) where the
issues involve policy planning, appear to rest in large part on the
notion that "policy," or, to use Professor Davis' phrase, "legislative
fact," is something pure, uncontaminated by particular data and
questions, assumptions, opinions and biases which have been
regarded as properly the subject of such methods in other contexts.' 0'
This premise is debatable. As Professor Robinson states, "a judgment
on policy or 'legislative fact' invariably involves an admixture of par-
ticular facts, opinions, and biases, some of which may and some of
which may not be appropriate for exploration by testimony and cross-
examination." 0 2
Professor Robinson also challenges the theory that "predictive
judgments or forecasts are a class apart from 'historical facts', and
techniques of testimonial proof and cross-examination are inappropri-
ate" in the case of predicative judgment. 03 He suggests that, in both
cases, "the determination must almost invariably rest on general con-
99. Id. (footnote omitted).
100. Id. at 407-08.
101. Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and
Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 521 (1970).
102. Id. Accord Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contributions of Judge Harold Leven-
thai to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 911 (1980) ("[Ajdjudicatory procedures
may be helpful in illuminating even decisions turning on legislative facts." (footnote omitted)).
103. Robinson, supra note 101, at 522.
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clusions that are inferred from particular factual data and an evalua-
tion of probabilities that may be as appropriate for testimonial proof
and cross-examination' '1 4 as questions of historical fact. He also sug-
gests that, even absent dispute about specific identifiable "facts," it
may still be desirable to force the agency, through cross-examination
of its experts, to disclose the particular premises, including facts, opi-
nions, and reasoning, which underlie its "policy" conclusions. 105
There are, of course, efficiency costs in adopting a system based
upon an adjudicatory model;1°6 however, those costs do not clearly
outweigh any possible benefits from the use of adjudicatory methods.
The challenge is one of design: Can we structure a participatory re-
gime that will efficiently capture the accuracy benefits of the adjudica-
tory methods in a way that will provide net benefits to the rulemaking
process?
Allowing input from affected interests has been a standard solution
to the problem of rulemaking's preclusive effects.'0 Beyond efficiency
costs, this solution has two basic limitations: first, uniform rules have
benefits,es even though uniformity limits the agency's sensitivity to
individual concerns during rulemaking; second, rules shaped by citi-
zen participation may reflect the unequal resources of the rulemaking
participants.'°9 The first problem poses the question of how responsive
to affected interests we want to make the rulemaking process. The
answer represents a choice of political values." 0 The second problem
104. Id.
105. Id. (footnote omitted).
106. Professor Richard Pierce identifies three ways rulemaking enhances efficiency:
[Rulemaking] avoids the needless cost and delay of finding legislative facts through
trial-type procedures; it eliminates the need to relitigate policy issues in the context of
disputes with no material differences in adjudicative facts; and, it yields much clearer
'rules' than can be extracted from a decision resolving a specific dispute.
Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia
Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 308. The draw out
adversely effects only the first of these efficiencies.
107. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1667
(1975) (describing the interest participation model).
108. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 H~Av. L. Rav.
1685, 1696 (1976).
109. Pierce & Shapiro, Political and Judicial Review of Agency Action, 59 TEX. L. REV.
1175, 1196 (1981) ("Since interest groups primarily represent business groups and the well-to-do,
many citizens go unrepresented." (footnotes omitted)).
110. Professor Shapiro suggests that:
From the founding of the republic, Americans have embraced two opposing modes of
public administration, the democratic and the technocratic. The former, which we
might term the Jacksonian tradition, calls for government by the common people
themselves, or at least by administrators directly representative of and responsive to
the people .... The opposing, Federalist tradition, first advocated by Hamilton,
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poses a question of whether a participatory system can be designed
that does not increase the advantages of those with wealth and power.
Florida's innovative draw out procedure attempts to meet this chal-
lenge by making those whose substantial interests are affected respon-
sible for objecting to agency decisions and by making the agency
responsible for meeting their objections, when timely and competently
made."' The draw out is thus a response to the challenge of institu-
tional design: it provides individuals a time-limited opportunity during
the rulemaking process to protect their substantial interests" 2 from the
choices agencies incorporate in valid rules." 3 This opportunity is par-
stresses the need for efficient government and thus the need for an administration
staffed not by an ever-changing stream of Know-Nothings, but by experts.
Shapiro, supra note 42, at 1495-96 (footnote omitted).
111. In this way, the draw out can be viewed as an attempt to merge our democratic and
technocratic traditions. The draw out responds to the technocratic tradition by recognizing vari-
ous kinds of expertise and empowering all involved, rather than assuming agency expertise in all
aspects of decisionmaking. The draw out provision treats affected persons as experts on how
proposed policy will affect their substantial interests. It treats the DOAH hearing officer as the
expert fact finder, and limits the autonomy of the agency to the area of its special expertise. This
approach is responsive to the democratic tradition because it empowers affected persons in the
process of policy creation and because it forces agencies to take account of opposition to the
factual and policy content of its rules.
112. The Florida APA was designed to guarantee greater adjudicatory process than does the
United States Constitution in connection with rulemaking. For this reason, it is "revolutionary":
Policymaking organs in our system of government have never operated under a consti-
tutional constraint requiring them to afford every interested member of the public an
opportunity to present testimony before any policy is adopted. ... To recognize a
constitutional right to participate directly in government policymaking would work a
revolution in existing government practices.
Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 284 (1984).
113. Two other administrative remedies provided by the act are available to challenge rules:
section 120.54(4), which authorizes proposed rule challenges, and section 120.56, which author-
izes existing rule challenges. Section 120.54(4) authorizes persons who are substantially affected
by a proposed rule to file a proposed rule challenge with the Division of Administrative Hear-
ings. Section 120.56 authorizes similar challenges to existing rules. These proceedings are availa-
ble to raise the issue of whether proposed or existing rules are an "invalid exercise of delegated
legislative authority," as that phrase is defined in section 120.52(8). They are heard and decided
by a DOAH hearing officer. The proposed rule challenge is decided while the rulemaking pro-
ceeding is pending before the agency. If the challengers can demonstrate that the proposed or
existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, the hearing officer is author-
ized to invalidate the proposed or existing rule. Only one other state, Missouri, has provided for
an administrative challenge to adopted rules. Dore, supra note 49, at 1034 (noting that some
other states provide for court challenges). The availability of these remedies may appear to
threaten one of the premises of the argument-that rules have a preclusive effect-because they
allow the invalidation of rules, even after they are adopted, since substantially affected persons
can wait until the rule is applied to them, demand a section 120.57 hearing on the matter, and
then simultaneously file a section 120.56 challenge to the rule's validity.
While the availability of rule challenge remedies may appear to mitigate the preclusive effect
of rules, it does so only in cases where the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority. There are many cases involving important disputes in rulemaking that do not rise to
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ticularly important in Florida because agencies are not permitted to
deviate from their own rules.14
The draw out should clearly be available in the situations discussed
by Professors Bonfield and Davis."' However, the draw out is in-
tended to be available in other situations as well, such as cases where
the disputed facts are described as "legislative." The draw out is
available because without it, the individual whose substantial interests
are affected in the rulemaking is forever denied the protection pro-
vided by section 120.57 in connection with the agency's decision. The
draw out is intended to be available where disputes arise concerning
policy choices because section 120.57 provides minimum standards for
determining disputed policy choices that affect substantial interests.
The Legislature recognized that the adoption of policy by rule frees an
agency from substantiating the policy when applied, thereby preclud-
ing those whose substantial interests are affected from invoking proce-
dures mandated by section 120.57 to examine the policy judgments
embodied in the rule. 1 6
The draw out provides more protection against preclusive rules than
do the procedures guaranteed by section 120.54(3)."' In section
120.54(3) proceedings, affected persons may speak, but the agency is
the level of invalidity. In those cases, the factual and policy choices made in rulemaking have a
preclusive effect and are not subject to challenge either in a section 120.57 proceeding, available
when the rule is enforced, or by rule challenge. Since in those situations the agency is making
decisions of a final nature about substantial interests without the procedural protections guaran-
teed by section 120.57, a draw out should be available.
114. Section 120.68(12)(b) was amended in 1984 to require an agency to follow its own rules.
Ch. 84-173, 1984 Fla. Laws 523-24. This amendment was intended to overrule Best Western
Tivoli Inn v. Department of Transportation, 435 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), which found
that an agency may deviate from its rules if it provides an explanation. See Staff of Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Govtl. Ops. HB 173 (1984) Staff Analysis 6, 7 (Apr. 16, 1984) (on file with the
author).
115. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text. State involvement in local zoning deci-
sions in the Florida Keys exemplifies these situations. The draw out has been used in rulemaking
concerning land use in the Florida Keys. See, e.g., In re Petitions for Draw-Out Proceedings
Pursuant to Section 120.54(17), F.S., Concerning the Dep't of Community Affairs' Proposed
Rules 9J-14.006 and 9J-15.006, Case No. 88-1067 RGM et. al. (1989) (25 consolidated cases)
(Recommended Order and Acceptance and Adoption of Hearing Officer's Recommended Order
on file with the author). The proposed rules at issue in that case disapproved of the petitioners'
map amendment requests that the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners had ap-
proved. The adoption of those proposed rules would have resulted in the denial of each of the
petitioners' individual rezoning requests. See FLA. STAT. Ch. 380 (1985). Therefore, the Depart-
ment determined that normal rulemaking proceedings under section 120.54 were not adequate to
protect the petitioners' substantial interests. Such rulemaking may also raise due process con-
cerns. See Allen v. Martinez, 573 So. 2d 987 (1991).
116. For further discussion of nonrule policy in Florida, see infra notes 328-33 and accompa-
nying text.
117. The draw out provides more procedural protection and improves the dynamics of inter-
action with the agency.
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not required to respond." 8 Section 120.54(3) may be sufficient when
the agency is acting without full knowledge of the facts or understand-
ing of the policy. However, it is inadequate to protect substantial in-
terests where the problem is not that the agency is uninformed, but
rather that it is unconvinced. The opportunity to hear the agency's
response to the input it receives when deciding the factual and policy
choices is essential to an "adequate opportunity to protect" substan-
tial interests. Without some response, it may be impossible to discern
the nature of the decisionmaker's concerns and, thus, to tailor the
presentation to address those concerns. Also, where an agency is not
required to express its reasons for discounting or rejecting input, nei-
ther the affected persons nor the courts will have a firm basis for un-
derstanding the agency's decision. Instead, the agency's reasons may
remain obscured, even during judicial review.
The dynamics of the draw out thus facilitate information exchange.
By making the agency a party, the draw out places the agency in a
position where it cannot stand mute and only receive input. Instead,
the agency must meet the evidence and argument presented by the par-
ticipant in the draw out with evidence and argument of its own. Oth-
erwise, the agency could not reject adverse fact findings made by the
hearing officer since there would not be competent and substantial ev-
idence in the record to justify the agency's substituted findings of
fact."19
Those who participated in drafting the Florida APA and in design-
ing the innovative draw out procedure were aware of traditional justi-
fications for the absence of formal procedures in rulemaking-
concerns that efficiency must be maintained and beliefs that proce-
dural opportunities would simply magnify the effect of resource dis-
parity among those affected by agency action. The Florida Legislature
responded to these concerns, but how it did so cannot be fully under-
stood without an examination of the act's approach to judicial review.
II. OPPORTUNITM S FOR JuDIc1A INP T IN RULEMAYING
Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, represents a clear departure from
the models of judicial review reflected in the federal APA and the
118. Whitehall Boca v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 456 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1984) (in a section 120.54(3) proceeding, "the administrative hearing officer advised the
parties that ... he and his staff would not conduct a 'question and answer session,' as it was the
department's primary duty ... 'to listen rather than to speak."'). All agencies do not necessar-
ily follow this procedure, but the act seems to have been construed to permit this approach.
119. The draw out thereby solves "a recurring problem of the administrative process: the
apparent insensitivity of agencies to communications addressed to them." Hamilton, Procedures
for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in
Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CA~n'. L. Rv. 1276, 1314 (1972).
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1961 Revised Model Act (RMA). By providing detailed guidelines for
judicial review of agency action, designed to limit the exercise of judi-
cial discretion in ways that affect the substance of agency rules.120 The
reviewing court must "deal separately with disputed issues of agency
procedure, interpretations of law, determinations of fact, or policy
within the agency's exercise of delegated discretion." 2 If the agency
fails to follow required procedures or has made a material error in
procedure that may have impaired the fairness of the proceedings or
the correctness of the action, the court must remand the case for fur-
ther agency action.'2 If the agency has erroneously interpreted a pro-
vision of law and a correct interpretation compels a particular action,
the court must either set aside or modify the agency action, or remand
the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation
of the provision.'1 If the agency's action depended upon any fact
found by the agency in a proceeding meeting the requirements of sec-
tion 120.57, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency regarding the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding
of fact; it may only set aside the agency action or remand the case to
the agency if it has found that the agency's action depended on a find-
ing of fact unsupported by competent and substantial evidence.'
2A
Where discretionary policy choices are involved, the court is not
permitted to substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Re-
mand to the agency is required when the court finds that the agency's
exercise of discretion is outside the range of discretion delegated to the
120. Section 120.68 does not distinguish between the review of rules and the review of orders
when it specifies the parameters of judicial review. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1989).
121. Id. § 120.68(7).
122. Section 120.68(8) provides:
The court shall remand the case for further agency action if it finds that either the
fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action may have been impaired by
a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure. Failure of
any agency to comply with s. 120.53 shall be presumed to be a material error in proce-
dure.
123. Section 120.68(9) provides:
If the court finds that the agency has erroneously interpreted a provision of law and
that a correct interpretation compels a particular action, it shall:
(a) Set aside or modify the agency action, or
(b) Remand the case to the agency for further action under a correct interpretation of
the provision of law.
124. Section 120.68(10) provides:
If the agency's action depends on any fact found by the agency in a proceeding meet-
ing the requirements of s. 120.57, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that
of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact. The
court shall, however, set aside agency action or remand the case to the agency if it
finds that the agency's action depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by
competent substantial evidence in the record.
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agency by law, is inconsistent with agency rule, is inconsistent with an
officially stated agency policy or prior agency practice (if the devia-
tion is not explained), or otherwise violates constitutional or statutory
provisions. 2 5 The court's decision may be mandatory, prohibitory, or
declaratory in form. 26 Section 120.68 is designed to eliminate review
of agency action based upon nebulous standards, such as the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard of review. Section 120.68(14) man-
dates that "[u]nless the court finds a ground for setting aside,
modifying, remanding, or ordering agency action or ancillary relief
under a specified provision of this section, it shall affirm the agency's
action."1 27 Thus, the drafters of section 120.68 established clear para-
meters for judicial review of agency action and limited both the mat-
ters that may be reviewed and the manner in which that review may be
accomplished. The Florida APA provides significantly more detail in
this area than do most other administrative procedure acts.'
The Reporter's Comments note the innovative nature of the Florida
APA's judicial review provisions and describe the "more detailed
analysis of how courts should review agency action" as one of the key
125. Section 120.68(12) provides:
The court shall remand the case to the agency if it finds the agency's exercise of dis-
cretion to be:
(a) Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by law;
(b) Inconsistent with an agency rule;
(c) Inconsistent with an officially stated agency policy or a prior agency practice, if
deviation therefrom is not explained by the agency; or
(d) Otherwise in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
but the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on an issue of
discretion.
126. Section 120.68(13) provides:
(a) The decision of the reviewing court may be mandatory, prohibitory, or declaratory
in form; and it shall provide whatever relief is appropriate irrespective of the original
form of the petition. The court may:
1. Order agency action required by law, order agency exercise of discretion when re-
quired by law, set aside agency action, remand the case for further agency proceed-
ings, or decide the rights, privileges, obligations, requirements, or procedures at issue
between the parties; and
2. Order such ancillary relief as the court finds necessary to redress the effects of
official action wrongfully taken or withheld.
(b) If the court sets aside agency action or remands the case to the agency for further
proceedings, it may make such interlocutory order as the court finds necessary to pre-
serve the interests of any party and the public pending further proceedings or agency
action.
127. Id. § 120.68(14).
128. The 1961 Model Act "contains no express standards to guide courts when they deter-
mine the validity of a rule." A. BoituLD, supra note 52, at 574. Section 5-116 of the 1981
Model Act, on the other hand, provides for a number of specific grounds for invalidating agency
rules. Section 120.68, the Florida Statute governing judicial review, is arguably even more spe-
cific.
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provisions which distinguishes the proposed act from existing prac-
tice.' 1  Section 120.68 also notably differs from the federal APA, in
that it does not use the words "arbitrary" or "capricious" when de-
scribing judicial review. The omission was not an oversight-it was
part of a considered decision to limit the scope of judicial review of
administrative action. 30
This decision reflects a recognition of the problems involved in al-
lowing courts to make post hoc evaluations of decisions agencies
make during rulemaking.13' Section 120.68 directs the courts to con-
sider whether the agency has committed a material error in proce-
dure, 32 whether the agency has correctly interpreted the statute it was
implementing, 3 3 whether its rule is supported by competent, substan-
tial evidence, '34 and whether the agency's exercise of discretion has ex-
ceeded the discretion delegated to it by the Legislature. 13
129. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 27-28. Florida has been a model for other states
in this regard. The Florida APA incorporated detailed standards for judicial review years before
that innovation was included in the 1981 MSAPA. A. BONFIELD, supra note 52, at 555 ("the
provisions of the new Model Act governing judicial review of agency rules are much more de-
tailed than those found in existing APAs .... "). Florida's standards are at least as detailed, if
not more detailed, than those adopted in the 1981 MSAPA. Compare FLA. STAT. §§ 120.68(7)-
(14) (1989) with 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 5-116, at 127.
130. The Reporter's Comments note: "This more detailed analysis of how courts should
review agency action is designed to provide more precise guidelines in Florida than ambiguous
provisions such as RMA 15(g)." Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 27. Section 15(g) of the
RMA provides:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of
the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or
remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision
if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) affected by other error of law;
(5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record; or
(6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwar-
ranted exercise of discretion.
1961 MODEL ACT, supra note 12, § 15(g), at 301-02.
131. Section 120.68 tried to answer the difficult question of what degree of deference courts
should give to agency decisions. "Over-deferential judicial review can leave agencies free to ig-
nore legislative policy. At the same time, review can become so nondeferential that judges substi-
tute their policy preferences for the agencies'." Shapiro & Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 865 (footnote
omitted).
132. FLA. STAT. § 120.68(8) (1989).
133. Id. § 120.68(9).
134. Id. § 120.68(10).
135. Id. § 120.68(12).
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However, the Florida APA does not put its faith only in these legal
apothegms. Experience with judicial review of agency action has
shown that even stern reminders that judges should not substitute
their judgment for that of the agency on matters of discretion do not
alone effectively curtail such activity. This has caused some commen-
tators to become cynical concerning review standards. 3 6 The Florida
APA attempts an innovative solution to this problem.
The Legislature restructured judicial review to rely on a system that
compartmentalizes the decisionmaking process and separates power
by assigning discrete responsibilities to the various actors in the proc-
ess, rather than placing its faith in words alone.17 The APA relies on
individuals whose substantial interests will be affected by proposed
rules to assure that controversial issues are presented and decided be-
fore rules are adopted. The draw out enables them to use adjudicatory
methods to develop detailed agency explanations concerning fact and
policy choices that the final rule reflects, and also to develop an evi-
dentiary context that will permit those conclusions to be carefully ex-
amined. Thus, the value of the record produced depends on the vigor
and skill of the participants.
The hearing officer plays the role of neutral decisionmaker in that
process, hearing and evaluating the evidence, ruling on proposed find-
ings, and submitting a recommended order to the agency consisting of
both findings of fact and conclusions of law. The agency must play
two roles: the role of litigant in the draw out, responding to the parti-
cipant's evidence and argument, and the role of ultimate decision-
maker, reviewing the proceedings as a whole before entering the final
order and proceeding to adopt a rule. The disputed choices reflected
in the final order must be supported by competent evidence in the rec-
ord and explained to the extent they vary from the order recom-
mended by the hearing officer.
136. "Some observers of the administrative scene purport to believe that rules concerning
judicial review 'have no more substance at the core than a seedless grape' and that in essence
'legal formulae governing the scope of review . .. tend to be little more than convenient labels
attached to results reached without their aid."' Byse, Scope of Judicial Review in Informal Rule-
making, 33 ADnN. L. REv. 183, 193 (1981) (quoting Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives in Ad-
ministrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 771, 780 (1975)).
137. The power of courts conducting judicial review is directly related to the power of
words. "The principal control mechanisms in our system of government are words in law books.
This elementary truth makes courts the primary institutions for agency control, because courts
are the official interpreters of the sacred constitutional and statutory texts." DeLong, New Wine
for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REv. 399, 411 (1986) (foot-
note omitted). Because it makes outcomes less dependent upon the interpretation of words, and
more reliant on compartmentalized decisionmaking, the act makes it possible to limit the power
of courts in the administrative process.
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The draw out thus sets the basis for a disciplined judicial review.
The system not only allows courts to focus on particular disputes, but
also provides them with a detailed, yet manageable, record on each
disputed point. When a party argues that a particular finding should
be adopted, it directs the hearing officer to the evidence in the record
it believes supports that point. If the hearing officer refuses to accept
a proposed finding, he or she must explain the decision. If the agency
rejects a finding in a recommended order, it too must explain why.
Thus, on contested points, the record will contain arguments that
identify evidence and rejections of findings that include reasons so
that the factual and policy reasons for each choice are clear. By the
time a court is called upon to review the final order, the nature of the
dispute, the evidence involved, the positions of all involved, and their
reasons for arguing or deciding in the ways they did, should all be
before the court. The court must then review these proceedings under
the specific dictates of section 120.68.13 s In such a review, it is neither
helpful nor appropriate to argue generally that a rule emerging from
the process is "arbitrary" or "capricious." Section 120.68 separates
issues involving procedure, evidentiary support, legal authority, inter-
pretations of law, and discretionary choice so that such matters do not
come together and blur the court's focus. 139
The nature and intended effect of the innovation were recognized
shortly after the Florida APA was adopted. Professor Donald Brodie
and Professor (now Justice) Hans Linde praised the judicial review
provisions of the act: "An important innovation [of the Florida APA]
is the deliberate omission of the accordion-like terms 'arbitrary,' 'ca-
pricious,' and 'abuse.' In place of these familiar epithets, the statute
requires the reviewing court to analyze the component elements of
agency actions which involve discretion."14° The Brodie and Linde ar-
ticle argues in favor of a new generation of statutory procedures and
holds up the Florida and Wisconsin Administrative Procedure Acts as
specific models.' 4 ' Their article is particularly complimentary of sec-
tion 120.68: "The Florida scope of review section sets new standards
for judicial surveillance of agency fairness, rationality, and compli-
ance with assigned goals. Not only is reversal by epithet excluded, but
court and counsel are directed to identify and dispose of one issue at a
138. For a more detailed discussion of those requirements, see supra notes 120-35 and ac-
companying text.
139. FLA. STAT. § 120.68 (1989).
140. Brodie & Linde, State Court Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of
Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 559-60. Linde participated in the Washington drafting session
that produced the initial draft of the Florida APA. Levinson, supra note 17, at 621 n.9.
141. Brodie & Linde, supra note 140, at 558.
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time.' ' 42 Brodie and Linde contrast the more explicit and detailed
standards of review in Florida with the federal approach, which they
note is generally traced back to the Supreme Court's opinion in Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.143 Overton Park was
based on the federal APA's judicial review section, which specifically
provided for an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. '"
III. EFFICIENCY CONCERNS AND THE BALANCE STRUCK BETWEEN CIT-
IZEN PARTICIPATION, AGENCY ACTION, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
As already noted, the Legislature was fully sensitive to the tradi-
tional fear that introducing evidentiary proceedings into the rulemak-
ing process could so encumber the process as to effectively destroy an
agency's regulatory power. The Legislature responded to this concern
in two ways. First, it structured the draw out to effectively process the
information received while minimizing possibilities for its abuse. Sec-
ond, as we have seen, it sought to enhance the efficiency of judicial
review by limiting its scope and increasing its precision.
The draw out procedure minimizes efficiency costs by limiting the
opportunity to invoke it as a remedy. It is available only where a sub-
stantially affected person appears at a section 120.54(3) hearing
(which cannot be requested any later than twenty-one days after publi-
cation of notice of the agency's intent to adopt a proposed rule) and
makes the showing required to obtain a draw out before the conclu-
sion of that hearing. 45 This limited window of opportunity assures
that only the most vigilant interests will seek to take advantage of the
draw out in ordinary cases and that only the most controversial rules
will mobilize less vigilant interests within that time period.
The draw out also preserves efficiency by placing the burden on citi-
zens to invoke the draw out by coming forward with their objections,
provide evidentiary support for those objections, and propose find-
ings if they desire specific rulings. The agency is not required to in-
clude in the record detailed justifications of its choices independent of
the matters raised in the draw out proceeding. Thus, the draw out
does not mandate rulemaking "on the record"-the Florida APA
contains no requirement that the content of rules rest only on what is
142. Id. at 563.
143. Id. at 555. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Over-
ton Park was for many years "the leading federal case on review of discretion." A. BONFrELD &
M. AsiMow, supra note 42, at 618.
144. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
145. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989); FLA. ADmIN. CODE R. 28-5.604 (1990).
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in the record of the agency hearing.' 46The draw out does provide per-
sons whose substantial interests are affected by a proposed rule with
an opportunity to demonstrate that the rule's factual premises are not
supported by substantial evidence or that the policy choices do not
follow logically from the agency's premises. However, aspects of the
rule which are not challenged need not be supported.
Concerns about the problem of differential access are valid; only
those who can mobilize quickly can participate. Nevertheless, the
draw out procedure creates meaningful opportunities for those with
less political power. 147 Politically powerful interests generally have re-
sources to influence agency choices in rulemaking without a draw out.
The draw out provides the less politically powerful with a mechanism
to bring the power of facts and logic to bear on the rulemaking pro-
cess. 48
The limitations on judicial review also enhance the efficiency of the
process. The draw out's compartmentalization of functions assures
that all participants will use their particular expertise to develop a
complete, yet focused, record. The review limitations in section 120.68
make reversal based upon vague concerns or upon disagreement with
the agency's exercise of discretion quite difficult. Compartmentaliza-
tion, together with the limitation on the courts' role and court inter-
vention, lessen the likelihood that rulemaking proceedings will need to
continue after the conclusion of judicial review. Unfortunately, the
Florida courts have disregarded this statutory scheme, so the act's in-
novations have never had an opportunity to operate effectively.
146. In federal law, formal rulemaking is on the record. Davis has suggested, "[rules are
made on the record when their factual content rests only on the record plus what is officially
noticed, even though ideas about law and policy come from outside the record." K. DAVIS,
supra note 50, § 6:3, at 454. In contrast, where formal rulemaking is required in the federal
system, "the record of the administrative hearing preceding formal rule making is exclusive, in
that 'upon it, and no other evidence, the further administrative proceedings must be had, the
final administrative decision made, and judicial review be confined."' Auerbach, Informal Rule
Making: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedures and Judicial Review, 72
Nw. U.L. REv. 15, 16 (1977) (footnote omitted) (quoting SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
79th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON THE ADMONISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Comm. Print 1945),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADmINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1946, S. Doc. No.
248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1946)).
147. For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 355-63 and accompanying text.
148. Nevertheless, standing problems may make it difficult for some affected interests to
have an effective voice in this process. For example, where an agency proposes a rule changing
eligibility standards in a benefit program such as unemployment compensation, identifying any
person whose substantial interests will be affected by that rule may be impossible; the rule would
not be applied to current applicants, and those to whom it will later be applied probably have
not yet become unemployed. However, even with these concerns, differential access problems
seem manageable, provided that the courts do not take a restrictive view of access requirements.
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IV. THE FLORIDA APA AND THE FLORIDA COURTS: FROM BALINo
(1977) TO ADAM SITH (1989), AND BEYOND
Florida courts have largely misconstrued the provisions of the Flor-
ida APA reviewed in the previous parts. I have provided an account
of the Legislature's intent when it enacted sections 120.54(3),
120.54(17), and 120.68 of the Florida APA. A different vision, how-
ever, has guided practice in Florida, one clouded by a return to the
labels and characterizations that the Florida APA was designed to re-
ject. The courts seem to have forgotten that the act represented a con-
scious legislative decision to create different procedures than those
adopted in other jurisdictions. Instead, federal law has strongly influ-
enced the court's construction of the Florida APA. In sum, the courts
have prevented effective implementation of the innovative procedures
specifically fashioned by the Florida Legislature. I develop these
points in the part that follows.
A. Section 120.54(3)- The Public Hearing
The first major case considering section 120.54(3) is the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's decision in Balino v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services. 49 In Balino, nursing home patients requested
a hearing during rulemaking pursuant to section 120.54(3) on a pro-
posed rule defining eligibility for the highest level of nursing care
funded by the medicaid program.150 The patients sought to present ev-
idence and argument concerning what they believed were weaknesses
in the proposed rule. They attempted to demonstrate that the pro-
posed definitions were "(1) incomplete because they fail[ed] to define
all the criteria required to be defined in the order [entered in earlier
proceedings that had required the rulemaking by] HRS Secretary Page
and (2) unworkable."'' The patients attempted to do this by calling
149. 362 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979). I was lead
counsel for America Balino and the other nursing home patients who sought to participate in the
rulemaking involved in that case. One of my opposing counsel has also written about the case.
Waas, The Limits Upon the Administrative Procedure Act's Drawout Remedy, 52 FLA. B.J. 815
(1978). The Balino decision is also one of the leading decisions construing section 120.54(17), an
aspect of the decision that will be discussed in the next section.
150. The dispute centered on additions to the rule which were being used to determine
whether medicaid nursing home patients were entitled to receive the highest level of care. In a
prior administrative proceeding, the patients had secured an order requiring the Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services to add definitions to key terms in the rule in order to remove
ambiguities that had created enforcement difficulties. Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab.
Servs., 348 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
151. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 25. The department was conducting a rulemaking procedure in an
attempt to comply with the earlier order that provided: "[the rule] . . . will be amended to in-
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as witnesses those who worked with and applied the proposed rule."52
They also attempted to invoke the rule excluding potential witnesses
from the hearing while other witnesses were being examined. The
hearing officer denied the patients the right to present any evidence,
and instead invited their counsel to "comment" on the proposed
rule." 3 The rule was subsequently adopted and the patients appealed.
The court's ruling is unremarkable in its effect. The court recog-
nized that section 120.54(3) required the patients, as persons whose
interests were affected by the rule, to be permitted to present evidence
as well as argument. The court therefore remanded the case, directing
the department to reconvene a rulemaking hearing within thirty days
and to consider the patients' claim that their interests could not be
adequately protected by a hearing conducted pursuant to section
120.54(3). 154
The reasoning the court used to reach its result is remarkable. It
looked to federal decisions construing the procedures required under
informal notice and comment rulemaking, as it decided the proper
construction of the Florida APA. It cited federal law when it weighed
the contentions of individuals denied an opportunity to present evi-
dence and argument. It quoted section 553(c) of the federal APA,111
and it quoted from law review commentary on the purposes of infor-
clude definitions and examples of key words and phrases, such as, 'nurse'; 'professional person';
'technical person'; 'available on a twenty-four hour basis'; 'which as a practical matter can only
be provided in a skilled nursing care facility on an inpatient basis."' Brief for Petitioner at 3 n.2,
Balino, 362 So. 2d at 21 (No. HH-177) (on file with the author). The proposed rule was largely
unresponsive to that order:
Of the five key words and phrases which were ordered defined and illustrated with
examples by the Secretary, two are still undefined, and three still contain no examples.
Three terms have been defined which do not appear in the text of the Rule. The De-
partment was successful in defining three of the terms which were ordered defined.
However, only one of those terms, "Professional Person," was both defined and il-
lustrated by examples as required by the Order which mandated the rulemaking pro-
ceeding.
Id, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
152. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 25.
153. Id. at 24. At that point, the patients sought to draw out the proceedings pursuant to
section 120.54(17). That request was also denied. See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this aspect of the case.
154. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 27. If the agency determined on remand that the patients' interests
could not be adequately protected in section 120.54(3) proceedings, then it would be required to
grant the draw out request. The most controversial aspect of the relief was the court's refusal to
vacate the rule that it found had been adopted through seriously defective procedures. For fur-
ther discussion of this point, see infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
155. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988) provides: "After notice required by this section, the agency
shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission
of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. .. ."
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mal rulemaking in the federal system. 56 Nowhere did the court recog-
nize the Florida APA's intended departures from federal rulemaking
procedure. 5 7
Instead, the court rested its decision on the same characterizations
the Florida Legislature explicitly repudiated'58 and characterized the
rulemaking proceeding as "a quasi-legislative, information-gathering
type [of proceeding], which in theory at least, does not adjudicate the
rights of any particular individual."' 5 9 The court's analysis is also in-
consistent with the preclusive effect rules have on substantial interests.
Rules employed to decide questions of fact and policy before they are
applied in the context of adjudication and which are not open for dis-
cussion in subsequent adjudication, clearly determine the rights of
particular individuals on those questions.60
Having reverted to the "quasi-legislative" characterization, the Bal-
ino court used it very differently than it had been used in the past.
Under the old act, the characterization was used to limit hearing op-
portunities. In Balino, however, the court used it to justify its ongoing
hostility towards the use of adjudicative procedures in rulemaking, on
the curious ground that such procedures might enable the agency to
limit citizen input. The court argued that, since section 120.54(3)
could not be viewed as an adversary proceeding,
[t]he agency has no right, as a litigant in an adversary proceeding
might have, to protect itself from evidence or argument that may be
unfavorable. The officer conducting the hearing must make every
effort to assure those present have fair opportunity to present
evidence and argument which is material to the rules in question and
appropriate under the circumstances.' 6 '
156. Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 362 So. 2d 21, 25 n.3 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979).
157. Despite its citation to federal law, the court did not find that section 120.54(3) proceed-
ings should be conducted like federal informal rulemaking proceedings, and it did not limit par-
ticipation in rulemaking proceedings to "notice and comment." Id.
158. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
159. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 24.
160. Section 120.54(3) provides only one type of opportunity to participate in the rulemaking
process. The draw out may be a better forum for protecting substantial interests from the preclu-
sive effects of rules. See infra notes 308-14 and accompanying text for further discussion of this
point.
161. Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 362 So. 2d 21, 24 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979). This injunction requiring the agencies to listen to
input has been used by some agencies as an excuse for refusing to participate in dialogue during
section 120.54(3) proceedings. See, e.g., Whitehall Boca v. Department of Health and Rehab.
Servs., 456 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (Department's duty during section 120.54(3)
proceeding is 'to listen rather than to speak."' (quoting the HRS official who conducted the
hearing)).
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Thus, the courts have used the act's concern for citizen input to imple-
ment their hostility towards adjudicatory process during rulemak-
ing.162
The characterization of rulemaking as quasi-legislative appears in
various commentaries as well. Professor Levinson describes the sec-
tion 120.54(3) proceeding as "an informal, quasi-legislative proceed-
ing." 63 Balino cites that article when it describes rulemaking as quasi-
legislative.'6 Professor Patricia Dore indicated in an article that
formed part of a Symposium issue on the newly enacted APA, that
"[ifn my opinion, the opportunity contemplated by section 120.54(2)
[now section 120.54(3)] is a public hearing of the legislative fact gath-
ering type."'' 65 This view was confirmed in Balino and further devel-
oped by Professor Dore in a later writing. 166
The "quasi-legislative" characterization of rulemaking has led
courts and commentators to suggest that the public hearing held in
connection with rulemaking should be conducted like a "legislative"
hearing. 67 While it is true that "[nlotice and comment rulemaking
proceedings are modeled on the representative political process of the
legislative branch of government,"'" it does not necessarily follow
that section 120.54(3) hearings should be conducted as legislative hear-
ings. If agencies follow the legislative hearing model, significant limi-
tations may be placed on the type of presentation an affected person
will be permitted to make. The legislative hearing model suggests a
162. The court's approach also suggests a shift in judicial beliefs. It suggests that the judici-
ary may no longer be convinced of the value of adjudication as an engine for discovering truth.
This is all the more surprising in light of the assumption, shared by the judicial decisions under
the old APA and by the Legislature in the enactment of the present APA, that adjudicatory
methods are the greatest engine for the discovery of truth.
163. Levinson, supra note 17, at 634.
164. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 24 n.2.
165. Dore, Rulemaking Innovations Under the New Administrative Procedure Act, 3 FLA.
ST. U.L. REv. 97, 98 (1975).
166. Dore, supra note 49, at 1000-03.
167. This suggests a much different kind of hearing than the one that has been described
here.
At first blush, the procedural trappings of a [legislative] hearing might give the unini-
tiated the impression that its primary purpose is to dig objectively into the facts which
prompted the introduction of a bill, to check the claims concerning the means-end
hypotheses, and to explore the efficacy of the value judgments which are in-
volved.... But once the hearing is under way, it soon becomes evident that the pro-
cedure is not geared for a critical study of the three component elements of a bill.
Witness after witness makes an appearance, states his name and connections, and usu-
ally proceeds to read from a prepared statement .... [Miaterials .. .are inserted
into the record without critical analysis and discussion .... [T]he evidentiary materi-
als presented by the witness are often apt to go unchallenged.
Cohen, Hearing on a Bill: Legislative Folklore? 37 MnM. L. REv. 34, 39-40 (1952).
168. A. BopmLD, supra note 52, at 185.
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presentation controlled by the agency, which might allow an affected
person to testify, and may involve questions asked by the agency
about the testimony. This is no different from permitting oral com-
ment, and is not the same as permitting the affected person to make
an evidentiary presentation.
Section 120.54(3) proceedings are not legislative hearings, and the
agency is not a Legislature. The appropriate manner in which to con-
duct those hearings is clear from the text of section 120.54(3), which
provides that the agency "shall" give "affected persons an opportu-
nity to present evidence and argument on all issues under considera-
tion appropriate to inform [the agency] of their contentions."' 69 This
guarantees affected persons the right to make an evidentiary presenta-
tion. The term "appropriate" limits the presentation to what is rea-
sonable, assuming an evidentiary presentation is permitted. The courts
seem to read "appropriate" as meaning appropriate, given the fact
that the proceeding is a legislative hearing. This is technically incorrect
not only because the drafters explicitly rejected such characterizations,
but also because it appears that the language of this provision was
borrowed from a section of the RMA governing contested cases. It is
also incorrect because it undermines the balance struck by the Legisla-
ture.
Recognizing the advantages of flexibility and informality, the test in
Florida for determining whether evidence can be restricted should be a
functional one: simply, what is the effect on affected interests? By
such an analysis, the section 120.54(3) hearing is not, as Balino sug-
gests and as the Supreme Court of Florida has now agreed, "designed
only to allow an agency to inform itself ... .o"17 That view has been
shaped by the courts' vision of what a legislative hearing should look
like, at the expense of fidelity to the Legislature's vision of what an
administrative hearing should involve: an evidentiary presentation ap-
propriate not for the agency to inform itself, but rather for affected
persons to inform the agency of their contentions. 7' The conclusion
that section 120.54(3) is designed solely for the benefit of the agency is
a significant flaw in the reasoning of the cases interpreting section
169. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1989) (emphasis added).
170. General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1067 (Fla.
1984).
171. This may well permit what the courts might characterize as "adjudication" procedures
in the rulemaking hearing. Although such procedure is inconsistent with the courts' vision of a
section 120.54(3) hearing, it is consistent with the Florida APA, which was designed to remedy
the problems that were created by "unthinking adherence to 'rule-making' and 'adjudication'
procedures, as if the two were wholly distinct and distinguishable," under the 1961 Act. Report-
er's Comments, supra note 9, at 6.
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120.54(3), because it misconceives the proper dynamics of those pro-
ceedings.
Despite the courts' "quasi-legislative" rhetoric, agencies permit
more than just comment or testimony by affected persons in section
120.54(3) public hearings. This is not surprising since the alternative,
as Balino makes clear, is for the agency to grant a request for a draw
out. Agencies can be expected to permit almost anything to be pre-
sented in the public hearing, even a presentation such as the one at-
tempted in Balino,172 if the alternative is a draw out.'7 Thus, despite
the characterization of public rulemaking hearings as legislative, the
hearings themselves, when pressed into service by those whose sub-
stantial interests are affected by a proposed rule, can be expected to
maintain only a loose resemblance to that model. 74 This has some-
times created a sense of incongruity between the courts' vision of
those proceedings and the actual administrative practice.'7
B. Section 120.54(17)- The Draw Out
While the draw out also has been the victim of the courts' failure to
follow the language of the statute, the problems with the draw out
172. In Balino, the affected persons sought to call and examine agency employees as wit-
nesses, and to invoke the rule excluding witnesses during the presentation of testimony at the
section 120.54(3) hearing. Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 362 So. 2d 21, 25
(Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979).
173. See Dore, supra note 49, at 1008 ("As a practical matter, an agency will be more in-
clined to transform the information gathering hearing to accommodate specifically requested
and adequately supported procedural protections than it will be to grant a request for an adjudi-
catory hearing."). Agency reluctance to grant a draw out is traceable to its reluctance to share
control over factfinding with DOAH and its reluctance to provide the detailed explanations the
draw out may require.
174. For example, in In re Wheeling of Cogenerated Energy, 70 P.U.R. 143, 147 (Fla. Pub.
Serv. Comm. 1985), the following occurred:
A public hearing on the rules was held in Tallahassee on May 17, June 5, and 6, 1985.
A request for a "draw-out" to a § 120.57(1) proceeding, pursuant to Section
120.54(17), was denied. However, the commission conducted the public hearing in a
manner similar to a Section 120.57(1) hearing. Witnesses were sworn and subject to
cross-examination.
175. This sense of incongruity is clear in City of Key West v. Askew, 324 So. 2d 655, 658
(Fla. 1st DCA 1975):
It would seem to be most illogical to permit "Citizen Petitioners", who testify before
sundry House and Senate committees against the enactment of a proposed bill, to
subsequently litigate in the courts the wisdom of the legislature in enacting the same.
Although the proceedings now sought to be reviewed [section 120.54(3) proceedings]
are analogous to the legislative process, apparently, logic has been supplanted by the
Administrative Procedure Act.
It is also evident in General Tel. Co. v. Florida Public Service Commission, 446 So. 2d 1063,
1067 (Fla. 1984), where the court notes: "Despite the section 120.54(3) hearing where interested
parties made statements under oath and were subjected to limited cross-examination, we find
that the rulemaking in this case retained its quasi-legislative nature." This sense of incongruity
would disappear if the courts ceased to permit the quasi-legislative label to have any power over
the question of which procedural protections are appropriate.
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have been more directly related to the influence of federal law. The
threshold questions are: who should have standing to invoke this rem-
edy, and how should it be invoked? Professor Dore states:
The use of the adjective "substantial" suggests that the interests
affected must be important or significant personal interests. The use
of the noun "interests" rather than "rights," "privileges," or
"immunities" suggests that the draw out petitioner's "substantial
interests" do not have to rise to the level of legally recognized and
protected rights, privileges, or immunities. Rather, any important or
significant concern personal to the petitioner is sufficient.'16
The Model Rules provide that a person seeking to draw out section
120.54(3) proceedings into more formal proceedings must request the
draw out before the conclusion of the 120.54(3) public hearing. 77 Un-
less the agency rejects the request at the time it is made, the party
making the request must, within forty-eight hours, file a petition with
the person conducting the rulemaking proceeding, substantiating the
matters asserted in support of the request. 7 8
The type of showing the person requesting draw out must demon-
strate has been the subject of discussion in some cases. In Bert Rogers
Schools of Real Estate v. Florida Real Estate Commission,7 9 the court
did more to obscure the nature of the remedy than to clarify it. The
court did not discuss the nature of the interests asserted by the party
seeking the draw out other than to note that "petitioner (in effect)
asserted that the Section 120.54(2)180 input hearing would not be suffi-
cient to protect its substantial interests, [and therefore] petitioner was
entitled to have the Commission exercise its discretion and make an
express determination as to whether the input hearing was adequate to
protect the interests asserted."'' The court found nothing in the rec-
ord to support a denial, and remanded the case with directions that
the Commission "grant petitioner a hearing as authorized by Section
120.57." 182
176. Dore, supra note 49, at 1004.
177. FLA. AiMDN. CODE R. 28-5.604 (1990); Private Care Ass'n of Fla. v. Department of
Health & Rehab. Servs., 10 Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 4388 (1988).
178. FLA. ArDua. CODE R. 28-5.604(2) (1990). The rule requires the petition to set forth
"specific facts supportive of the claim that the rulemaking proceedings will not provide an ade-
quate opportunity to protect substantial interests." It also provides that the agency may hold a
hearing to determine the merits of the petition. Id. at 28-5.604(3).
179. 339 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
180. This was the previous site of material now contained in section 120.54(3).
181. Bert Rogers, 339 So. 2d. at 228.
182. Id. While Bert Rogers suggests that agencies summarily reject draw out requests at their
peril if adequate allegations of the need for such proceedings are made, a more recent supreme
court decision rejects the contention that allegations alone are sufficient to require an agency to
grant the request. See Corn v. Department of Legal Affairs, 368 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 1979).
WE'RE NO ANGELS
The Balino case includes the most complete discussion of the draw
out remedy. There, the court found that the agency had indeed denied
the patients an opportunity to present evidence permitted during the
rulemaking proceeding; however, the court found it could not deter-
mine whether or not a draw out should have been permitted, and di-
rected the issue to be revisited on remand:
The principal question to be resolved is whether [the patients'
substantial] interests are adequately protected in the § 120.54 rule-
making proceeding. The answer to that question depends, in part at
least, on the extent to which petitioners are able, and are permitted,
to make an effective presentation at the Section 120.54 hearing. 8 3
A person seeking a draw out must affirmatively demonstrate to the
agency that the proceeding does not provide "adequate opportunity to
protect substantial interests." The important question is "What does
that phrase mean?" The court in Balino looked to federal law for
guidance concerning the nature of the showing this phrase requires
and found that the patients had not demonstrated any "unique cir-
cumstances that might justify a trial-type presentation in the informal
rule-making proceeding,"'' suggesting that such a showing is neces-
sary before a draw out will be permitted. The court seemed to rely on
federal law for this requirement, because it included the following
footnote to support that statement:
American Airlines Inc. v. CAB, 123 U.S.App. D.C. 310, 319, 359
F.2d 624, 633, cert. den. 385 U.S. 843, 87 S.Ct. 73, 17 L.Ed.2d 75
(1966): "Nowhere in the record is there any specific proffer by
petitioners as to the subjects they believed required oral hearings,
what kinds of facts they proposed to adduce and by what witnesses,
etc. Nor was there any specific proffer as to [the] particular lines of
cross-examination which required exploration at an oral hearing.";
Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication Rule Making, Vol. 1971,
Duke L.Rev. 51, 72: "ITihe opinions are not devoid of hints that a
petitioner would be wise, rather than demanding a full statutory
adjudication as a matter of right, to specify what procedures, not
normally required in a rule-making proceeding, he considers
appropriate in the particular circumstances of the case." 85
183. Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 362 So. 2d 21, 26 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fa. 1979).
184. Id. at 25. The court continued this theme later in the opinion. It suggested that the
patients should have submitted "a verbal or written statement of their contentions, of the evi-
dence sought to be elicited and the particular reasons why examination and cross-examination"
were essential. Id. at 26.
185. Id. at 25 n.6.
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The court then announced what it believed was required: "Petitioners,
for their part, should have submitted either a verbal or written state-
ment of their contentions, of the evidence sought to be elicited and the
particular reasons why examination and cross-examination was essen-
tial to that presentation of a § 120.57 proceeding necessary [sic] . "186
The federal materials quoted in Balino reflect a federal experience
with rulemaking procedures that differs in important ways from the
Florida experience. The federal statute governing both the rulemaking
procedure in American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board8 7
and the informal rulemaking discussed in the Duke Law Review Arti-
cle requires only an opportunity for notice and comment. The proffer
discussed in that context was required by the federal courts so that
they could determine whether to impose rulemaking procedures not
authorized by statute. s8 In Florida, neither the court nor agency is
free to determine which additional procedures are required. If the
agency decides to grant the draw out request, the statute specifies the
additional procedures that "shall" be used.8 9 Since a person making a
successful draw out request is entitled to the protection set out in sec-
tion 120.57, it makes no sense to require individuals to specify with
particularity the additional procedures needed and the reasons they
are necessary. Whether or not a need for cross-examination is demon-
strated, the statute guarantees the right to cross-examine, provided a
question of material fact exists. The type of showing required in Bal-
186. Id. at 26. Because of the error in the text there is some ambiguity in the requirement,
but it appears that persons seeking to draw out must proffer their contentions, their evidence,
and why the particular procedural protections of section 120.57, such as cross-examination, are
necessary.
187. 359 F.2d 624, 632, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966) (this case is commonly known as
the "Blocked Space" case).
188. There was a time when federal courts required additional procedural protections, like
cross-examination, based upon such requests. This trend, known as "hybrid rulemaking," is
described in one of the articles cited by the court in Balino as follows:
[S]everal recent judicial decisions ... have ordered an agency-despite the inapplica-
bility of sections 556 and 557 [the provisions of federal law that govern formal rule-
making]-to afford opponents of a rule substantially greater procedural opportunities
than are prescribed by section 553 [the provision of federal law that governs informal
rulemaking]. None of these cases relied on the APA's procedural requirements con-
cerning formal rulemaking; indeed, several of the opinions showed no inclination to
rule that the particular decision-making process in contention fell anywhere within
APA classifications. Thus, with only a little help from Congress, the courts seem to
have created a procedural category that might be termed "hybrid rulemaking" or
"notice-and-comment-plus."
Williams, supra note 95, at 402 (footnote omitted).
189. Section 120.54(17) provides that the agency "shall ... convene a separate proceeding
under the provisions of s. 120.57" (emphasis added). If there is a question of material fact,
section 120.57(1) procedures are to be used. If no such question exists, then section 120.57(2)
governs.
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ino makes sense only where the court needs to decide the particular
procedures necessary, a situation that does not occur in Florida.
Therefore, the federal law cited in Balino is inapposite.
In order to affirmatively demonstrate that a proceeding does not
provide adequate opportunity to protect substantial interests (the
showing required by section 120.54(17)), all one need demonstrate is
that the proposed rule will preclusively determine factual premises and
policy choices. Once such a showing is made, the act requires section
120.57 proceedings during rulemaking, because the preclusive effect
of the rule will render section 120.57 proceedings useless at any later
time. Thus, what is "adequate" to protect persons whose substantial
interests are affected by an agency rule is no different from what is
adequate in any other proceeding where substantial interests are af-
fected: the procedural protections guaranteed by section 120.57. Ade-
quacy is not a matter of abstraction; it is a matter of statutory right.
It has been suggested that the decision to permit a draw out is a
matter within the agency's discretion.'19 While it is true that section
120.54(17) states the showing must be made "to the agency" and shall
be granted "[i]f the agency determines" the rulemaking proceeding is
inadequate, this language does not mean the drafters intended to leave
this decision to the agency's discretion. The requirement that the per-
sons affected make the showing to the agency and that the agency
make a determination on the question assures that the showing will be
made at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner: in full to the
agency, rather than for the first time on judicial review after the adop-
tion of the rule. It does not mean that the agency is free to determine
when it believes such a proceeding is necessary. If it did, the draw out
would rarely if ever be granted.
The draw out is designed to limit agency power. Therefore, it is
unreasonable to assume that the act intended to give the agency the
discretion to determine when it will allow the remedy. A reading that
guarantees a draw out as a matter of right, acknowledging it as the
only opportunity for a section 120.57 hearing on the matters decided
by the rule adoption, is a more reasonable construction because it is
more consistent with the act's overall approach, from citizen partici-
pation to judicial review. A construction vesting the agency with dis-
cretion to decide when adjudicatory procedures are appropriate
deprives citizens of an effective means of participation, and also de-
prives courts of an adequate record for conducting judicial review.
Professor Dore agrees with the limiting construction the courts have
given the draw out language in the APA. She agrees that the partici-
190. See Dore, supra note 49, at 1007-08 and cases cited therein.
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pants must demonstrate the procedural protections they need.' 9' The
agency then has discretion to determine "which, if any, of the re-
quested procedures are necessary to protect petitioner's substantial in-
terests. The agency may then either extend the necessary procedural
protections to the petitioner in the information gathering hearing, or
if that response is inconvenient or inappropriate, suspend the proceed-
ing and convene an adjudicatory proceeding."' 92 These requirements
facilitate agency denial of draw out requests in several ways. For ex-
ample, the agency can reject the showing as not sufficiently particular,
or it can deny proposed presentation because, in its judgment, such a
presentation is unnecessary. Clearly, if Professor Dore is correct, the
agency can use these two grounds together to deny most draw out re-
quests. To do so, the agency need only require that all draw out re-
quests be accompanied by detailed proffers. It could then deny most
requests either because the proffers are not detailed enough or, if de-
tailed proffers are made, deny the request because the agency under-
stands the nature of the participants' objections or suggestions from
the detailed proffer, and a draw out is therefore unnecessary.
In cases in which the agency has no choice but to recognize both the
sufficiency of the showing and the need for a presentation using adju-
dicatory process, the courts still may allow the agency to deny the re-
quest. A denial of the draw out is presently permissible when the
particular protection requested, such as the cross-examination of spe-
cific witnesses, is provided in the section 120.54(3) hearing. Thus,
Professor Dore's construction of the draw out provision should be re-
jected because it recognizes agency prerogative to effectively prevent
the remedy from being invoked in almost every case. 93
The courts have given the draw out a self-defeating construction be-
cause they disfavor adjudicatory process in rulemaking. The existence
of such a process in rulemaking conflicts with their vision of those
proceedings as "quasi-legislative." The showing the courts have cre-
ated helps agencies avoid this disfavored remedy in almost every case.
The draw out has rarely been tried,' 94 and when tried, has usually
been denied.' 95 Professor Dore has recognized the realities in opera-
tion here:
191. "Whatever the nature of the asserted need, it must be accompanied by a specific proffer
of the facts to be adduced through each witness and an explanation of why the evidence sought
to be elicited through examination or cross-examination of these witnesses is necessary to protect
the interests." Id.
192. Id.
193. It is, of course, a well-established rule of statutory construction that courts should
avoid a construction of a statute that would render a section of it meaningless. Cilento v. State,
377 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979).
194. The discussion at the Conference indicated that the draw out provision has rarely been
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As a practical matter, an agency will be more inclined to transform
the information gathering hearing to accommodate specifically
requested and adequately supported procedural protections than it
will be to grant a request for an adjudicatory hearing .... By
responding to a petition in this fashion, the agency maintains the
relative informality of the rulemaking process, retains control over
the development of its policy, and saves time. 196
This analysis ignores the fact that the draw out was specifically de-
signed to formalize the relative informality of the rulemaking process
and wrest from the agency a certain amount of control over the devel-
opment of policy.
C. Judicial Review
Judicial review under the new act is governed by section 120.68, an
innovative provision that "sets new standards for judicial surveillance
of agency fairness, rationality, and compliance with assigned
goals."' 9 However, the courts' view of rulemaking proceedings as
"quasi-legislative," and their reliance on federal law for guidance in
interpreting the Florida APA have had a greater effect on the courts'
approach to judicial review than section 120.68. This trend began
soon after the act took effect. In Balino, the court advanced the
quasi-legislative characterization of the rulemaking process as a basis
used and is not well understood. See Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 51-62
(Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of various speakers). Although a few speakers recognized the provision
would be useful to resolve disputes concerning the factual premises of the rule, some reported
that their groups did not understand the provision, and others saw no difference between the
draw out and the rule challenge.
195. All the reported appellate decisions discussing the draw out concern the agency's refusal
to convene draw out proceedings in the first instance. See, e.g., Bert Rogers Schools of Real
Estate v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 339 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) (reversing denial of
draw out as unsupported by the record, and remanding for one); Mitchell v. School Bd. of Leon
County, 347 So. 2d 805, 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (essentially affirming rejection of request as
untimely); Cross Keys Waterways v. Askew, 351 So. 2d 1062, 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (denial
of draw out affirmed without explanation), aff'd sub nom. Askew v. Cross Keys Waterway, 372
So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978); Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 362 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1978) (remanding for further proceedings that could perhaps include a draw out), cert.
denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979); Corn v. Department of Legal Affairs, 368 So. 2d 591 (Fla.
1979) (no conflict with Bert Rogers where the court dismissed the appeal from denial of draw
out); Whitehall Boca v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 456 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1984) (stating that although the agency reacted "perhaps too abruptly" in denying a draw
out, appellants failed to show "manifest error amounting to an abuse of discretion"); Bayonet
Point Hosp. v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 490 So. 2d 1318, 1320 (Fla. 1st DCA
1986) (denying draw out from section 120.54(5) proceeding, which is not possible because only
section 120.54(3) proceedings can be drawn out, on grounds that proper showing was not made).
196. Dore, supra note 49, at 1008.
197. Brodie & Linde, supra note 140, at 563.
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for relaxed review, and refused to invalidate rule amendments, even
though it found that during their adoption, the agency had wrongfully
denied participants an opportunity to present evidence. The court
stated, "[t]here is no authority cited, and we have found none, which
requires that this court hold invalid rules or rule modifications
adopted following a legislative type hearing," citing two federal deci-
sions. 98 The court's resort to federal law is inapposite here as well.
While the cited authorities did not require invalidation, they did rec-
ognize that courts have the power to suspend rules adopted with inad-
equate procedural safeguards and that it is unusual for courts to leave
rules in effect while they remand for further rulemaking proceedings.
If this is the law where procedural protections not required by statute
are at issue, it would seem more appropriate to invalidate a rule the
agency adopted without granting the opportunity to present evidence
required by the statute. 199
198. Balino, 362 So. 2d at 27 (citing Williams, supra note 95, at 443; Portland Cement As-
soc. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers' Assoc. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). The cited cases suggest that courts may
entertain motions to suspend rules adopted through inadequate procedures if the showing nor-
mally required for an injunction is made to the court. The cited portion of the Williams article
describes the situation "when a court remands for a hearing involving cross-examination but
leaves the rules in effect pending the hearing" as a "probably rare case." Williams, supra note
95, at 443.
199. Subsequent Florida decisions cast doubt on the court's suggestion that procedural error
will be judged differently when it occurs in rulemaking than if it occurs in adjudication. See,
e.g., Association of Condominiums, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 431 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1983) (material error of procedure justified quashing rule where opportunity for section
120.54(3) hearing was denied). The court perhaps could have refused to invalidate the rule on the
grounds that section 120.68(8) does not provide for reversal, only "remand," in cases of mate-
rial procedural error. It is unclear whether this was intended to shield from reversal even agency
action taken with willful disregard for proper procedure. See Alley, Agency Accountability: Ju-
dicial Remedies for Wrongful Agency Action Under the Florida APA, 54 FLA. B.J. 445 (1980).
In discussing Balino, Professor John-Edward Alley notes that cases have split on the question
of whether reversal is proper in the case of procedural error. Id. at 446-47. He suggests also that
section 120.68(13), which provides that the court may award "whatever relief is appropriate,"
and which he sees as a "virtually untapped source of judicial remedial power," may be available
to provide authority for reversal where only procedural error has occurred. Id. at 447. I suggest
that an expansive construction of section 120.68(13) is inconsistent with the significant limita-
tions on judicial review included in section 120.68. However, the petitioners in Balino did seek to
have the rule at issue there declared invalid pursuant to section 120.68(13)(a). Brief for Petitioner
at 22, Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 362 So. 2d 21 (1st DCA 1978), cert.
denied, 370 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1979) (No. HH-177) (on file with the author). There has also been
some suggestion that "substantial compliance" with rule adoption procedures will be found suf-
ficient, and that a showing of "prejudice" is required to challenge procedural error. See Brews-
ter Phosphates v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 444 So. 2d 483, 486 n.6 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Requiring a showing of actual prejudice seems inconsistent with the language of 120.68(8), which
provides for remand where the fairness or correctness of agency action "may have been im-
paired" by material procedural error. In addition, the concept of substantial compliance with
rulemaking procedure threatens the linchpin of the statutory scheme: the ability of affected per-
sons to hold the agency fully accountable through the use of procedural safeguards.
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The quasi-legislative characterization of rulemaking has also af-
fected the way the courts have defined their review of agency rules.
The most striking example is General Telephone Co. of Florida v.
Florida Public Service Commission," in which the Florida Supreme
Court reviewed a rule adopted by the Public Service Commission. It
cited one of the cases intended to be overruled by the new APA, Dan-
iel v. Florida State Turnpike Authority,20' in support of its determina-
tion that "agency rulemaking pursuant to statutory authorization...
is a quasi-legislative function." The court found that "[a]s a quasi-
legislative proceeding, our review of the rulemaking is more limited
than would be review of a quasi-judicial proceeding."0 3 The court an-
nounced a standard of review of rules not found in section 120.68:
Where the empowering provision of a statute states simply that an
agency may "make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act," the validity of the regulations
promulgated thereunder will be sustained as long as they are
reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation, and
are not arbitrary or capricious.20
The supreme court borrowed the standard announced in General Tele-
phone from earlier decisions of the First District Court of Appeal,
such as Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental Regu-
lation,205 despite the fact that the First District created the Agrico
Chemical standard to review decisions of DOAH hearing officers in
rule challenge proceedings, not to conduct direct judicial review of
200. 446 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1984).
201. 213 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1968). The Daniel decision was not mentioned by name in the
Reporter's Comments; however, Daniel, like Bay National Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229
So. 2d 302 (1st DCA 1969), which was explicitly disapproved, relied on the characterizations. It
was thus one of the group of cases to which the Reporter's Comments referred when they stated
that "the act is intended to overrule cases making the distinction, such as Bay National
Bank .... Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 18.
202. General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063, 1066 (Fla.
1984).
203. Id. at 1067.
204. Id. (citations omitted). The requirement that rules be reasonably related to the purposes
of the enabling legislation has been described as a "purely instrumental rationality standard
which generally provides a wide margin for the agency's policy choices .... " Gifford, supra
note 90, at 595. The requirement that rules themselves not be arbitrary and capricious suggests
that "the agency's inferences from, and evaluations of, raw data to ultimate factual conclusions
are also governed by a rationality standard which here is less [of) a criterion of instrumental
rationality and more of a general standard of reasonableness as measured by commonly shared
experience." Id. (footnote omitted).
205. 365 So. 2d 759, 762 (Fla. Ist DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1979).
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agency rules. 206 In fact, shortly before General Telephone, the First
District had developed a different standard for direct review of agency
rules that was even more deferential than the supreme court's stan-
dard in General Telephone. Citing Polk v. School Board of Polk
County20 , a Second District case, the First District Court of Appeal
held in Brewster Phosphates v. Department of Environmental Regula-
tion,208 that on direct review, "a rule will not be reversed absent a
flagrant abuse of discretion. ' ' 209 However, at the time of the Brewster
Phosphates decision, the First District was unsure whether it had used
the correct review standard, since the supreme court had earlier af-
firmed a different Second District decision, which upheld an agency
rule on direct review on the basis that the evidence in the record was
sufficient to support the rule, where the rule had been attacked on
appeal as not supported by competent and substantial evidence. 210
This uncertainty apparently led the court in Brewster Phosphates to
note, in a footnote, that even if it were to apply the substantial evi-
dence standard urged by the appellant, the result would not change. 21'
206. The court's choice of review standards was thus not only unrelated to section 120.68, it
was also inconsistent with the internal logic of the opinion. The opinion found that "the stan-
dard of review for a quasi-legislative proceeding must differ from that for a quasi-judicial pro-
ceeding, as a qualitative, quantitative standard such as competent substantial evidence is
conceptually inapplicable to a proceeding where the record was not compiled in an adjudicatory
setting and no factual issues were determined." General Telephone, 446 So. 2d at 1067. At the
same time, the court adopted for the direct review of rules a review standard that had been
developed to review final orders in rule challenges, a "quasi-judicial" action.
207. 373 So. 2d 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In that case, a rule was challenged on direct review,
on the grounds that there was no substantial evidence to support it. The court agreed that "there
was no evidence at all in a judicial sense" because "those who presented their views at the public
hearing did so in the context of a town meeting." Id. at 962. The court then turned to Broward
County v. Administration Commission, 321 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), a case that had
relied heavily on Bay National Bank despite the admonition in the Reporter's Comments that the
new act was intended to specifically overrule that case. The court in Polk County failed to recog-
nize that the new act rejected Bay National Bank, and proceeded to rely on Broward County to
find that judicial review of quasi-legislative action was more limited than review of quasi-judicial
action. The court concluded, "[t]he agency rule-making function involves the exercise of discre-
tion, and absent a flagrant abuse of that discretion a court may not substitute its judgment for
that of the agency. Section 120.68(12), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978); Citizens of Florida v.
Mayo, 357 So. 2d 731 (Fla.1978)." Polk County, 373 So. 2d at 962. The reference to Mayo is
clearly inapposite as that case involved a denial of a petition to initiate rulemaking, and neither
that case nor section 120.68(12) supports the conclusion that the "flagrant abuse" standard is an
appropriate one in the direct judicial review of rulemaking.
208. 444 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
209. Id. at 486 (footnote omitted). In Brewster, the court cnfirmed that its Agrico Chemical
standard was applicable in the review of section 120.56 rule challenges, not in the direct review
of rules. Id.
210. Florida Canners Ass'n v. Department of Citrus, 371 So. 2d 503, 519 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979), aff'd sub nom. Coca-Cola Co. v. Department of Citrus, 406 So. 2d 1079, 1088 (Fla.
1982). The supreme court later rejected the substantial evidence test in General Telephone.
211. 444So.2dat486n.I1.
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The courts have tended to ignore the inconsistency between Polk
County and Brewster Phosphates, on the one hand, and the supreme
court's position in General Telephone on the other.212
Recently, in Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Envi-
ronmental Regulation,23 the First District attempted to clarify the law
in this area. 214 Here, Concerned Citizens of Citrus County, Inc. (Con-
cerned Citizens) filed a petition to initiate rulemaking in an attempt
"to have existent potable waters in Pinellas, Hillsborough, Pasco,
Hernando and Citrus counties classified Class G-I groundwater, and
to thereby impose the most stringent water quality protection ac-
corded groundwaters of the state. ' 21 5 The Environmental Regulation
Commission (ERC) deferred action on the petition and directed the
Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) to review the exist-
ing G-I rule and to propose revisions. After the agency held public
hearings and prepared the revisions, 2 6 they were challenged under sec-
tion 120.54(4) before the Division of Administrative Hearings
(DOAH) as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The
hearing officer sustained some of the proposed revisions and found
others invalid. Numerous appeals and cross appeals were filed.
The First District decided that the proper standard for judicial re-
view of a DOAH order in a section 120.54(4) rule challenge was
whether the order, rather than the proposed rule, was supported by
substantial evidence. 21 7 The court also rejected the use of the substan-
tial competent evidence standard as appropriate in the direct review of
212. See, e.g., Booker Creek Preservation, Inc. v. Southwest Fla. Water Management Dist.,
534 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). The court in Booker Creek stated:
The route by which these issues reach us necessarily limits our scope of review, and
our ability to determine them. Gen. Teleph. Co. of Fla. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
446 So.2d 1063 (Fla.1984); Brewster Phosphates v. State Dep't of Environmental Reg-
ulation, 444 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. den., 450 So.2d 485 (Fla. 1984).... The
validity of the exemptions from this rule must be sustained as long as we can find they
are reasonably related to the purposes of the Isolated Wetlands Act, and are not arbi-
trary or capricious. Gen. Teleph. Co., 446 So. 2d at 1067; Polk v. School Board of
Polk County, 373 So.2d 960 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
Id. at 422-23.
213. 553 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
214. "The standard of judicial review to be applied by the appellate court ... has never
been clearly articulated in the case law and has been the source of much confusion." Id. at 1270.
215. Id. at 1262.
216. The Florida APA does not require this type of hearing, but it is available where the
agency seeks broader input as it shapes its proposed rule. "The APA establishes no particular
procedure to be followed by an agency during the original drafting of the proposed rule. The
drafting sessions of a collegial agency head or committee appear to be 'workshops' or 'meetings'
subject to the requirements of Section 120.53(lXd)." Id. at 1265 n.4.
217. Id. at 1274.
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rules and announced that on direct review, agency rules would be re-
viewed under an arbitrary and capricious standard.218
Adam Smith was an appeal from an order of DOAH in a rule chal-
lenge. The decision's extensive discussion of the standard supposed to
be used on direct review, therefore, was dicta. However, that discus-
sion is important because the Adam Smith standard has already been
applied in a subsequent case219 to invalidate an agency rule, and it ap-
pears likely that Adam -Smith will continue to be used as an authority
for invalidating agency rules on direct review.
The court in Adam Smith derived its arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard for judicial review of agency rules22 from federal law, not from
section 120.68. 221 Its decision to borrow the federal standard from Cit-
izens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe22 ignores two important
facts: first, the Florida APA explicitly forbids Florida courts to de-
velop their own approach to judicial review of agency action;M sec-
ond, the APA deliberately omits the words "arbitrary and
capricious," which are the words in the federal APA upon which the
decision in Overton Park clearly rests. The drafters' decision to omit
the words "arbitrary and capricious," and thus reject review by epi-
thet, was hailed at the time as an "important innovation." 22 Thus,
the statute and its legislative make the court's decision to rely on Ov-
erton Park rather than section 120.68 difficult to reconcile with the
legislative mandate m
218. Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1271 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989).
219. Manasota-88, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 567 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
220. 553 So. 2d at 1271.
221. Id. at 1272.
222. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
223. "Unless the court finds a ground for setting aside, modifying, remanding, or ordering
agency action or ancillary relief under a speckfied-provision of this section, it shall affirm the
agency's action." FLA. STAT. § 120.68(14) (1989) (emphasis added).
224. "In place of these familiar epithets, the statute requires the reviewing court to analyze
the component elements of agency actions which involve discretion." Brodie & Linde, supra
note 140, at 559-60.
225. However, the matter is not completely clear. In 1987, the Legislature added section
120.52(8), containing a definition for the previously undefined phrase, "invalid exercise of dele-
gated legislative authority." The phrase is important in the context of rule challenges because
only existing rules and proposed rules constituting an invalid exercise of delegated legislative
authority may be invalidated by DOAH. Section 120.52 provides a number of specific grounds
for such a determination. One is that "[t]he rule is arbitrary and capricious." FLA. STAT. §
120.52(8) (1989).
A review of the legislative history suggests that the drafters of section 120.52(8) were attempt-
ing to codify the existing decisional law, which by that time had already adopted the phrase
"arbitrary and capricious," despite indications in the APA that this was inappropriate. See Staff
of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., HB 710 (1987) Staff Analysis (Apr. 9, 1987) (on file with
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Section 120.68(10) provides for a competent substantial evidence
standard of review when there is a challenge to the factual basis of
agency action. 226 Section 120.68 does not distinguish between the stan-
dard of review for rules and orders. The Adam Smith and General
Telephone cases both rejected the substantial evidence test required by
section 120.68(10) on the grounds that the nature of the record pro-
duced in rulemaking does not permit such a review. 227 This has not
been the experience in other jurisdictions. 228 This suggests that Florida
the author). "The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) has reviewed DOAH and
court decisions for the past ten years to determine the grounds stated for declaring rules invalid.
The bill would codify those grounds." Id. at 2. The Staff Analysis of Proposed Amendments to
Chapter 120 provides even more detail:
Paragraph (e) codifies the long established principle that administrative rules cannot
be arbitrary or capricious, i.e., unsupported by logic, despotic or irrational. E.g.,
Agrico Chem. Co. v. State D.E.R., 365 So.2d 759, 763 (Fla. I DCA 1978); cert. den.
376 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1979); General Telephone Company of Florida v. Florida P.S.C.,
446 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 1984).
Staff of Fla. H.R. and S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops. HB 710 and SB 608 (1987) Staff Analysis of
Proposed Amendments 2 (1987) (on file with the author). There is no indication that the drafters
of this amendment were aware of the scrupulous avoidance of the term "arbitrary and capri-
cious" characterizing earlier drafting efforts. It does not appear that this amendment was an
attempt to depart from that path.
226. Rulemaking commonly involves the resolution of fact questions. Sometimes policy
choices involve fact questions, and sometimes facts are resolved when the factual predicate of a
rule is determined. Where individuals seek to participate in the resolution of fact and policy
choices during rulemaking, the Florida APA provides that they may do so through the draw out.
If they are unsatisfied with the resolution reached by the agency, judicial review is available.
Section 120.68(10) provides:
If the agency's action depends on any fact found by the agency in a proceeding meet-
ing the requirements of s. 120.57, the court shall not substitute its judgment for that
of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on any disputed finding of fact. The
court shall, however, set aside agency action or remand the case to the agency if it
finds that the agency's action depends on any finding of fact that is not supported by
competent substantial evidence in the record.
FLA. STAT. § 120.68(10) (1989).
The draw out meets "the requirements of s.120.57." The above language also suggests that
where substantially affected persons have not first participated in a draw out, they may not
obtain judicial review of the agency's resolution of factual issues. Similarly, the substantially
affected person has the burden of assembling, through the draw out, a record sufficient to per-
mit judicial review based upon a competent, substantial evidence standard.
227. Adam Smith rejected competent substantial evidence review because of a belief that
using this evidence standard in rulemaking "would force rulemakers to adopt more formal,
rigid, trial-like procedures in an attempt to make an adequate record capable of judicial review."
Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation, 553 So. 2d 1260, 1272 n.16 (Fla.
1st DCA 1989). In General Telephone, the court found that "competent and substantial evidence
is conceptually inapplicable to a proceeding where the record was not compiled in an adjudica-
tory setting .. " General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063,
1067 (Fla. 1984).
228. Both the federal courts and the 1981 MSAPA have adhered to the substantial evidence
standard of review even in the absence of a record generated by trial-type procedures. The fed-
eral courts have had to adjust to the idea of substantial evidence review of informal rulemaking
1991]
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courts could conduct substantial evidence review on what they have
considered to be inadequate records. While that solution would be
consistent with federal law, it would not be consistent with the Florida
APA. In Florida, it is possible to create a record capable of competent
substantial evidence review through the use of the draw out. Rulemak-
ing records now available are inadequate for judicial review of rules
using the competent substantial evidence standard mandated by sec-
tion 120.68(10) because the draw out has been made virtually unavail-
able as a result of judicial interpretations.
The proper solution to the confusion in this area would have re-
quired the First District to certify the matter to the supreme court and
suggest that it revisit General Telephone and Balino and reinterpret
the draw out, to make the draw out more available to facilitate com-
petent substantial evidence review. Instead, Adam Smith looked to
federal law. There it discovered "hard look" review. 229 Federal courts
created the doctrine of hard look review to review administrative ac-
tion in the federal system. Although there are many definitions of
hard look review, Professor Sunstein has described hard look review
as the requirement that agencies "consider all statutorily relevant fac-
tors, to justify departures from past practices, to furnish detailed ex-
planations of their decisions, to explain the rejection of alternatives
and to show connections between statutory purposes and regulatory
policies . "...1,230 To facilitate hard look review in Florida, the court
because a number of federal statutes require the courts to conduct such review. Comment, Con-
vergence of the Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary and Capricious Standards of Review During
Informal Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 541, 542 n.5 (1986). Section 5-116(c)(7) of the
1981 MSAPA mandates substantial evidence review of rules made through notice and comment
rulemaking through a process that involves supplementing the record on appeal with evidence.
For further discussion of this provision, see infra notes 315-19 and accompanying text.
229. "Every noteworthy phenomenon can use a label; the hard look doctrine is as important
to the judicial review of technological decisionmaking by administrators as the slam dunk is to
professional basketball." Rogers, A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under
Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L.J. 699, 704-05 (1979). As Professor Rogers notes, "[a]ctually, courts
take a hard look to make sure the agency has taken a hard look." Id. at 704-05 n.43.
230. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 421, 470 (1987).
Professor Bonfield has described hard look review as composed of two distinct elements. First,
the court insures that the agency has taken a hard look at the problem. This requires "the agency
to furnish a sufficient explanation of its factual findings and conclusions, to establish that it has
sought out the necessary information, and to show that it actually took into account the appro-
priate factors and seriously considered the available data and alternate solutions." A. BONHELD
& M. Asniow, supra note 42, at 621-22.
Second, as is the current practice in federal law, the court takes a hard look at the substance
of the decision under review. Professor Bonfield notes that the grounds for reversal under this
portion of the standard of review were restated by the ABA Section on Administrative Law as
follows:
i. The action rests upon a policy judgment that is so unacceptable as to render the
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created additional record requirements during rulemaking. In Adam
Smith, the court stated:
The administrative record that comes before the appellate court on a
direct appeal from an adopted rule will generally consist of the
following: (1) the agency's initial proposal, its tentative empirical
findings, important advice received from experts, and the description
of the critical experimental and methodological techniques on which
the agency intends to rely; (2) the written or oral replies of interested
parties to the agency's proposals and to all the materials considered
by the agency; and (3) the final rule accompanied by a statement
both justifying the rule and explaining its normative and empirical
predicates. 231
The court did not cite any statutory authority for the requirement that
an agency write down and include in the record such things as "tenta-
tive empirical findings, ' '12 2 advice received from experts, 233 and de-
scriptions of experimental and methodological techniques. 23 The
court determined that a proper record for judicial review of informal
rulemaking "will reflect all of the relevant views and facts considered
action arbitrary.
ii. The action rests upon reasoning that is so illogical as to render the action arbitrary.
iii. The asserted or necessary factual premises of the action do not withstand scru-
tiny ....
iv. The action is, without good reason, inconsistent with prior agency policies or pre-
cedents.
v. The agency arbitrarily failed to adopt an alternative solution to the problem ad-
dressed in the action.
vi. The action fails in other respects to rest upon reasoned decisionmaking.
Id. at 622.
231. Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1270 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989).
232. It is important to keep this requirement in context. While the court will require these
things in the record, it claims its role in reviewing these materials is quite limited:
The reviewing court is not authorized to examine whether a rulemaker's empirical
conclusions have support in substantial evidence. Rather, the arbitrary and capricious
standard requires an inquiry into the basic orderliness of the rulemaking process, and
authorizes the courts to scrutinize the actual making of a rule for signs of blind preju-
dice or inattention to crucial facts.
Id. at 1273. The workability of the court's distinction between conducting a substantial evidence
review (which it forbids), and scrutinizing the record for inattention to crucial facts (which it
requires) is questionable.
233. The court only requires "important" advice. Important in whose judgment? What stan-
dards should rulemakers use in deciding whether to provide the explanations the court requires
of important advice? To avoid the consequences of failing to provide full explanations, rulemak-
ers will probably learn to err on the side of including full explanations whenever they are in
doubt about the importance of the advice received, a development that threatens to further bu-
reaucratize rulemaking.
234. Here, the requirement is qualified by the term "critical." The same questions arise.
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by the rulemaker, from whatever source, and will reveal if and how
the rulemaker considered each factor throughout the process of policy
formation. 235 The court also suggested that to "demonstrate his seri-
ousness and good faith" a rulemaker can through a "justification"
statement,23 6 for example, detail for the court the actual attention he
gave to the factors, and explain his final disposition with respect to
each of them. 237
It is not hard to find a federal parallel for using the justification
statement in the manner that Adam Smith suggests. The federal courts
similarly transformed the basis and purpose statement required by
statute in informal rulemaking from its original purpose to that of
providing the additional information necessary to conduct a more
searching judicial review. Section 553, governing federal informal ru-
lemaking, began its career modestly. According to one commentator,
"section 553 requires that when a rule is issued, it must be accompa-
nied by a concise statement of its basis and purpose. The authors of
the statute apparently had in mind something like a headnote."238
Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court, when he was a law
professor, stated that "[t]here is no doubt that the burden meant to be
imposed by this provision was minimal. ' 239 Nevertheless, the courts
used this provision to require agencies to explain the major issues of
policy ventilated in rulemaking and why the agencies reacted to them
as they did.3
The circumstances that led the federal courts to improvise new rec-
ord requirements are demonstrated by cases like United States v.
Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.,U1 an enforcement proceeding by
the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) against a company that re-
fused to conform to an FDA rule prescribing the process for prepar-
ing hot smoked whitefish. The FDA's rule was designed to prevent
235. Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1273 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
236. This refers to section 120.54(1 1)(a), which provides in relevant part that "[t]he adopting
agency shall file with the committee ... a detailed written statement of the facts and circum-
stances justifying the proposed rule."
237. Adam Smith, 553 So. 2d at 1273 n.19.
238. Allen, The Durability of the Administrative Procedure Act, 72 VA. L. Rav. 235, 248
(1986) (footnote omitted).
239. Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
SUP. CT. REV. 345, 378.
240. Id. at 379. See, e.g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (stating that adjectives "concise" and "general" "must be accommodated to
realities of judicial scrutiny").
241. 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). This case is included in many law school administrative law
casebooks and is discussed in detail in Davis' Treatise. K. DAVIs, supra note 50, § 6:12, at 499-
501.
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botulism. The defendant contended that compliance with the rule
would render its product commercially unsalable. The record reflected
that the defendant had processed whitefish for fifty-six years without
a single case of botulism. In addition, the record reflected that the
industry had processed over seventeen million pounds of whitefish
without a single case of botulism. Industry representatives, including
the defendant, had participated in the rulemaking, explained the prob-
lems the prescribed process would create, and suggested alternative
approaches. It was unclear whether the agency failed to understand
that the process would make the whitefish unsalable, or simply de-
cided the danger of botulism required the process "even if that meant
commercial death for the whitefish industry." 2 The court was frus-
trated by the rulemaking procedure's failure to provide enough infor-
mation so that it could determine whether a reasonable or an arbitrary
decision had been made.23 To address this problem, the court read the
basis and purpose statement requirement to mean that the agency
must provide additional information, such as the reasons the Secre-
tary chose to follow one course rather than another and the facts
upon which those choices were based.2"
Just as the basis and purpose statement was rewritten in federal
law, the Adam Smith court has rewritten the justification statement
requirement of section 120.54(1 1)(a).24 Under that section, the agency
is required to file certain documents with the Joint Administrative
Procedures Committee (JAPC) in connection with each rule it pro-
poses to adopt, including "a detailed written statement of the facts
and circumstances justifying the proposed rule. . . ."24 Thus, Adam
Smith has adapted a section designed to facilitate JAPC review into
one which facilitates a more searching judicial review.
242. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 250.
243. Davis finds five reasons in the opinion for the court's decision to invalidate the FDA
regulations:
(1) inadequate facts in the rulemaking record to support the rule; (2) the agency's
reliance on facts that were not in the rulemaking record and that the company had no
chance to rebut; (3) lack of an articulate effort ... to connect the scientific require-
ments to the available technology that would make commercial survival possible; (4)
failure of the agency to sustain the burden of proof, which 'required it to bear a
burden of adducing a reasoned presentation supporting the reliability of its methodol-
ogy'; and (5) failure of the agency to respond to a vital comment.
K. DAVIS, supra note 50, § 6:12, at 499-500.
244. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 253. The court stated, "[w]e think that to sanction silence in
the face of such vital questions would be to make the statutory requirement of a 'concise general
statement' less than an adequate safeguard against arbitrary decision-making." Id.
245. Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1268 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989).
246. FI. STAT. § 120.54(11)(a)(1989).
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In addition to changing the purpose of the justification statement,
Adam Smith has changed its scope. The Guide to Rules Promulgation
Under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act247 explains that the
"Statement of Justification" is part of the "Initial Rule Review File"
and the "Final Review File." Each of these files must include "[a]
detailed written statement of the facts and circumstances justifying the
adoption of the proposed rule ..... ,24" The fact that these require-
ments are less stringent than Adam Smith is clear from a sample state-
ment of justification included in the Appendices to the Guide. It
speaks only in general terms about the need for the proposed rule and
does not address any of the factors that Adam Smith suggests the jus-
tification statement must address.
The Adam Smith approach is now being used to review agency
rules. In Manasota-88, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Regulation,'249 the
First District used Adam Smith as authority to remand a rulemaking
proceeding "with directions to fully comply with the requirements of
[section 120.54(1 1)(b)] ... and to develop a more detailed record in
accordance with the opinion in Adam Smith . . . -25 In the Mana-
sota-88 case, the court noted that a one-page statement titled "Facts
and Circumstances" had been filed that briefly set out the history of
the rule amendment and a summary of the proposed rule. The court
found the agency's failure to detail the relevant factors it considered,
its failure to explain if and how it considered each factor throughout
the process of policy formation, and its failure to describe the actual
attention it gave to the factors-including an explanation of the final
disposition with respect to each one-required remand in Manasota-
88. 2 5 1
The exact nature of the review required by the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard announced in Adam Smith is not clear. At one point,
the opinion states that the standard it announced requires only "the
most rudimentary command of rationality. 25 2 Elsewhere in the opin-
ion, the court explains:
247. Guide to Rules Promulgation Under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act (Nov.
1986 ed.), in A. ENGLAND & L. LEVINSON, supra note 9, at app. E.
248. Id. at 3. The statement is also required by Model Rule 28-3.027, entitled "Rulemaking
Materials." The Model Rule requires that, after publication of notice initiating rulemaking, the
agency make available "[a] detailed written statement justifying the proposed rule .... FLA.
ADnmN. CODE R. 28-3.027(2) (1990).
249. 567 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
250. Id. at 898.
251. Id.
252. Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1273 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989).
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[Imn applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to an agency's
informal rulemaking proceedings, the reviewing court must consider
whether the agency: (1) has considered all relevant factors; (2) has
given actual, good faith consideration to those factors; and (3) has
used reason rather than whim to progress from consideration of
these factors to its final decision.253
Thus, the court's description of the standard is somewhat confusing
because it alternately describes the standard in both deferential and
more searching terms .2 4 The standard is also unclear because Overton
Park is no longer the definitive case on the hard look doctrine in fed-
eral law.
Present day federal law on this point suggests that a considerably
more searching review may be required when this standard is applied
than Adam Smith indicates. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associa-
tion of the United States v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,21-
not cited in Adam Smith, is now the leading example of the hard look
doctrine. 256 State Farm demonstrates how much the arbitrary and ca-
pricious standard has changed since the Pacific States Box decision in
1935.257 The court found that the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review is narrow and, therefore, a court should not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the agency.
Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
"rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made. . . .Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
253. Id.
254. Throughout the opinion, the court alternates between descriptions of the arbitrary and
capricious standard that suggested first the old federal approach (minimum rationality) and then
the new federal approach (hard look) for review of administrative rules. In the end, it is unclear
how hard a look Adam Smith will require.
255. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
256. A. BoNFIELD & M. Asnmow, supra note 42, at 618.
257. "We do not view as equivalent the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislation
drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity afforded an agency in fulfilling its statu-
tory mandate." State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 n.9. "State Farm left unclear the basis for height-
ened scrutiny of administrative decisions." Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,
1987 DuKE L.J. 387, 427 (1987).
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that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise. s
In Adam Smith, the court appears not only to have ignored the
more recent developments in the hard look doctrine, but also to have
been unaware of the weaknesses in that approach. The merits of the
hard look doctrine have been the subject of debate among administra-
tive law scholars. Professor Peter Strauss recently summarized the po-
sitions of some academics on the question of hard look review,2 9
noting that while Professor Richard Stewart supports the approach,
many other academics have expressed reservations: °
Those who are against hard look review believe with Steven Breyer
that it calls on judges to perform a function for which they are not
well suited; or with Martin Shapiro, that review's inevitable tendency
to focus on only a limited number of issues in a complex proceeding
invites a distortion of agency effort and a quite imperfect view of
agency process; or with Shep Melnick, that the programmatic impact
on the agency of hard look review is at best mixed and probably
productive of misallocated resources-too much time spent on too
few rules, excessive effort in a few instances producing under-
regulation (that is, the absence of funds to make any effort) in
others.2'
Even Professor Sunstein, a strong proponent of the hard look re-
view, has candidly recognized the concerns raised by the hard look
approach:
An active judicial posture may be inconsistent with the rationale that
underlay the original creation of administrative agencies, substituting
a politically unaccountable, decentralized, and generalist decision
maker for the relatively specialized, centralized and accountable
administrator. There is, moreover, a danger that an active judicial
stance may result in usurpation of political prerogatives.M
There is also a danger that hard look review may not be uniformly
searching and that the courts may use agency failure to conform with
258. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (citation omitted).
259. Strauss, Considering Political Alternatives to "Hard Look" Review, 1989 DUKE L.J.
538 (1989).
260. Id. at 539-40.
261. Id. at 540 (footnotes omitted).
262. Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and Administrative Law, 7
HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 51, 58 (1984).
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procedural requirements to force reconsideration of agency decisions
with which the courts disagree:
[A]t times one is convinced that, whatever the articulated reason,
there lies at the heart of the [court's] decision a dissatisfaction with
the agency's judgment on the merits, a sense of frustration at being
unable to reverse that judgment directly, and a resulting desire to
compel the agency to observe the highest standards of fair
procedure .... 263
The hard look doctrine has not only been criticized, it may be un-
welcome in some jurisdictions. 2" Professor Bonfield has explained
that the 1981 MSAPA "reflects serious misgivings on the part of its
drafters toward hard look review of discretionary action." 265 The judi-
cial review provisions of the 1981 MSAPA are drafted in a way that
gives state legislatures the option of adopting or rejecting hard look
review. The phrase "otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious"
is bracketed to indicate that it can be omitted by those states wishing
to avoid hard look review. 26 If the 1981 MSAPA drafters' approach
to statutory construction is used to construe the Florida APA, review
of agency rules based upon a hard look or arbitrary and capricious
standard is clearly inappropriate in Florida.
It is unclear where the courts' rebalancing of legislative choices will
lead; there are many possible alternatives. For example, the courts
could return to the intended APA balance by reviving the draw out
and limiting judicial review, as section 120.68 provides. Or, the courts
could reject the hard look doctrine and the additional record require-
ments adopted in Adam Smith and return to the confusion it sought
to resolve. Without additional record requirements or better opportu-
nities to make a record during rulemaking, however, judicial review of
agency rules would necessarily be quite deferential. Finally, the courts
could continue along the course charted in Adam Smith. If that
course is followed, the federal experience suggests that more difficul-
ties lie ahead.
263. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81
H~Av. L. REv. 721, 722-23 (1968).
264. It may be unwelcome because "[tihis standard of review has been improperly used by
some courts to substitute their judgment for that of the agency as to the wisdom or the desirabi-
lity of the latter's action." A. BONFMLD, supra note 52, at 574.
265. A. BONFIEML & M. Asnow, supra note 42, at 623.
266. A. BONFiELD, supra note 52, at 574-75. The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) equivocated with respect to the use of this language in the 1981
MSAPA. Id.
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An empirical study of the federal system for the Administrative
Conference of the United States267 compared reversal rates under def-
erential judicial review and hard look review in the federal system.268
The study found that, contrary to conventional wisdom, judicial re-
view was not more stringent in the mid-1970's, if by "stringent" one
means the propensity of the courts to reverse or remand rather than
affirm. 269 The study suggests that it is not the absolute stringency of
judicial review which translates into reversals and remands, but rather
increasing marginal stringency, and that difficulties arise when courts
change the law when agencies have not yet changed their practices. 20
The study also noted that "[a]lthough the rules are indeed more strin-
gent today, they are also relatively clear and predictable, and agencies
routinely comply with them. The courts have practically gone out of
the business of imposing new procedural requirements on agencies.
Thus, there are fewer occasions today for courts to reverse or re-
mand." ' 271 The federal experience suggests that the change begun by
the Adam Smith decision threatens to create a period of higher rever-
sal rates while agencies adjust to the new regime.
Adjusting to Adam Smith is made more difficult by the many un-
certainties surrounding that approach. It is unclear, for example, ex-
actly what Adam Smith will require272 and to what degree Adam
Smith will be accepted in Florida, since the other district courts and
the supreme court have not yet spoken on the issue. 273 Also, the First
District Court of Appeal has not clearly stated that it has imposed
substantial new rulemaking requirements not found anywhere else in
267. Schuck & Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administra-
tive Law (1990). This study will be published in a forthcoming issue of the Duke Law Journal.
268. Professors Schuck and Elliott found:
In the 1960's, courts routinely upheld agency actions that were accompanied by short,
vague notices in the Federal Register, although these notices were clearly inadequate to
provide meaningful disclosure of the factual basis for the agency's action. No court in
the 1980's would permit an agency to proceed without much more detailed disclosure
of the underlying factual support for the agency's action.
Id. at 13.
269. Id. at 12.
270. Id. at 13.
271. Id.
272. The many developments that followed cases like Overton Park in federal law suggest
that other innovations, not suggested in Adam Smith, may soon follow. For ideas on that sub-
ject, see infra notes 280-99 and accompanying text.
273. In the mean time, it is no secret where dissatisfied individuals will file for judicial review
of agency rules. Under the terms of the APA, the losing party at the administrative level usually
has a choice of appellate districts on judicial review: either the district court of appeal where the
appellant resides or the court of appeal where the agency is headquartered. FLA. STAT. §
120.68(2) (1989). Access to the First District is often available because most state agencies are
headquartered in Tallahassee, which is in the First District.
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Florida law. In fact, in Manasota-88,274 which first applied the new
Adam Smith regime, the court gave the misleading impression that the
Adam Smith standard does not differ from the standard of review in
General Telephone, a much more deferential standard of review that
Adam Smith had clearly modified. 275 As things stand today, a painful
transition appears likely because it will take time for the courts to rec-
ognize that significant change is underway and to decide what new
standards they will require. Agencies will then take additional time to
understand and adapt to those new standards. 276
Another probable result of the Adam Smith decision must be con-
sidered. Adam Smith threatens not only the viability of newly adopted
rules, but also the viability of all previously adopted agency rules.
This threat is significant. Even the model justification statement in-
cluded in the Guide to Rules Promulgation would not withstand the
scrutiny now conducted in the name of arbitrary and capricious re-
view. 2" Therefore, it seems likely that almost every administrative rule
now in force is vulnerable to attack on the basis that it fals to con-
form with the record requirements Adam Smith imposed. 278 As section
120.52(8)(e) makes clear, section 120.56 provides an administrative
remedy for invalidating agency rules that are "arbitrary and capri-
274. Manasota-88, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 567 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
275. Id. at 897. In Manasota-88, the court quoted General Telephone's statement that the
appellate court must sustain the validity of rules adopted by an agency "as long as they are
reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation, and are not arbitrary or capri-
cious. . . ." Id. (quoting General Tel. Co. of Fla. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 446 So. 2d 1063,
1067 (Fla. 1984)). The court then proceeded to explain the requirements of Adam Smith. This
interpretation gives the false impression that the deferential review standard of General Tele-
phone is no different from the much more stringent review sanctioned by Adam Smith.
276. Florida courts should try to avoid a period of increased reversals of agency rules. One
way to do this is to return to the APA's intended approach to making and reviewing rules. But,
even if the courts are unwilling to do that, the Supreme Court of Florida should at least clarify
existing law. It must decide whether it is willing to embrace hard look review, and if so, what it
will require of the agencies. The new record requirements imposed by Adam Smith should simi-
larly be abandoned or confirmed. If accepted, those requirements should be clarified and codi-
fied in the Model Rules. Florida case law provides precedent for convening model rulemaking
proceedings to codify procedural changes suggested by the courts. In Capelletti Bros. v. Depart-
ment of Transportation, 362 So. 2d 346 (H7a. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So. 2d 1374, the
court required a "clear point of entry" to section 120.57 proceedings. Rulemaking was then
convened to add a model rule governing point of entry. See FLA. ADbNu. CODE R. 28-5.111
(1990) ("Point of Entry into Proceedings"). Codifying any additional record requirements im-
posed by the courts would ensure changes are clearly articulated and routinely incorporated in
the rule adoption process.
277. See discussion supra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
278. This resembles the federal experience, where the adoption of additional record require-
ments resulted in the invalidation of existing rules not promulgated in compliance with those
requirements during enforcement proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food
Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the regulation was promulgated
in an arbitrary manner and was, therefore, invalid).
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cious." The Adam Smith and Manasota-88 decisions establish that
rules not complying with the courts' vision of proper record require-
ments are invalid under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. If
DOAH hearing officers apply those cases to existing rules in section
120.56 rule challenge proceedings, they will find that most existing
rules do not conform. Thus, these decisions threaten the viability of
the Florida Administrative Code. It will be particularly difficult to ar-
gue the unfairness of applying the Adam Smith standard retroactively
because the First District seems unwilling to admit a difference exists
between the standards in Adam Smith and General Telephone.
As a result, the Adam Smith approach threatens to create wide-
spread instability, and litigants will undoubtedly take full advantage
of this weakness. The most likely scenario is that every time a rule is
applied, its validity will be simultaneously challenged on this basis.
Mechanically, this will occur through the filing of two administrative
actions: a request for a section 120.57 hearing to challenge the merits
of the agency's action, and a section 120.56 rule challenge to strip the
agency of its rules during the consideration of the merits. The rule
challenge probably will be tried and decided first because section
120.56 provides expedited proceedings in rule challenges, including fi-
nal decisions within seventy days. If the challenged rules have a stan-
dard justification statement, and if the hearing officer follows the
emerging First District case law, it is reasonable to expect the invalida-
tion of most challenged rules. The agency will then be without the
benefit of its rules when it needs them the most: at the time it seeks to
enforce its policies in section 120.57 proceedings. If this occurs, the
agency is at a serious disadvantage, because its rule policy has sud-
denly become nonrule policy. If the agency decides to proceed, it must
carry a heavier burden and prove up the policies that were formerly
incorporated in its rules during the section 120.57 proceedings. 279 The
party opposing the agency in the section 120.57 proceeding gains a
significant advantage because that party will be able to challenge the
factual premises and policy choices of the now nonrule policy.
279. Nonrule policy may be used in section 120.57(1) proceedings, but only under the follow-
ing conditions:
[It] must be established by expert testimony, documentary opinions, or other evidence
appropriate to the nature of the issues involved and the agency must expose and eluci-
date its reasons for its discretionary action .... In other words, an agency may apply
incipient or developing policy in a Section 120.57 administrative hearing provided the
agency explicates, supports and defends such policy with competent, substantial evi-
dence on the record in such proceedings.
Health Care Retirement Corp. of Am., Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 559 So.
2d 665, 667-68 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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V. THE DRAw OUT RECONSIDERED
The Adam Smith case has attempted to balance the desire for effi-
ciency and the need for accountability in the rulemaking process. The
desire to balance these conflicting norms is not unusual because ac-
countability and efficiency form a basic tension that underlies deci-
sions about how the rulemaking process should be conducted. With
too much procedural protection, efficiency suffers; with too little pro-
cedural protection, procedure ceases to be an effective method of
guaranteeing accountability.
It is not at all surprising, therefore, that concerns about accounta-
bility and efficiency are central to decisions about rulemaking proce-
dure and the nature and scope of judicial review; however, it is quite
surprising, given the detailed provisions of the Florida APA and its
historical background, that courts are resolving issues of rulemaking
procedure and judicial review on an ad hoc basis. The Florida APA
strikes a balance between accountability and efficiency. The courts'
job is not to reweigh that balance based upon their own preferences or
concerns, but to adhere to the balance established in the statute. The
danger in ignoring that balance is that premises supporting rules will
not be sufficiently examined and preferences of courts will not be suf-
ficiently restrained.
The Florida APA's balance clearly favors adjudicatory methods in
rulemaking. This preference becomes even clearer when one compares
the Florida act to any other administrative procedure act. The courts
may not like that preference, given their view of rulemaking as quasi-
legislative; nevertheless, they are not permitted to change the balance.
The reasons are obvious: first, it is not their decision to make; the
APA has given the courts a limited role in the administrative process
and courts are not permitted to create new standards of review. Sec-
ond, courts are not as well suited as the Legislature to make such
choices, since the courts cannot provide the clarity and consistency in
this area that a legislative enactment can. The Florida experience dem-
onstrates this problem. In Balino, for example, the court opted for
less formality in the rulemaking process than the statute demanded. In
Adam Smith, it opted for more. The requirements imposed by Adam
Smith are unclear and in some respects problematic.
Why did the courts reject the adjudicatory methods in the APA and
rely instead on court-created requirements that are less efficient and
effective than those required by the APA? There was both motive and
opportunity: the motive was the courts' view of rulemaking as quasi-
legislative; federal law created the opportunity, because it provided a
body of precedent that initially confirmed the courts' intuitive distrust
of adjudicatory methods in rulemaking. Later, after it became clear
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that its approach was too deferential and more accountability in rule-
making was necessary, federal law provided the courts with a ready-
made solution: hard look review. While the parallels between the State
and federal experiences have been noted throughout this Article, they
are worth exploring further.
A. History Repeats
The problems in federal law that the hard look doctrine was created
to solve can be traced to the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp.2  and United States
v. Florida East Coast Railway Co.2u' Prior to those decisions, formal
proceedings were more readily available in federal law.212 These deci-
sions limited the language in statutes, such as the agency's organic act,
that the courts would thereafter view as requiring formal proceedings
in rulemaking.283 Since Congress had used various formulations to de-
scribe the necessary rulemaking procedure, after Florida East Coast
very few statutes contained the precise language the court required to
trigger formal rulemaking. 28 4 This left most rulemaking to the hardly
rigorous statutory requirements of informal rulemaking. 285 Absent
new legislation, 26 and in light of increased informal rulemaking and
280. 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
281. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
282. Indeed, Judge Friendly has suggested that Florida East Coast "signals a large expansion
of what can be done by notice and comment rulemaking and a corresponding retraction of the
area where a trial-type hearing is required in the regulatory field." Friendly, Some Kind of Hear-
ing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1308 (1975).
283. After these cases, the fact that a statute required rules be made "after hearing" was
insufficient to require formal rulemaking pursuant to sections 556 and 557.
284. After Florida East Coast, the words "on the record" became the "touchstone test."
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
285. "The central loss in discarding the adjudicatory model in favor of notice and comment
rulemaking was not cross-examination or oral testimony in particular; rather it was the focused
and defined record which all the procedures used in adjudication were intended to produce."
Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 61 (1975).
286. No government-wide legislation emerged from efforts to reform rulemaking. Breger,
The APA: An Administrative Conference Perspective, 72 VA. L. Rav. 337, 342, 347-48 (1986);
K. DAvis, supra note 50, § 6:9, at 481 ("No statutory change has been made in the APA or in
any other law that cuts across all or most agencies."). However, changes in procedure have been
made in individual statutes. Id. Professor Shapiro has suggested:
The basic reason there is little attention anywhere to amending the [federal] APA is
that most of the administrative law we are interested in preserving or changing is not
in the APA but in subsequent law made by the courts, by Congress in recent statutes
establishing and modifying new agencies and programs, by the agencies themselves,
and by the presidency.
Shapiro, supra note 38, at 480-81.
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adjudication by federal agencies2 7 the courts' concerns about fairness
and accountability during rulemaking drew them into a procedural
void. They responded with a burst of creativity:
They invented a host of procedural requirements that turned
rulemaking into a multiparty paper trial. They also imposed a
rulemaking record requirement that allowed courts to review
minutely every aspect of that trial. They invented a "dialogue"
requirement and a "hard look" requirement that turned the agency
from a legislative rulemaker into a party at its own proceedings.
They converted the "arbitrary and capricious" test specified by the
APA as the standard of judicial review of rulemaking from a lunacy
test into a "clear error" standard that empowers a court to quash a
rule not only when it is crazy but also when the judges simply believe
it is wrong. 2"
Hybrid rulemaking in the federal system arose as a compromise be-
tween two sets of concerns: Florida East Coast expressed the concern
that adjudicatory methods in rulemaking were inefficient; the oppos-
ing concern was that rules would fail to reflect wisdom and truth with-
out adjudicatory methods, such as cross-examination. 289 The
preclusive effect given rules adopted through notice and comment
procedures heightened these concerns. There is real irony in Balino's
use of the "Blocked Space" 290 case as authority for marginalizing the
287. See Scalia, supra note 239, at 377; Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process:
The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CoNEu. L. Ray. 375 (1974) (noting that administrative law
has entered an age of rulemaking).
288. Shapiro, supra note 38, at 462. Davis notes that "the nature of informal rulemaking
procedure under Section 553 has undergone fundamental and extensive changes, brought about
by a combination of congressional legislation and judicial legislation." K. DAvis, supra note 50,
§ 6:9, at 481. While a law professor, Justice Scalia suggested:
[T]he "notice and comment" provision of § 553 has been converted, contrary to its
original intent, into a requirement that the agency disclose in advance the factual data
to be relied upon in rulemaking; and the "statement of basis and purpose" provision
into a requirement that major arguments against a proposed rule be answered.
Scalia, supra note 239, at 394.
289. Professors Pierce, Shapiro, and Verkuil note:
Many lawyers and judges believed, however, that informal notice and comment rule-
making was an unsatisfactory procedure for formulating rules whose wisdom or ne-
cessity was premised on contested facts. To many observers and participants in the
administrative process who were accustomed to the judicial approach to fact-finding,
it was heresy to allow agencies to resolve contested issues of fact without providing
opponents an opportunity to cross-examine the proponents of those facts.
R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, ADmwmTRAmrE LAW AND PRocEss § 6.4.9, at 330
(1985).
290. American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
843 (1966).
1991l
832 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 18:767
draw out. 29' The "Blocked Space" case exemplifies how agencies can
use rulemaking to limit participation by affected persons in decisions
of great importance to them. In addition, dicta in the "Blocked
Space" case foreshadowed the courts' eventual response to that gam-
bit: the development of hybrid rulemaking. 292
The hybrid rulemaking solution that arose as a balance between
these competing concerns ultimately failed to survive Supreme Court
review. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. ,293 the Court rejected the view that the
section governing informal rulemaking "merely establishes lower pro-
cedural bounds" and that a court may routinely require more when a
proposed rule addresses "complex or technical factual issues or 'Is-
sues of Great Public Import."' The Court found that Congress in-
tended that the discretion of the agencies and not that of the courts be
exercised in determining when extra procedural devices should be em-
ployed. 295 The decision created uncertainty concerning the degree to
which it undermined judicial interpretations of informal rulemaking
requirements; 296 however, it was clear that not all of the courts' crea-
tive solutions had been rejected. 291
Florida courts have not learned, the lesson taught by history and are
in the process of repeating it. The Balino case had the same effect in
Florida as the Allegheny-Ludlum and Florida East Coast cases did
upon federal law. Balino, like those federal cases, limited the use of
adjudicatory methods in rulemaking. As a result, rulemaking has be-
291. In the "Blocked Space" case, the Civil Aeronautics Board used rulemaking to amend
existing cargo carriage certificates. This allowed it to dispense with the adjudicatory hearings
that were required by statute whenever existing certificates were being amended.
292. The "Blocked Space" case marked the beginning of the move toward hybrid rulemak-
ing. DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. Rnv. 257,
262 (1979). Dicta in that case, which indicated the court's willingness to create procedural re-
quirements not established by Congress, is cited in later rulemaking cases. See Scalia, supra note
239, at 348-49.
293. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
294. Id. at 545.
295. Id. at 546 (emphasis in original).
296. A. BoNmFw & M. AsIMow, supra note 42, at 318-19 (noting questions raised by deci-
sion).
297. The judicially created requirement of a record for judicial review of informal rulemak-
ing-rulemaking that is by definition not "on the record"-survived Vermont Yankee, because
the Court remanded for a determination of whether the rule was sustainable on the existing
record. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549. Also, Vermont Yankee "retained the requirement
that an agency must sufficiently justify its decisions." Shapiro & Levy, supra note 257, at 421.
"The Court apparently believes that judicial review of informal rulemaking best takes place
exclusively on an administrative record that has been prepared in proceedings over which the
agency concerned has sole control." Gifford, Administrative Rulemaking and Judicial Review:
Some Conceptual Models, 65 Mn¢. L. Rav. 63, 68 (1980).
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come quite informal, and it has therefore become more difficult to
assure accountability during the rulemaking process. Nevertheless,
agencies continue to decide important questions of law and fact in
rulemaking and to give those decisions preclusive effect. This has
given rise to concerns, implicit in Adam Smith, that the Balino ap-
proach fails to adequately guarantee accountability. Adam Smith is an
attempt to strike a different balance between efficiency and accounta-
bility in the rulemaking process, a balance that assures greater ac-
countability.
Thus, the Florida courts' response to judicial marginalization of the
formal process prescribed by statute has resembled the federal courts'
response. Both systems have fashioned additional record requirements
and hard look review. The courts in Florida, however, have not gone
so far as to impose hybrid rulemaking procedures, probably because
of the Florida courts' longstanding aversion to adjudicatory process in
rulemaking.
This judicial imperialism has been tempered to some degree in the
federal courts, 298 but the Supreme Court of Florida has yet to speak
on the latest innovations created by the First District. Even when it
addresses this issue, the cycle may continue. The reduction of proce-
dural protections raises accountability concerns, and judicially im-
posed accountability mechanisms are always subject to attack as being
the judgments of judges. This cycle will continue until either " judi-
cial legislation" like that imposed by Adam Smith becomes accepted
or the courts return to the balance between accountability and effi-
ciency established by the Legislature in the Florida APA.
A return to that balance would not be as difficult in Florida as in
the federal system. The federal act has been treated more like a consti-
tution than a statute because it has been so unresponsive to the chang-
ing conditions of administrative law since the 1940's.299 The Florida
APA, on the other hand, surveyed the landscape in the 1970's, in-
cluded certain innovations, and refused to incorporate others. There-
fore, it is fair to conclude that the statutory innovations it adopted,
and not others that the courts now find useful, should be used in Flor-
ida.
298. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 519.
299. One way to encourage the acceptability of an active judicial role is to argue that the
statute was never meant to provide specifics. See, e.g., Morrison, The Administrative Procedure
Act: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. Rv. 253 (1986) (noting that the APA is more like
a constitution than a statute); Scalia, supra note 239, at 375 ("[tlhe APA as Magna Carta of
Administrative Procedure"). This argument is more difficult to make in Florida because of the
obvious and precise language of the Florida APA.
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B. The Advantages of the Draw Out
The unavailability of the draw out has made protection of substan-
tial interests difficult during rulemakiig. The informality of the rule-
making process, together with the relaxed standards of review
common before Adam Smith, have made it impossible to develop a
record and obtain the precise judicial review required by the act.2°°
Even after Adam Smith signaled a shift toward a more searching form
of judicial review, the affected person's ability to make a record is
questionable: requiring the agency to incorporate explanations in its
rulemaking materials does not give the same level of protection as al-
lowing participants to secure agency explanations through adjudica-
tory process. Whether the explanations stated in the rulemaking
materials are any more reliable than post hoc rationalizations will de-
pend on the agency. While the quality of the explanations provided by
adjudicatory process will also vary, the source of the variance will be
the participants' vigor, rather than the agency's good faith. The Flor-
ida courts' solution thus distinctly disadvantages 01 participants whose
objections to proposed rules are significant, but insufficient for chal-
lenging the rule's validity. °2
Additionally, the Adam Smith requirements have undesirable side
effects not shared by the draw out. The record requirements demand
additional explanations and, therefore, additional paperwork in every
case. 03 The draw out, however, is not invoked in every case, and de-
tailed explanations are not necessary where the draw out is not re-
quested.3°4 Also, the additional paperwork required by Adam Smith is
300. These were rights the drafters sought to secure. Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at
5, 27.
301. Those who can file rule challenges need not accept the agency's explanation about the
choices made and the reasons for those choices. For example, an agency may say in the justifica-
tion statement required by Adam Smith that it gave full consideration to certain facts or policy
considerations. The court may be inclined to accept that statement. Agency discussion of the
issue suggests the agency is aware of the matters involved. In the rule challenge proceedings
authorized by section 120.54(4), challengers need not accept the agency's assurances; they can
demonstrate the agency's lack of familiarity with fact or policy, or its lack of consideration of
either, by examining witnesses and presenting evidence. Evidence speaks louder than assurances.
Thus, if accountability is the concern, as in the Florida APA, an administrative adjudicatory
process is clearly superior to the record requirements imposed by the court.
302. Those grounds are set out in section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
303. Some fear that "the administrative costs of recordkeeping or reason-giving may severely
deplete available resources." Shapiro, supra note 42, at 1502.
304. Of course, the agency must continue to comply with other requirements in the APA,
such as filing a justification statement; however, the justification statement required before
Adam Smith was not particularly demanding. How much explanation will be required in a draw
out depends on the degree to which explanation is required by the participants, and will probably
vary with the vigor of the participants, the skill of their counsel, and the strength of their dis-
pleasure with the proposed rule.
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in some ways more difficult to prepare than a response to a draw out.
In a draw out the participants explain their concerns, and the agency
must respond, not to all possible concerns, but only to the concerns
raised by the participants. The new record requirements created by
Adam Smith demand that the agency not only respond to concerns
raised during rulemaking, but also anticipate the yet unformulated
concerns of reviewing courts. When those concerns, which apparently
include such things as the agency's tentative empirical findings and
experimental and methodological techniques, 05 are first questioned on
judicial review, the agency has long since lost its opportunity to ad-
dress them in a manner acceptable to the courts. This will encourage
agencies to paper the record with explanations to queries that may
never be raised, in order to protect the rule during judicial review106 I
have suggested a proper construction of the Florida APA would pre-
clude direct judicial review of the rule's substance where an adequate
record for review has not been made through the draw out.
The draw out also has the advantage of not undermining the final-
ity of agency rules. The failure to comply with the Adam Smith re-
quirements leaves agency rules vulnerable to an arbitrary and
capricious challenge years after they have become final. The draw out
does not have this effect. If no one requests a draw out, rule adoption
without detailed explanations does not render the rule arbitrary and
capricious. Thus, the act balances protection of substantial interests
with the need for flexibility.
The Adam Smith decision suggests that the courts are losing confi-
dence in deferential review and are struggling to restore accountability
to the rulemaking process. Their concerns about accountability are
valid, but are those concerns more serious where objections to the
proposed rule do not go to its validity and section 120.54(4) challenges
are not available. 307 In such cases, a problem of accountability arises
305. Adam Smith Enterprises, Inc., 308 So. 2d at 1273.
306. The additional record requirements in Adam Smith not only produce unnecessary pa-
perwork when proposed rules are of no interest to affected persons, they also produce unneces-
sary paperwork when substantially affected persons oppose proposed rules on the grounds they
are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. In cases where the proposed rule is
subject to challenge as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to section
120.54(4), the rule challenge remedy provides substantially affected persons with a tool more
powerful than the justification statement: Challengers can require agencies to respond either
through discovery or through the agency's response to the challenger's evidentiary presentation.
A challenger is likely to unearth the factual and policy choices incorporated in a proposed rule
and the reasons supporting those choices during the course of the rule challenge proceeding.
Thus, in cases where rule validity is at issue, the problem of accountability which troubles the
court in Adam Smith is not a matter of great concern.
307. It is important to recognize that cases not involving validity challenges may nevertheless
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because, where the draw out is not permitted, no formal process is
available to challenge the rule and only section 120.54(3) proceedings
are available. Even with a newly invigorated justification statement,
section 120.54(3) proceedings are a poor substitute for formal pro-
ceedings if the goal is to determine the issue of fact and policy the
agency has considered, because the act does not require the agency to
respond to questions during those proceedings.
Although it is too early to determine the effectiveness of hard look
review in protecting substantial interests in Florida, a comparison of
approaches suggests that the draw out can provide significantly more
protection. Take, for example, a case that involves a factual dispute.
The Adam Smith approach tends to submerge factual issues because
there are no required findings of fact and the agency rule is reviewed
under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Thus, the record hampers
the court's ability to understand the underlying factual issues. The
justification statement presents only the agency's untested assertions
concerning the facts, the policy choices, and the reasons for those
choices. The court must then compare those assertions to the evidence
and argument presented in the section 120.54(3) hearing-evidence
not processed in the same way that a draw out would prepare the evi-
dence for judicial review. No findings of fact have been made and,
while the agency may respond to evidence and argument presented in
its justification statement, it need not submit a point-by-point re-
sponse, as required by the draw out. The court is thus disadvantaged;
it must compare untested assertions of the agency with the unpro-
cessed evidence of the appellant.
The draw out permits a more careful examination of factual prem-
ises. Both the participant and the agency may present evidence and
test the others' evidence through cross-examination. They may also
present proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that articu-
late the conclusions they believe are warranted by their presentations.
Usually, an independent hearing officer enters a recommended order
that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law.3°0 If the hearing
need close scrutiny. For example, where objections to a proposed rule point out that the rule
threatens to devastate a regulated person or industry, and the agency does not explain why it has
decided to adopt such a rule, the reviewing court wants to know: Does the agency comprehend
the consequences of its proposed rule? Is such a draconian step really necessary? Without some
assurance in the record that the agency does indeed understand and have good reasons for its
course of action, the reviewing court is understandably hesitant to simply affirm. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977).
.308. A rulemaking participant can submit proposed findings of fact in a draw out, an oppor-
tunity not available in section 120.54(3) proceedings. Florida Canners Ass'n v. Department of
Citrus, 371 So. 2d 503, 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (agency correct in refusing to rule on findings of
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officer's findings favor the individual, and the agency subsequently
rejects the hearing officer's findings, the court can easily determine
whether the record contains competent substantial evidence to support
the agency's choices, since the court will have before it the evidence in
the draw out, the parties' proposed findings, the hearing officer's
findings, and the agency's substituted findings. The approach to judi-
cial review that should be followed in such cases has been clarified:
In determining whether substantial evidence supports the agency's
substituted findings of fact, a reviewing court will naturally accord
greater probative force to the hearing officer's contrary findings
when the question is simply the weight or credibility of testimony by
witnesses, or when the factual issues are otherwise susceptible of
ordinary methods of proof, or when concerning those facts the
agency may not rightfully claim special insight .... At the other end
of the scale, where the ultimate facts are increasingly matters of
opinion and opinions are increasingly infused by policy
considerations for which the agency has special responsibility, a
reviewing court will give correspondingly less weight to the hearing
officer's findings in determining the substantiality of evidence
supporting the agency's substituted findings. °9
The susceptibility of factual issues to ordinary methods of proof
constrains the agency's fact finding, since the court may require the
agency to base its rules on the facts found by the hearing officer.
310
The agency has more prerogatives, however, where factual issues are
infused with policy within the agency's special expertise and the draw
out imposes less of a constraint. As the court noted in McDonald:
fact submitted in section 120.54(3) proceedings), aff'd sub nom. Coca-Cola Co. v. Department
of Citrus, 406 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1981). The broad statement in Florida Canners that "[slection
120.59 does not apply to rulemaking" is incorrect to the extent that it suggests that proposed
findings are not permissible during a draw out. Island Harbor Beach Club, Ltd. v. Department
of Natural Resources, 476 So. 2d 1350, 1351 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ("we do not agree with DNR
that section 120.59 is inapplicable to proposed rule challenge proceedings"). Like the proposed
rule challenge, the draw out is conducted pursuant to section 120.57. The hearing officer's order
must include a ruling on each proposed finding. FLA. STAT. § 120.59(2) (1989). The ruling must
specify which proposed findings are rejected and the basis for the rejection. Island Harbor, 476
So. 2d at 1353.
309. McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
This is applicable to the draw out, as well. Although a draw out occurs during rulemaking, it is
also a section 120.57 proceeding, so both a recommended and final order are entered when a
material issue of fact exists. The recommended order is entered by the hearing officer, and the
final order is entered by the agency before rulemaking resumes. Whether the agency's final order
is reviewable independent of the final rule review is an open question.
310. See, e.g., Tampa Wholesale Liquors, Inc. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & To-
bacco, 376 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (requiring a remand for entry of order consis-
tent with fact findings of hearing officer).
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[D]isplaced findings of [the] hearing officer ... lessen in probative
force as the "facts" blur into opinions and opinions into policies,
and the Department's power to substitute findings based on record
evidence correspondingly increases. But the Department's duty of
exposition also increases. The final order must display the agency's
rationale. It must address countervailing arguments developed in the
record and urged by a hearing officer's recommended findings and
conclusions or by a party's written challenge of agency rationale in
informal proceedings, or by proposed findings submitted to the
agency by a party.3 '
The draw out thus checks agency overreaching by using independ-
ent hearing officers to resolve factual disputes. 12 The limitation on
the power of agencies to find facts during rulemaking also answers a
major concern raised by Judge Williams in his reinterpretation of Bi-
Metallic,"3 that the agency might avoid correction of its factual errors
by recasting them as value judgments. If an agency engages in such
conduct under the Florida APA, the draw out makes its gambit clear.
During the draw out, an agency cannot play its cards close to the vest.
Because the agency is a litigant, it must provide its best evidence and
real reasons or risk adverse findings of fact and conclusions of law in
the hearing officer's recommended order. The process thus permits
the participants to require the agency to articulate the precise factual
and policy bases for the proposed rule so each can be examined or
challenged. If any premise is flawed or unsupported, and the agency
refuses to acknowledge and address the problem, the reviewing court
can be enlisted to force the agency to address the problem.3 14 Any at-
tempt to recast facts as policy choices will be hard to disguise in this
type of regime. Thus, the system permits the participant to harness the
power of fact and logic to protect substantial interests.
Section 120.68 serves as a check on overreaching by the courts; it
limits judicial control over agency policy choice by requiring precise
311. McDonald, 346 So. 2d at 583. Although the quoted material described the agency's
duty to explain nonrule policy in the context of its application to an individual who challenges it,
I suggest that the same requirements should apply with even greater force when the agency's
policy judgments are challenged during the process of making its nonrule policy into a rule.
312. The creation of a group of hearing officers was designed to "improve the fairness of
administrative practice ...." Reporter's Comments, supra note 9, at 22.
313. See discussion supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. Williams discounted the
value of procedural checks on factual errors during rulemaking because "[tjo the extent that the
agency, simply by recasting its value judgment, may achieve its original result despite being
forced to correct its factual errors, the benefits that are supposed to be derived from precision
are vitiated." Williams, supra note 95, at 408.
314. Thus, participants may prevent the agency from supporting the rule on judicial review
with facts and reasons not first subjected to careful examination during rulemaking.
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review of discrete questions. The clear record provided by the draw
out facilitates closer adherence to section 120.68(7), one of the act's
most important checks on judicial overreaching and perhaps the most
neglected provision in the act. Section 120.68(7) commands that each
time a court reviews agency action, it must deal separately with dis-
puted issues of agency procedure, interpretations of law, and determi-
nations of fact or policy within the agency's exercise of delegated
discretion. Judicial review that separately addresses each issue, using
the focused record produced by the draw out, is unlikely to result in
judicial overreaching or a decision based upon the courts' own policy
preferences. In contrast, the "review by epithet" conducted with the
record characteristic in hard look review provides ample cover for the
imposition of judicial preferences during judicial review.
The Florida APA introduced the draw out mechanism to produce
an adequate record for competent substantial evidence review. It has
several advantages over other approaches, such as the review of rules
made through notice and comment rulemaking outlined in the 1981
MSAPA. The 1981 MSAPA provides that a rule or order may be held
invalid when it is:
based on a determination of fact, made or implied by the agency,
that is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in
light of the whole record before the court, which includes the agency
record for judicial review, supplemented by any additional evidence
received by the court under this Act. 315
Thus, the 1981 MSAPA's substantial evidence standard of review for
factual determinations "applies to judicial review of legislative facts
on which a rule rests.131 6 Logistically, this may be accomplished by
permitting the record to be supplemented on judicial review of the
rule;31 7 however, where a bona fide dispute exists over the facts upon
which the rule expressly or impliedly rests, the 1981 MSAPA requires
either the official agency rulemaking record or supplemental submis-
sions to be supported by "substantial evidence. 31
315. 1981 MODEL ACT, supra note 4, § 5-116(c)(7), at 127.
316. A. Bomrniaw, supra note 52, at 576.
317. 1981 MoDEL ACT, supra note 4, § 5-116 (c)(7), at 127. Unless required by other law,
"the agency rule-making record need not constitute the exclusive basis for agency action on that
rule or for judicial review thereof." Id. § 3-112 (c), at 50.
318. A. BomNEuD, supra note 52, at 579. However, the burden of demonstrating rule inva-
lidity is on the appellant, and "an agency need not, as a technical matter, submit to the review-
ing court evidence on the reasonableness of its fact-findings in rule making until those
challenging the rule have made a prima facie case that those fact-findings are unreasonable." Id.
Ultimately, Bonfield finds little difference between the substantial evidence and the arbitrary and
capricious standards since both standards require review for rationality. Id. at 576-77.
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The Florida APA provides, through the draw out, a record that al-
lows the court to conduct a review that is more efficient and precise
than is possible when evidence is initially provided on appeal. The
draw out permits the evidence to be processed and analyzed in specific
ways during the rulemaking proceeding, benefitting both the review-
ing court and the rulemaking agency. As stated in Anheuser Busch,
Inc. v Department of Business Regulations,3 1 9 "the accuracy of every
factual premise and the rationality of every policy choice which is
identifiable and reasonably debatable must be shown by some kind of
evidence undergirding the order which makes that policy choice on
that factual premise. ' ' 320 The agency's factual premises and policy
choices are illuminated by the parties' proposed findings, the rulings
on these findings, the agency's final decision, and its reasons for re-
jecting the hearing officer's findings. Whether or not evidence suffi-
ciently supports the rulings will be clear from a review of the draw out
record. The court need not rely on information that was not first pre-
sented and analyzed by the agency or which is presented to the court
out of context. This process thus compares favorably with the 1981
MSAPA's approach.
C. Is the Draw Out Worth Trying?
The Legislature and drafters of the Florida APA have tried a novel
approach to standard rulemaking concerns, one that blends formality
with uncommon flexibility: the rule adoption process can either in-
volve no participation where no affected person chooses to partici-
pate, making detailed supporting explanations unnecessary, or it can
involve significant formality where facts are in dispute. Whether or
not the draw out approach to rulemaking works, it is clearly a bold
experiment. Unfortunately, after fifteen years of experience under the
APA, we do not know how it is working because it has never really
been tried.
From the beginning, the Florida courts have shown great reluctance
to permit adjudicatory process in rulemaking. Such reluctance has no
basis in the Florida experience because the courts have never permit-
319. 393 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
320. Id. at 1182. At first, these standards may seem inapplicable to the draw out, because
they were announced in connection with nonrule policy in section 120.57 proceedings. However,
they are in fact applicable. A draw out is a section 120.57 proceeding, and the factual and policy
choices the agency is attempting to adopt will bind substantially affected persons in all future
cases. These choices should be subject to no less scrutiny than would be appropriate if they were
being applied to an individual. Any other construction of the draw out remedy does not provide
the participant an "adequate opportunity to protect" his or her substantial interests. FLA. STAT.
§ 120.54(17) (1989).
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ted the draw out to become a regular part of rulemaking procedure.
These fears most likely come from the federal experience; 32' however,
it is not clear how much weight courts should give the federal experi-
ence with formal rulemaking in determining whether adjudicatory
process will work in Florida. There are major differences between the
federal and the Florida experiences. For example, state rulemaking af-
fects fewer people than federal rulemaking, so fewer people may be
interested in participating in rulemaking on the state level than on the
federal level. Also, the flexibility of formal procedure in Florida may
permit agencies to avoid some of the difficulties, such as delay and
confusion, that have occurred in the federal system.32
The concerns fueling the Florida courts' reluctance to permit adju-
dicatory process in rulemaking are most clearly expressed in the Adam
Smith case. In Adam Smith the court recognized that additional meas-
ures are necessary to improve accountability in rulemaking, the court
chose to create additional record requirements and implement hard
look review rather than use the draw out.323 The court's reluctance to
resort to adjudicatory methods was two-part: first, the court was not
convinced that adjudicatory methods were necessary, and second, it
feared that such methods would be counterproductive. Its suggestion
that "[flormalized adjudicatory methods are clearly nonessential for
purposes of rational rulemaking ' 32 indicates that the court did not
believe hard look review and additional record requirements would
cause great difficulties or prove inferior to adjudicatory methods. For
321. "The trial procedures of §§ 556 and 557 are not good for making rules of general appli-
cability. Such is the consensus of judges, legislators, administrators, and practitioners." K.
DAvis, supra note 50, § 6:8, at 475. Davis called the FDA's peanut butter proceeding, which
questioned whether peanut butter should have 87% or 90% peanuts and which lasted from 1959
until a final rule was issued in 1968, "a great educator of the American legal profession." Id.
322. The FDA's peanut butter rule is always used as an example of formal rulemaking fail-
ure. Yet, the agency itself might have been responsible for much of the delay and confusion it
attributes to formal rulemaking. "Perhaps much of the problem with formal rulemaking is the
result of the failure of the agencies to take advantage of the flexibility permitted by the formal
hearing sections of the [federal APA." D. ROTHSCHLD & C. KOCH, FuNDAmNTAuS Os ADmnmS-
TRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 540 (1981). Accord Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation, 16 SAN Dmoo L. REv. 183,
195 (1979) ("To some courts and commentators the application of sections 556 and 557 to gen-
eral rulemaking is anathema. To others, including the present writer, this is a very exaggerated
view." (footnote omitted)).
323. While the court did not expressly consider reviving the draw out, it did give some
thought to the use of adjudicatory methods in the rulemaking process. It rejected the competent,
substantial evidence standard of review because it believed that such a standard on agency rule-
making "would force rulemakers to adopt more formal, rigid, trial-like procedures in an attempt
to make an adequate record capable of judicial review." Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1272 n.16 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
324. id. at 1273 n.19
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the reasons discussed in the previous section, experience with the
Adam Smith approach should provide ample evidence to refute this
view.
The second part of the court's concern questioned the benefits that
adjudicatory methods can offer to improve accountability during rule-
making. The court predicted dire consequences if trial-like procedures
were adopted in rulemaking:
A general paralysis of administration would result, and rulemaking
would lose most of its peculiar advantages as a tool of administrative
policymaking. Trial-like adjudication would be extremely costly in
time, staff, and money. Orderly innovation would be difficult. To
discern basic agency policy, the public would often have to wade
through volumes of scarcely relevant testimony and findings.
Especially in the rapidly expanding realms of economic,
environmental, and energy regulation, the policy disputes are too
sharp, the technological considerations too complex, and the
interests affected too numerous to require agencies to rely on the
ponderous workings of adjudication.121
Will the draw out create these problems if it is permitted to become a
regular part of the rulemaking process? It seems unlikely that the
draw out will obscure agency policy, since that policy will be discerna-
ble from the agency's reasons for rejecting the input it receives. Where
in the record will these reasons be found? When the draw out is gov-
erned by section 120.57(1), they will be found in the agency's pro-
posed findings and in its final order rejecting some or all of the
hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law. When the
draw out is governed by section 120.57(2), they will be found in that
section's required statement of reasons for overruling objections to
the proposed rule. Thus, it will be no more difficult to find agency
policy after a draw out than it will be to find policy in the regime
created by Adam Smith.
325. Id. at 1272 n.16. From the first full sentence to the end, the quoted material is verba-
tim, without citation, from Wright, supra note 287, at 376. The beginning partially quoted sen-
tence has been assembled from material on page 378 of that article. The influence of this article
on the court's decision in Adam Smith should not be underestimated. In it, Judge Skelly Wright
criticized the D.C. Circuit's trend of requiring hybrid rulemaking procedures, but endorsed "a
properly expansive reading" of section 553. Id. at 380-84. The Adam Smith opinion takes a
similar tack, but fails to recognize the differences between federal and Florida law. It is not true
in Florida, as it is in federal law, that the claim "that regulated parties have some 'right' to an
adjudicatory promulgation of general policies merely because these policies affect important in-
terests ... has been decisively rejected." Id. at 377. The draw out was designed to preserve this
right.
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Will routine use of the draw out create costly chaos? Two other
experiences under the act suggest that chaos is not a likely result. The
first is the Florida experience with the proposed rule challenge. For
the past fifteen years, section 120.54(4) has made adjudicatory process
available in rulemaking in the limited situation where a challenge to
the validity of a proposed rule is involved. Although this provision
has injected into rulemaking the trial-like proceedings feared in Adam
Smith, the courts do not seem particularly critical of section 120.54(4)
proceedings. Also, little complaint about such proceedings has ap-
peared elsewhere to suggest that the adjudicatory process injected into
rulemaking by rule challenge remedy has created problems.
At the Seventh Administrative Law Conference celebrated by this
issue of the Law Review, we asked those attending to focus on this
issue in their group sessions. We specifically asked their position on
the following question: "Should a single person who [would] be sub-
stantially affected by a proposed rule if [it] is adopted be able to chal-
lenge the validity of the proposed rule before it is adopted and
becomes effective? Or would it be better to give prefiling review au-
thority to the Attorney General? '26 While some expressed concern
over the possibility that individuals could use such proceedings to de-
lay the adoption of rules and thus gain leverage in negotiations with
the agency over the substance of the proposed rule, very little opposi-
tion to the remedy was expressed, even among agency lawyers. Fur-
thermore, most of the small groups reported satisfaction with section
120.54(4) as it is presently operating.3 27 Of course, opportunities to file
rule challenges are limited, and the draw out would be more available,
if permitted. However, both proceedings involve a similar form of ad-
judicatory process.
Also instructive is Florida's experience with nonrule policy,312 which
suggests that permitting more adjudicatory process during rulemaking
will not significantly reduce the efficiency of the process. It is no se-
cret that Florida courts have experienced problems in securing agency
compliance with the requirement that agencies adopt as rules policy
326. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 45 (Mar. 17, 1990) (remarks of
Stephen Maher).
327. See generally id. at 45-51. In one group, "the agency people thought it was a very good
provision to keep." Id. at 49 (remarks of Arthur England). It was also reported that "an agency
dominated group reached a conclusion that this procedure was important enough or too impor-
tant from the private perspective to be replaced." Id. at 47 (remarks of Prof. Dore).
328. In Florida, agencies may develop policy through adjudication on a case-by-case basis,
but must explicate and defend such policy repeatedly in section 120.57 proceedings when they
choose that mode of policy development. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Indiantown Tel. Sys.,
Inc., 435 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Department of Business Reg-
ulation, 393 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
19911
844 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITYLA WREVIEW [Vol. 18:767
statements of general applicability. 29 The courts began to enforce this
rulemaking requirement by invalidating established policy not prop-
erly adopted as a rule,330 but abandoned this approach because invali-
dating rules on this basis permitted the skill of the litigants, rather
than the merits of the case, to decide the claim. 33' The courts then
decided that the burden of having to prove up the factual and policy
predicates for its nonrule policy in every case where it was applied
would force agencies to promulgate those policies as rules.3 32
The consensus is that this approach has failed to encourage rule-
making;3 33 thus, the underlying assumption that agencies will act to
avoid the burden of repeatedly proving up their nonrule policy has
proven false. This suggests that requiring formal proof of policy and
its factual predicates may not be as burdensome as generally believed.
If requiring agencies to repeatedly prove up their policy, in formal
proceedings through the introduction of evidence and to test that pol-
icy through cross-examination and rebuttal evidence, has not proven
burdensome enough to stop agencies from continuing to use nonrule
policy, then the courts' fears that similar requirements in rulemaking
will make it too burdensome are similarly unfounded.
The court in Adam Smith also raises economic regulation, environ-
mental regulation, and energy regulation as special situations where
policy disputes are too sharp, technological issues too complex, and
interests too numerous for a "ponderous" adjudicatory process. The
sharpness of policy disputes should not prevent the use of the draw
out. The draw out will permit the development of an equally sharp
record for judicial review of issues that divide the agency and substan-
tially affected persons. Sharp disputes are specially benefited by this
329. See Waas, The Nightmare of Nonrule Policy, 56 FLA. B. J. 193 (1982).
330. See Price Wise Buying Group v. Nuzum, 343 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Depart-
ment of Admin. v. Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
331. The similarity between the side effects of this strategy (now abandoned) and the Adam
Smith attempt to enforce accountability during rulemaking by adding record requirements, is
clear. In both cases, the strategy is open to exploitation by skilled practitioners who may use it to
obtain results that reflect their skill as litigators rather than the merits of their client's claim.
332. For judicial accounts of this transition of approach, see Barker v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 428 So. 2d 720, 722-23 (Fla. ist DCA 1983); White Advertising Int'l v. Department
of Transp., 368 So. 2d 411, 413-15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (Ervin, J., concurring and dissenting).
333. This was the consensus at the Seventh Administrative Law Conference. In her remarks,
Professor Dore noted, that "[olver the years participants at the administrative law conference,
but particularly last year's participants, have complained about the fact that in Florida they
think we have a real problem with incipient non-rule policy." Transcript of Seventh Admin. L.
Conference proceedings 126 (Mar. 16, 1990) (remarks of Prof. Dore). Legislation was intro-
duced during the 1990 legislative session to respond to the problem of agencies not promulgating
their policy as rules. Professor Dore discussed these proposals at the Conference, id. at 126-133,
and they were also one subject discussed in the small group sessions.
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process, because all involved-even those who do not prevail-can
take comfort in the fairness of the process that produced the proposed
rule.3
3 4
Complex issues and numerous interests will not make the process
too ponderous. If the agency cannot explain complex issues, perhaps
it does not really understand them. Furthermore, if a large number of
substantially affected persons are so unhappy with a proposed rule
that they are willing to hire lawyers to request and conduct a draw
out, they should be heard. Reasonable limitations can assure that the
presentations are not duplicative and do not go too far afield. A
Model Rule can be adopted on this point if the problem appears seri-
ous. Also, the availability of the DOAH, a group of professional
hearing officers, lessens concern about the logistics of multiple-party
participation.
The more serious problem with the complex multiparty proceedings
feared by the Adam Smith court is that the courts may make the leap
from requiring the agency to respond to each of the parties, to "mak-
ing synoptic demands quite apart from requiring the agencies to re-
spond to all comments." 35 The irony is that Adam Smith's additional
requirements are synoptic, and the draw out is not. The court in
Adam Smith moved towards synoptic demands when it required all
agencies, in connection with every proposed rule, to compile a record
that reflects all of the views and facts considered, and to provide in-
formation, such as the agency's tentative empirical findings, impor-
tant expert advice, and the description of the critical experimental and
methodological techniques on which the agency intends to rely,
334. Acceptability is the third consideration, together with accountability and efficiency, that
should be balanced to achieve fairness in an administrative system. Cramton, supra note 48, at
593. "Acceptability emphasizes the indispensable virtues of procedures that are considered fair
by those whom they affect, as well as by the general public. Usually this translates into meaning-
ful participation in the decisional process." Id. Professor Barry Boyer has noted:
[There is a] pervasive American belief that individuals and organizations have a fun-
damental right to participate in the decision of issues that affect their well-being. Ad-
judication guarantees this right to participate at all important stages of the decisional
process; moreover, because adjudicative decision-making takes place on the public
record and employs a reasoning process of applying principles to facts, the parties
have assurance that their participation will be meaningful. Finally, there seem to be
other intangible values inherent in trial procedures: private litigants may gain satisfac-
tion from having the right to force agencies to come forward and formally justify their
positions ....
Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Ec-
onomic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111, 148 (1972) (footnote omitted).
335. Professor Shapiro defines synoptic decisionmaking as a "process that requires all facts
to be known, all alternative policies to be considered, all values to be identified and placed in an
order of priorities and that then selects the alternative that best achieves the values given the
facts." Shapiro, supra note 38, at 466 n.21.
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whether or not anyone inquired about them.336 Had the court instead
implemented the draw out, it would have required only that the
agency respond to the participants.
Another problem with rulemaking proceedings is that the agency's
rulemaking task may be "polycentric. 331 7 Professor Lon Fuller de-
scribes polycentrism as follows:
We may visualize this kind of situation by thinking of a spider web.
A pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a complicated
pattern throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original pull
will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting
tensions but will rather create a different complicated pattern of
tensions. 338
When dealing with a polycentric task, adjudication may not be well
suited to the task because "forms of adjudication cannot encompass
and take into account the complex repercussions that may result"
from individual changes. 339 There is a danger that the decisionmaker
will respond by reformulating the problem to make it amenable to
adjudicative procedures .3
Concerns over the polycentric nature of rulemaking must, however,
be kept in perspective, since, Fuller adds, "[t]here are polycentric ele-
ments in almost all problems submitted to adjudication ' 3 4' and the
distinction is "often a matter of degree.'4 2 Also, in some circum-
stances adjudicative methods may improve accuracy in a polycentric
controversy, 343 where in others they may not.3"
Other concerns suggested in Adam Smith are more troubling. The
court notes that "[a] rulemaker must typically make and coordinate
many empirical conclusions dependant on raw material outside the
conventional evidentiary categories of 'testimony' and 'exhibits.' For
example, the rulemaker must often draw upon prior experience, ex-
pert advice, the developing technical literature, ongoing experiments,
336. Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1270 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1989).
337. Fuller, supra note 74, at 394.
338. Id. at 395.
339. Id. at 394. Managerial direction has been suggested as a method to solve polycentric
problems. Id. at 398.
340. Id. at 401.
341. Id. at 397.
342. Id.
343. Boyer notes that adjudicative procedures may protect accuracy against undue political
influence in polycentric controversies. Boyer, supra note 334, at 142.
344. Boyer also notes that adjudicative procedures may decrease accuracy when the agency
decision should approach the optimizing model. Id. at 140.
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or seasoned predictions."3 45 In other words, the court questions
whether the picture the rulemaker sees can be captured on the film of
adjudicatory process.31 Proponents of the use of adjudicatory process
in rulemaking assume that it is beneficial because it is truth-finding,
and thus can assure that rules find a firm footing in objective reality.
Is the assumption that adjudicatory methods are able to find truth
correct in this context? 347 Will the draw out that uses a DOAH hearing
officer to find facts do a better job of finding "the truth" than the
agency itself?
The Florida APA's approach to fact finding evidences a strong con-
cern that the agency cannot be trusted to find discernable facts with-
out the presence of an intermediary, such as the DOAH hearing
officer, 348 because the agency may use its fact finding power to sub-
merge policy judgments and thus defeat the act's repeated theme-the
requirement that the agency must explain its exercises of discretion.3 49
In the Legislature's judgment, this paramount concern outweighs the
costs involved, including the agency's loss of independence in fact
finding and the administrative burdens associated with constantly ex-
plaining its decisions.
It may be impossible to reduce the world to a transcript, or to find-
ings of fact, and still preserve the bigger picture. The 1981 MSAPA
approach seems to recognize this, and the MSAPA is willing to sacri-
fice close scrutiny of agency fact finding in rulemaking to preserve the
345. Adam Smith Enters., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Reg., 553 So. 2d 1260, 1273 n.19
(Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
346. Professor Davis uses still another metaphor to describe the facts used in this process:
"Facts that are useful in lawmaking, like chemical elements, often come as a part of a com-
pound or mixture; the facts are often a part of thinking processes or judgment." Davis, supra
note 91, at 935. He also cautions that there are some facts "that cannot be proved or dis-
proved." Id. at 938.
347. Professor Cramton notes that in trial-type hearings, there is a danger that the issues
must be "severely compressed and put in a bipolar form."
Since trial procedure is intricate and specialized, lawyers come to dominate the deci-
sion-making process even though many issues may be non-legal. Moreover, trial pro-
cedures are enormously expensive and often dilatory. Finally, . . . [t]he focus on
"justice in the individual case" does not lend itself to intelligent forward planning, to
rational consideration of major options and alternatives, and to a concern for the
aggregate effects of individualized decisions.
Cramton, supra note 48, at 590.
348. The 1981 MSAPA has taken a different approach: "[R]eviewing courts may not substi-
tute their judgments de novo for those of the agencies with respect to the existence of the facts
necessary to legitimate particular rules. Agencies are normally delegated authority to find those
facts based on an exercise of discretion." A. BONFIELD, supra note 52, at 582-83. Thus, the 1981
MSAPA does not restrict agency determination of the facts upon which the proposed rule is
based, and it limits the ability of courts to review those factual determinations.
349. See McDonald v. Department of Banking & Fin., 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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agencies' freedom to see the world their own way without "assis-
tance" from independent fact finders or reviewing judges. The
MSAPA may be less fair to persons whose substantial interests are
affected by the proposed rule, but better suited to protect the
"hunch."
Can agency hunches survive a draw out? Will the process wring out
the agency knowledge and expertise that intuition may represent? Cer-
tainly, the draw out is not designed to remove the hunch from rule-
making,5 0 but rather, to investigate the hunch, to find out about the
experience and understanding it may represent, and to discover if the
agency is within the proper domain of hunches. It exposes weaknesses
in the hunch that the policy maker may not even have realized existed
until the investigation was made. Thus, while it is not the ideal envi-
ronment for intuition, the draw out may not destroy it. We will not
know for sure until we give the draw out a real chance.
D. Should the Draw Out Be Modified?
The weakness in the draw out approach may be that the premise
upon which the mechanism itself is based-that adjudicatory process
should be equally available whether the proceeding is denominated a
rulemaking or an adjudication-is flawed. Requiring the agency to ex-
plain and defend its factual premises and policy choices during rule-
making may not produce better decisions. The rulemaker may not be
able to work effectively without the power to find its own facts. But
the draw out is a legislative choice that must either be accepted or
changed. It is hard to understand the cavalier disregard for legislative
judgment that has thus far been shown. Nevertheless, opposition to
the draw out has been strong. Should the statute be changed? I sug-
gest that the draw out should be tried in its present form because po-
tential modifications do not look promising.
Of course, the draw out could be modified in ways that would make
it more acceptable to the courts, and in fact, the courts have already
begun that process. Taking the court's lead, the Legislature could
change the provision from its current absolute form, which guarantees
a participation opportunity for all whose substantial interests are af-
350. Safeguards in the draw out process may help prevent loss of the hunch's essence. Agen-
cies still retain their power over policy choice. They are required to explain their choice, but even
Adam Smith acknowledges that there is a need for explanation. Adjudicatory administrative
process does not have all the distorting characteristics of a trial where the rules of evidence are
strictly enforced. Evidence inadmissible in civil courts but "of a type commonly relied upon by
reasonably prudent persons," is admissible in administrative hearings. Benton & Pfeiffer, supra
note 68, at 4-19 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 120.58(l)(a) (1989)).
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fected, to a form guaranteeing such an opportunity only in certain
circumstances. The nature of the opportunity provided could also be
made more flexible. For example, the statute might reject the concept
of one draw out procedure for all agencies, and instead require proce-
dural protections on either an agency-by-agency or case-by-case basis.
The Legislature could limit the required protections to those that the
participant can demonstrate are necessary, rather than the full 120.57
protections now guaranteed. This approach would benefit from a
guiding principle, which could be used by participants, agencies, and
courts to determine when adjudicatory methods will be required and
which protections will be required. Such a principle might state: "An
agency should engage in formal factfinding when, regardless of the
role it is playing, the need for factual accuracy outweighs other con-
siderations and trial-type procedures will effectively decrease uncer-
tainty."3'
While these modifications will alleviate concerns about the rigidity
of the draw out approach, 3 2 problems do exist with these modifica-
tions. Opinions will strongly differ, for example, on various ques-
tions, such as when adjudicatory procedures can increase accuracy,
how much they will decrease efficiency, and how necessary they are to
preserving the acceptability of agency decisions. The courts' views on
these questions will prove dispositive, and given the courts' longstand-
ing hostility to adjudicatory process in rulemaking, a more flexible
statutory substitute for the draw out provision would probably rarely
result in adjudicatory process. 3  Some of the same concerns discussed
351. McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Sci-
ence Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729, 775
(1979). Professor McGarity calls this a "newly developing 'functional approach."' Id. Judge
Leventhal also favored a functional inquiry which asked what procedures are necessary for rea-
soned decisionmaking and effective participation. Estreicher, supra note 102, at 909-10.
352. "Rigidity" describes the fact that the draw out is now (theoretically, at least) available
to resolve factual and policy disputes, whether or not the rigorous procedures would bring "net"
benefits to the process. In other words, the inefficiencies that the draw out may bring to the
process through delay and resource expenditure may not be outweighed, in the agency's or the
court's mind, by the contributions it makes to the accuracy of decisions incorporated in the rule.
I suggest that the draw out is not concerned with net benefits because it exists to protect the
rights of the participant. Similarly, the public interest is protected, not by agency denial of
process, but by agency participation in the process.
353. For example, if it were ultimately decided under such general guidelines that adjudica-
tory procedures were only required where adjudicatory facts were involved, the process would
add little to rulemaking procedure. Similarly, if showings were required to obtain additional
procedures that were difficult to meet, the remedy might rarely be used. For example, if those
who sought adjudicatory process were required to demonstrate 1) the benefit to accuracy the
procedure would provide; 2) the cost to efficiency; 3) the increase in the decision's acceptability;
and 4) the particular procedures needed and how each would be used (perhaps, as the Florida
courts now require, the particulars of a proposed examination) it is unlikely many who sought
additional procedures would ever survive the preliminary inquiry.
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in hard look review are also troubling in this context, since courts may
use the failure to provide additional protections as grounds for revers-
ing decisions with which they disagree.
Much of the benefit of the draw out will be lost under a flexible
approach. One strength of the present procedure is that one can deter-
mine, with certainty, when the draw out will be available: It is availa-
ble any time a rule will preclusively determine fact and policy
questions. The statute also provides certainty in the available proce-
dures if the request is granted. It not only guarantees important pro-
tections that might not be specifically demanded, such as an
independent hearing officer and a ban on ex parte contacts, but also
develops an adequate record for substantial evidence review. A more
flexible system for providing adjudicatory process may not provide an
ideal record for such judicial review. Since a shift to a more flexible
approach will sacrifice benefits that the strict procedure of the draw
out makes possible, the draw out should not be tried in modified
form.
VI. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN THE 1990's
The rulemaking and judicial review provisions of the Florida APA
were a bold experiment, never before attempted in Florida or in any
other jurisdiction. Professor Dore asked at the Seventh Administra-
tive Law Conference whether the draw out is "an innovation whose
time has not yet come?13 4 Unfortunately, its time may have already
come and gone, without its having ever been tried. Florida law in this
area has gone so far afield the courts may now be unable to change
direction. If the courts do not act, then the Legislature should inter-
vene.
Rulemaking under the Florida APA has been reshaped by judicial
usurpation of the prerogatives of others. The Legislature authorized
those whose substantial interests would be affected by proposed rules
to bring the power of facts and logic to bear on agency choices made
during rulemaking. The courts have essentially withdrawn this prerog-
ative from rulemaking participants by marginalizing the draw out.
The First District, through its decision in Adam Smith, has now
placed the responsibility for documenting those choices on the agency,
and the power for reviewing those choices in the courts. Similarly, the
courts have expropriated the Legislature's required justification state-
ment that facilitates JAPC legislative review of proposed rules and
354. Transcript of Seventh Admin. L. Conf. proceedings 136 (Mar. 16, 1990) (remarks of
Prof. Dore).
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have revised it to facilitate closer judicial review of rules. The courts
have ignored the Legislature's explicit limitations on the nature and
scope of judicial review, and instead have adopted a standard of re-
view which makes it easier for courts to substitute their judgment for
the agency's on matters of discretion. In short, judges are substituting
their own judgments for the statutory mechanisms designed to assure
accountability in administrative rulemaking.
Flaws in the legislative scheme did not necessitate this shift. The
courts have not been forced to step in because the public has been
shut out. Concerns about differential access to agency proceedings are
logical in any system which relies heavily on participation by affected
persons to shape agency policy. However, the .APA experience of the
last fifteen years would surprise those who expected exclusion of indi-
viduals from the process due to inadequate resources, lack of organi-
zation, or too little political power. For example, prisoners have been
perhaps too successful in using the APA's rulemaking provisions to
shape corrections policy.3" The poor have also used the rulemaking
provisions of the APA to shape welfare policy, 3 6 medicaid policy,35 7
and policy in the area of unemployment insurance. 358
The problem of differential access remains serious despite these ef-
forts, not because these groups failed to take advantage of the oppor-
tunity provided, but because the courts have taken affirmative steps to
limit the ability of politically less powerful groups to participate in the
process. Department of Offender Rehabilitation v. Jerry359 marked an
early turning point in the law in this area, by establishing access re-
quirements that pose a significant obstacle to participation in formal
proceedings, such as the rule challenge and the draw out. Although
355. The strongest testament to this success was the decision to amend the APA to limit the
participation of prisoners in some of the remedies provided by the act. Ch. 83-78, 1983 Fla.
Laws 257.
356. See, e.g., Amos v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 444 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA
1983) ("policy clearance" was invalid rule); Woodley v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs.,
505 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (agency rule read to require reversal and remand).
357. See, e.g., Balino v. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 348 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1977) (requiring department to amend its rules); Farmworker Rights Organization, Inc. v.
Department of Health & Rehab. Servs., 430 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (rules establishing
certificate of need criteria held invalid as they did not explicitly contain any criterion dealing
with access of low-income and minority groups services); Kearse v. Department of Health &
Rehab. Servs., 474 So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (portions of proposed administrative rule
requiring prior authorization for reimbursement of medically necessary services held invalid).
358. See, e.g., Guerra v. Department of Labor & Employ. Sec., 427 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1983) (requiring department to amend its rules); Cotilla v. Department of Labor & Em-
ploy. Security, I Fla. Admin. L. Rep. 1026 (1979) (invalidating Department's subpoena rule).
359. 353 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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the supreme court has modified Jerry to some extent,36° the fact re-
mains that courts have construed the APA provisions governing ac-
cess to formal process in a way which makes it more difficult for
affected persons to protect their substantial interests.3 6l Not surpris-
ingly, this barrier has also been grounded in inapposite federal case
law.3 62
Thus, concerns about differential access have proven significant,
not because the politically powerless lack the interest or resources, but
because their participation has been thwarted by a concerted effort to
make the system less responsive to those interests. This trend is unac-
ceptable because the statute relies on such participation to guarantee
fairness. When participation is prevented, the system fails.3 63
The APA as now interpreted by the courts fails to guarantee equal
access to its procedural protections, fails to permit those who have
access to its procedural protections to make a record capable of judi-
cial review, fails to allow those with access to protect their substantial
interests during rulemaking, fails to prevent judges from substituting
their judgment for that of the Legislature concerning procedures agen-
cies should use during rulemaking, and fails to prevent judges from
substituting their judgment for that of the agency on the discretionary
agency decisions incorporated in the rules emerging from rulemaking.
Thus, as it is presently construed, the APA has failed to accomplish
its basic mission in this area. If these problems cannot be remedied by
the courts-and it appears unlikely at this point that they can-then
the Legislature must intervene.
The Legislature can decide to continue this experiment, which I be-
lieve still holds promise. But if it does, it must amend the act to sweep
aside much existing case law. In addition, it must take measures to
protect against future encroachments on its prerogatives. It must de-
fine with greater clarity the attributes of those who can participate in
administrative proceedings, and it must more clearly define how those
proceedings will operate. The Legislature, of course, has other op-
360. Florida Home Builders Ass'n v. Department of Labor & Employ. Sec., 412 So. 2d 351
(Fla. 1982). For an extended discussion of Jerry and Florida Home Builders, see Dore, supra
note 49, at 968-974.
361. See Dore, supra note 49.
362. Professor Dore notes that the Florida courts' reliance on federal case law to develop
standing requirements in the administrative context is inappropriate because federal law is dis-
similar. Id. at 969.
363. When politically less powerful groups are excluded from the protections of the act or
denied standing, the discretionary judgments made by the agency are permitted to go unchal-
lenged: "Proponents of restrictive standing respond that [these individuals) can always take their
complaints to the political system, but that system often ignores such complaints." Shapiro &
Glicksman, supra note 131, at 886 (footnotes omitted).
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tions. It may choose to give up on the present innovative scheme and
enact a completely new statute. Professor Bonfield proposes such an
approach in this Symposium issue.

